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5ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the Brenta footwear industrial district in North-eastern Italy (800 
firms, 15,000 workers, total sales of 1.5 billion Euros).
Brenta is considered as a test case to assess the relevance today of the industrial 
district model. In doing so, particular attention is devoted to some aspects usually 
neglected by the specialised literature: self-help organisations, unionisation, politics 
and the public authorities, interaction among local actors.
The Introduction underlines Brenta* s path-dependent development and introduces the 
concept of “innovative conservatism**.
Chapter I discusses Brenta’s relevance as a case study in the reassessment of the 
Italianate version of industrial districts.
Chapter II provides an historical outline from the establishment of the first 
mechanised enterprise (1898).
Chapter HI discusses the respective roles of the main local actors. Entrepreneurs’ 
associations were quite successful over the years but were never able to surmount 
Brenta’s structural weaknesses (in particular its disproportionate emphasis on 
manufacture at the expense of other activities including marketing). Trade unions 
contributed largely to the shaping of the area, although unionisation was mainly an 
outside-driven development. Brenta’s mixed political affiliation resulted in the novel 
co-existence of “red” (Communist) and “white” (Christian Democrat) cultures, 
which offers an interesting example of “civic capital” a la Putnam.
Chapter IV analyses the work of the Brenta Training Centre (1923) as an area for co­
operation among the above-mentioned actors.
6The Conclusion emphasises that Brenta represents a study in contrasts. It remains a 
conservative area, lagging behind in particular in technological innovation. It has 
however come closer and closer to the industrial district model, especially through its 
complex network of institutions drawing upon its “civic capital”. Brenta offers a 
contribution to the current debate about industrial districts and the ongoing 
reassessment of the “social embeddedness perspective”, providing a middle ground 
between the enthusiasm of the 1980s and the growing pessimism of recent years.
7INTRODUCTION
Along the banks of the Brenta Canal
The Riviera del Brenta footwear industry began in 1898, with the local firm 
system gradually evolving into a full-fledged industrial district and still prospering 
today. In 2004 Brenta employed some 15,000 workers, with approximately 800 
enterprises and a handful of self-help organisations. In 2003, total sales amounted to 
1.5 billion euros, with exports representing more than 90% of production, accounting 
for 5% of total employment in the Italian footwear industry and generating 10% of 
total footwear sales in Italy. Active and capable local entrepreneurs, who were also 
able to draw significant competitive advantages from the specific genius loci, played 
a pivotal role in the development of this industry.
Geographically, Riviera del Brenta is a strip of land stretching for some 35 
km from Padua to Venice along a branch of the river Brenta and is home to some 
60,000 inhabitants. On its banks are a number of small towns (Stra\ Fiesso, Dolo, 
Mira, Oriago), whose origins reach back to the 12th century. They subsequently 
became fashionable holiday resorts for the Venetian aristocracy who built around 
100 summer residences between the 16th and 17th centuries. This was a powerful 
factor in the emergence of Brenta* s specific brand of social and cultural environment 
~  partly urban, partly rural ~ which in turn prompted the consolidation of a local 
collective identity. In this regard, Brenta confirms “the power of the past”: It shows 
“a sort of path-dependent development that has included not only economic but also 
political and social arrangements”, which in turn have affected to some extent not
8only its organisation and technological level but also the mentality and the 
institutions of its entrepreneurs.1
The Brenta footwear industry, launched with the establishment of the first 
mechanised factory in 1898, progressively developed into a cluster of small- and 
medium-sized companies featuring a number of elements included in the industrial 
district model (in particular a number of small- and medium-sized firms specialised 
in the same production, inter-firm co-operation, back- and forward linkages, 
institutions providing common services, local mechanisms for knowledge 
transmission, shared values based on mutual trust and reduced transaction costs). 
Brenta is located within the “Third Italy”, which is customarily defined as 
comprising seven regions of central and north-eastern Italy. Third Italy’s economy is 
largely, although not exclusively, based on small enterprises and is distinct from both 
the “industrial triangle” in the northwest and the still largely agricultural south.
Consequently, Brenta is often referred to as a typical industrial district 
corresponding to Becattini’s classical definition as “a social and territorial entity 
characterised by the active presence, in a circumscribed area - fixed by nature and 
historical heritage -  of a community of individuals and a population of industrial 
enterprises” . At the same time, however, some key aspects of Brenta’s economic 
system and its economic development diverge from the stylised industrial district 
model, in particular in its “Italianate” version which emphasises the social and 
political dimensions rather than the role of firms and entrepreneurs.3 This thesis 
devotes special attention to these deviations.
1 Margarita Dritsas and Terry Gourvish (eds.), European Enterprise: Strategies o f Adaptation and 
Renewal in the Twentieth Century, Athens, 1997, p. 14.
2 Andrea Colli, Networking the Market: Evidence and Conjectures from the History of the Italian 
Industrial Districts, in W. Feldenkirchen and Terry Gourvish (eds.), European Yearbook o f Business 
History, Vol. 1,1998, p. 75.
3 Writers have devoted considerable attention to the definition of industrial districts and provided lists 
of their constitutive elements. In doing so, most of them explicitly built upon the classical work of 
Alfred Marshall, who first introduced this concept in Principles o f Economics, 1890, reprinted in
9In fact, Brenta as a case study confirms the interest of the recent shift in the 
literature from the “Italianate” emphasis to what Wilson and Popp term “social 
embeddedness perspective” and towards the more specifically economic aspects of 
local systems.4 In this context, entrepreneurs are the key actors, and the ultimate 
responsibility for success or failure depends upon them. The social and cultural 
context and other actors, individual and collective, play a useful supporting role. This 
is a significant shift away from the quasi-identification of the industrial district 
model with a stylised narration of north and central Italian local systems centred on 
social, cultural and collective elements, and is a move towards a more open model, 
encompassing a number of different cases from different countries. Brenta economic 
history, precisely for being in many respects a typical successful Italian district, can 
be a useful test case for assessing the validity of this approach.
London 1920, 8th edition. On Marshall’s contribution to the industrial district model, see in particular 
Andrew Popp, Business Structure, Business Culture and the Industrial District. The Potteries, c. 
1850-1914, Aldershot/UK, 2001, p. 13-23. The lists of industrial district components proposed by 
Schmitz and Rabellotti respectively are of some interest since both are also based on the analysis of 
footwear areas (in Rabellotti’s case, including Brenta). Hubert Schmitz, Small Shoemakers and 
Fordist Giants: Tale of a Super Cluster, World Development, January 1995, 9-28, identifies the 
geographical and sectoral concentration of companies; predominance of small- and medium-sized 
companies; vertical disintegration at the company level; co-operative competition; a socio-cultural 
identity which facilitates trust, active self-help organisation. Roberta Rabellotti, ibid., 29-42, 
regroups the same concepts into four main factors: clusters of mainly small- and medium-sized 
enterprises spatially concentrated and sectorally specialised; a set of forward and backward linkages, 
based on market and non-market exchanges of goods, information and people; a common cultural and 
social background linking economic agents and creating a behavioural code, sometimes explicit but 
often implicit; a network of public and private local institutions supporting the economic agents acting 
within the cluster. Some writers underline that in order for a cluster of firms to turn into a successful 
industrial district, however, the simple co-existence of specific constitutive elements (in particular 
sector and geographical concentration, which are the really indispensable prerequisites) must be 
integrated into a number of subsequent, dynamic developments involving the way in which each 
component interacts with the others. Hubert Schmitz, Small shoemakers..., quote., 10-1, mentions for 
example “... the division of labour and specialisation among firms; the provision of their specialised 
products and services at short notice and great speed; the emergence of suppliers who provide raw 
materials and components; the growth of suppliers who provide new or second-hand machinery and 
spare parts; the emergence of agents who sell to distant national and international markets; the growth 
of specialised producer services in technical, financial and accounting matters; and the formation of 
associations providing services and lobbying for its members”.
4 John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp, Industrial Clusters and Regional Business Networks in England, 
1750-1970, Aldershot/UK, 2003, p. 11.
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Brenta has a number of characteristics which do not fit easily in the stylised 
Italianate industrial district model. These include the lack of a single, unified 
political culture; a comparatively high level of commuters from outside the district, 
who share little or nothing of the alleged specifically local common values and 
traditions; an only partial geographical overlap of the historic Riviera del Brenta with 
the industrial district which bears the same name; often troubled relations between 
the entrepreneurs and trade unions, the latter being led by managerial and political 
staff from outside the district; at times high birth and mortality rates of firms, which 
resulted in an erosion of trust. At the same time, however, Brenta was successful in 
establishing a range of common services and institutions, including a vibrant 
entrepreneurial association and one of the oldest Italian training centres in this field; 
developing a co-operative relationship between entrepreneurs and labour; entering 
into a permanent dialogue with local authorities; and forging some collective 
identity. All this has evolved into a rather complex, mutually supporting interaction 
among the various local actors and the institutions which represent their views. And 
yet, the often cited high degree of institutionalisation achieved by Brenta seems to 
reflect more “fragmented, fragile and situational coalitions of interests, identities and 
values” rather than the embodiment of a collective social organisation.5
The value of Brenta as a test case should be assessed in comparison with 
other industrial districts, including those located outside the Third Italy, which in 
recent years have attracted the growing attention of writers. After all, the roots of the 
industrial district model are to be found outside Italy. Not only were the cases 
analysed by Alfred Marshall British, but none of the industrial districts mentioned in 
Sabel and Piore’s seminal work as evidence of the survival of craft production during
5 Andrew Popp, Business Structure, Business Culture and the Industrial District. The Potteries, c. 
1850-1914, Aldershot/UK, 2001, p. 10.
the heyday of mass production in the 19th century were Italian.6 Special attention 
should therefore be devoted to research on specific cases which question the general 
validity of the Italianate version of the industrial district model, including some 
English districts only recently rediscovered.
In his investigation into the manufacture of pottery located in North 
Staffordshire, Popp underlines several features which do apply equally as well to 
Brenta, apart from distance in space and time: extensive rather than intensive growth; 
insistence on product rather than on process innovation; multiplication of firms; 
prevalence of personal capitalism; the institutionalisation of associationist impulses 
both within and among labour and capital; the emergence of a powerful collective 
reputation; micro-localisation within the district; developments prompted by threats 
from foreign industries; response to these through a deeper commitment to 
established patterns of development even under rapidly altering conditions; 
comparatively hesitant mechanisation; the struggle of a few larger firms swamped by 
waves of small start-ups.
Also in Birmingham’s jewellery district, described by Camevali, “the whole 
combination of craft and skills and machinery allowed the production of both high- 
quality and affordable pieces”; but again, as in Brenta, Birmingham’s history “... was 
not one of constant growth but rather one of adaptation to changes in demand”, with 
the lowering of entry barriers as a result of the low capital outlay involved in setting 
up a small trade. The lynchpin of the system was the presence of several independent 
workers, from unskilled to masters. Most jewellery makers remained small, to the 
extent that entrepreneurs employing 30 to 40 people could be considered large
6 Sabel and Piore mention a number of “the most famous industrial districts of the 19th century”, 
including silks in Lyon, ribbon, hardware and specialty steel in Saint-Etienne, edge tools, cutlery and 
specialty steel in Solingen and Sheffield, calicoes in Alsace, wollen and cotton textiles in Roubaix, 
cotton goods in Philadelphia and Pawtucket: Charles F. Sabel and Michael J. Piore, The Second 
Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity, New York 1984, p. 28.
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enterprises. Flexibility was achieved by using independent workers. British laws 
(such as the Lower Standard Act, which in 1854 legalised the manufacturing of 9-, 
12- and 15-carat gold) played a significant role, and were comparable to Italian 
employment laws, which prompted the fragmentation of larger firms and the 
proliferation of small firms in 20th century Italy.7 A local training centre, the 
Birmingham School of Jewellery and Silversmith, was established as early as 1890, 
and played a role comparable, in some regards, to that played by the Brenta Training 
Centre established in 1923. Another interesting similarity is the nearly total lack of 
mobility.8
Comparisons can be drawn between Brenta and English districts with regard 
to the social and collective aspects put into perspective by the new turn in English 
business history. Popp and Camevali again provide ample accounts of associations in 
the Potteries in the second half of the 19th century and in Birmingham in the 20th 
century respectively. Evaluations of the effectiveness and results of the associations 
may vary significantly. Popp notes that "... active co-operation was extremely 
difficult to achieve in the Potteries”, this confirming the lack of a local, shared sense 
of collective mission.9 Camevali on the other hand underlines a “... dynamic 
institutional environment involving the City Council, the Jewellery School and the 
Jewellers’ Association, and which in previous years was also instrumental in 
promoting trust by controlling rogue wholesalers.10 In this light, Brenta’s economic 
history should be assessed with equal attention to its entrepreneurial aspects as well 
as to its social and political dimensions.
7 Laws can indeed have major effects on economic developments: see for instance the british Beer Act 
of 1830, as a consequence of which the centuries-old (beer) industry was dramatically shaken up“: 
T.R. Gourvish and R.G. Wilson, The British Brewing Industry 1830-1980, Cambridge 1994, p. 3.
8 Francesca Camevali, Golden Opportunities: Jewelry Making in Birmingham between Mass 
Production and Specialty, Enterprise and Society, Volume 4, Number 2/June 2003, 275-79.
9 Andrew Popp, Business Structure..., quote., p. 259.
10 Francesca Camevali, Golden Opportunities..., quot., p. 279-280.
The historic core of the Brenta industrial district, ever since the establishment 
of the first mechanised enterprise in 1898, has been located in the western section of 
the Riviera (from Stra’ to Dolo through Fiesso) and subsequently expanded towards 
some urban communes closer to Padua (Noventa Padovana, Vigonza) as well as 
some rural communes south of the river (Camponogara, Fosso’, Campagna Lupia). 
The economic development of the eastern section (from Dolo to Oriago through 
Mira) in the 20th century was shaped by comparatively large heavy industries 
(chemicals in Mira, chemicals, naval dockyards, oil refineries in Porto Marghera).
The availability of labour, unionisation, commuting and related social 
problems, the role of politics and the emergence of formal associations were all 
influenced by the propinquity of these two intrinsically different local economic 
systems, although both were originally embedded in the same local context and 
culture.
At first glance, Brenta’s economic history may be puzzling. It has produced 
shoes, only shoes (most of which were ladies leather shoes of middle to high-quality) 
for more than ten decades, focusing successfully on what it does best 
(manufacturing) but neglecting to a large extent other non-production related aspects 
(brand development, marketing). In the “golden age” of the Italian districts (the 
1980s and the early 1990s), Brenta also showed design capabilities; at the turn of the 
21st century, however, Brenta was again concentrating increasingly on its core 
competence - “pure” manufacturing.
At the same time, Brenta has evolved. While exports were virtually non­
existent until the Second World War, Brenta exported more than 90% of its 
production by 2003. Shoes were initially produced by a number of small artisan 
workshops, and later by a comparatively large and advanced enterprise surrounded 
by a cluster of smaller firms and workshops. From the early 1950s, Brenta went
14
through a phase of vertical integration leading to the establishment of several 
medium-sized enterprises employing more than 100 workers each; it underwent a 
subsequent phase of de-verticalisation with a significant reduction in the average size 
of firms and increased inter-firm co-operation; attempted, with mixed results, the 
outsourcing abroad of some manufacturing phases. Relations among local actors, 
initially conducted in an informal way on the basis of widespread mutual trust, took 
place later within some formal local organisations. Competition, originally based on 
cost (with cost reduction strategies centred on low wages) shifted its focus to quality. 
Relations between entrepreneurs and labour, at times rather confrontational in the 
1950s and 1960s, became more co-operative. The political context changed from the 
comparatively well-rooted and active Fascist organisations of the first post-war 
period to the ideological and political competition between two mass-based parties in 
the second post-war period, which in turn collapsed at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Exports grew within a stable international currency system until the early 1970s, then 
were exposed to the uncertainties of continuous fluctuations in the lira exchange rate 
until the introduction of the euro in 1999 brought about a new phase of monetary 
stability.
The issue of Brenta’s specific, original balance between conservation and innovation 
will be discussed in depth in this thesis, since it can provide some contribution to the 
ongoing reassessment of the industrial district model from a “thick” to a “thin” 
version.11 A “thin” industrial district (i.e. based on sectoral and unstable 
convergences of interests of individual entrepreneurs) is likely not to function in the 
same way as the “thick” canonical district (in which co-operation is socially and 
historically embedded and therefore likely to be more resilient). It has been shown 
that some key elements of the idealised version may either lack or be confined to an
ancillary role. For instance, Popp’s analysis of Widnes and Camevali’s research on 
Birmingham jewellery both question the role of trust as a “natural” element of 
industrial districts.12 “If trust does not follow on automatically from clustering”, 
Popp notes, “other attributes of industrial districts, including their resilience and their 
flexibility, may also require further evaluation”.13 In this context, it is legitimate to 
assume that not all districts are necessarily innovative.
My research confirms precisely Brenta’s limited capability (or interest) to innovate, 
and underlines its very strong commitment to existing structures and procedures, a 
remarkable path-dependency, hyper-specialisation in a very limited number of core 
functions, and limited changes in its fundamental structures for over half a century. 
From this perspective, Brenta is an interesting case study, since an important element 
of the industrial district model is the balance between the two opposite forces of 
conservation and innovation. Both have been abundantly investigated by the 
literature, but in such a way that they are made to appear more compatible than they 
really are. The path-dependency of industrial district and their roots in traditional 
skills, long-lasting social structures and common historic heritage have been 
commonplace since Piore and Sabel’s seminal work. For instance, Some of Jonathan 
Zeitlin’s remarks are a hymn to continuity: “(in Italy and Germany)... conservatism 
in social relations and attitudes has provided the basis for social co-operation and 
economic co-ordination necessary to develop innovative strategies in manufacturing. 
(In those countries) ... flexible specialisation has been based on legacies of labour
11 Andrew Popp, Business Structure, Business Culture and the Industrial District. The Potteries, c. 
1850-1914, (Aldershot/UK, 2001), p. 23.
12 Andrew Popp, Networks and Industrial restructuring: the Widnes district and the formation o f the 
United Alakli Company, 1890, in John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp (eds.), Industrial Clusters and 
Regional Business Networks in England, 1750-1970, Aldershsot/UK, 2003), p. 208-18; Francesca 
Camevali, Malefactors and Honourable Men: the making o f commercial honesty in nineteenth century 
industrial Birmingham, ibid., p. 192-207.
13 Popp Andrew, Trust in an industrial district: The Potteries, c. 1850-1900, Journal o f Economic 
History, 3(1), 2000, 47.
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skills and institutions of regional and social co-operation that persisted into the 
supposedly “Fordist” era.”14
At the same time, canonical industrial districts are supposed to be highly innovative, 
capable of adjusting to ever changing market conditions and more flexible than large 
industries. Best’s concept of new competition, in which Italian districts represent an 
almost ideal embodiment, is based on constant change and on the ever-changing 
entrepreneurial firm, as opposed to the rigid conditions prevailing under the 
paradigm of “old competition”. The entrepreneurial firm “... is organised from top to 
bottom to pursue continuous improvement in methods, products and processes”.15
However, these two opposite forces can also be seen as having different functions at 
different stages of the life cycles of districts. Zeitlin and Hirst for instance underline 
that “social continuity has provided the stability and support to absorb and promote 
radical change in technology and economic organisation”.16
In the ideal-typical industrial district, conservation ensures the preconditions for the 
emergence of districts and, later, the preservation of the global balance among their 
components. Innovation is the key to subsequent growth and success. As a 
consequence, the ideal-typical industrial district is rooted in the preservation of local 
uninterrupted traditions, values and skills, sometimes going back for centuries, and 
operates within this context; but its growth and success depends on its ability to 
redefine itself free of the legacy of the past and to adjust quickly and effectively to 
changing conditions.
In the real world, however, innovation and conservation also interact and at times 
conflict. A balance between the two is needed. Contrary to the idealised image,
14 Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin, Flexible Specialisation versus post-Fordism, Economy and Society, 
Volume 20 Number 1, February 1991,12.
15 M.H.Best, The New Competition. Institutions o f Industrial Restructuring, Cambridge 1990, p. 3.
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Brenta’s balance between these two opposite forces lies significantly closer to 
conservation. This, however, has not prevented its remarkable success.
Brenta’s conservatism is rather unique even among footwear districts.
Innovation can indeed be a significant force even in mature industrial districts. Porter 
devotes significant pages to the impact of new technologies on the development of 
the ceramic tiles industry in Sassuolo and to the comparatively high technological
17content of this mature product which is usually known at best for its design. 
Francesca Camevali recalls the role of the technological break-through in the 
Birmingham jewellery industry following a visit to the United States in the late 
1940s, which paved the way for the adoption of the waste wax process of casting.18 
But even districts in that most mature of all possible mature production -footwear - 
can indeed show a comparatively high degree of innovation. Drawing on the 
experience of Italian footwear districts competing with Brenta, at least three main 
categories of innovation can be identified, concerning:
a) production segment: Vigevano, the largest and oldest footwear cluster in Italy,
successfully completed its repositioning in a higher value market by abandoning 
footwear and embracing the production of footwear machine tools.
b) product: Montebelluna evolved from the production of hiking boots to plastic ski
boots, importing new technologies from the USA after the Cortina Winter Olympic 
games in 1958 and improving them locally. In the mid-1990s, the firm Geox 
launched a very successful footwear-related technology which features tiny holes in
16 Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin, Flexible Specialisation versus post-Fordism, quote., p. 12.
17 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage o f Nations, London 1990, p. 217.
18 Francesca Camevali, Golden Opportunities: Jewelry Making in Birmingham between Mass 
Production and Specialty, Enterprise and Society, Volume 4, Number 2/June 2003,283-4.
18
rubber outsoles to manage moisture and a breathable membrane which keeps feet 
dry.19
c)the district organisation: comparatively large firms have emerged in a number of 
Italian footwear clusters, including in the Marches (Della Valle) and Barletta 
(Filanto). These firms have in turn restructured their respective industrial districts 
and brought them in line with the hub-and-spike model; are better equipped to 
perform the high-quality functions of marketing, branding and design; and their 
leading entrepreneurs (in particular Diego Della Valle) play a role at the national 
level in non-footwear related fields which in turn can be instrumental in further 
enhancing their economic profile.
In comparison, Brenta has shown a particularly deep commitment to its traditional 
core competences and structures. Brenta has been producing mainly middle-to high 
quality ladies leather footwear. Technology improvements have been slow and 
incremental. The basis feature of the district, as it emerged in the mid-1950s, have 
remained substantially unchanged in real terms: its size (some 10,000 employees and 
some 500 to 700 enterprises); its total production and total sales (which have varied 
over time but never more than by a factor of two); the dimensional structure of its 
firm population (with “industrial” firms, those employing 19 or more people, 
fluctuating around 30% of the total); its spatial structure (with approximately 45% of 
firms and employees being located within the tiny core area of Stra’, Fiesso and 
Noventa, corresponding to less than 10% of the total district; the leading role of a
19 The role of technological and organisational innovation in some Italian mature industrial clusters 
including footwear has been analysed in particular by Porter in the context of his mutually reinforcing 
system of preconditions for international success (“diamond”). He comments especially on the 
establishment of a cluster of plastic injection moulding machinery industries precisely in the footwear 
area of Montebelluna, prompted by the originally US idea of plastic shells for ski boots, and the rapid 
single-firing process in the production of ceramic tiles in Sassuolo: Michael E. Porter, The 
Competitive Advantage o f Nations, quote., p. 162.
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sort of local entrepreneurial aristocracy (some 15 to 20 families), controlling most 
“large” firms and offsetting the potentially destabilising effect of the high local 
natality and mortality rates of firms.
Not that Brenta failed to consider or to explore innovative ways to conquer new 
markets or simply to face increased competition and changing environments. 
Attempts along the lines mentioned above were even comparatively frequent and 
experiences gathered in this way significant, including research and development 
carried out by entrepreneurial organisations, collective action in high-quality 
activities (branding, marketing), or even efforts to better pursue economies of scale 
(for instance by establishing consortia). Innovations brought about by these 
endeavours however remained comparatively minor, although some indirect benefits 
were reaped. It was the case in particular of the collective brand promoted by an ad 
hoc new consortium, which was seldom adopted by individual producer but ended up 
as symbol not of shoes but of the area producing them, and therefore at least helped 
the consolidation of a collective local identity.
The innovation strategies successfully pursued by Brenta have been rather focussed 
not on modifications of the type of product or of the district organisation, but on the 
possibilities offered by the intrinsic flexibility of its products. Shoes (and in 
particular high-fashion shoes) are by definition no standardised product: they come 
of course in different sizes, colours, materials and above all qualities and designs. 
Brenta has exploited this to its full possible extent, as confirmed by the growth of 
designer firms by a factor of two between 1974 and 1985, as well as the success of 
design courses organised by the Brenta Training Centre. The careful exploitation of 
this “intrinsic” flexibility has in particular made possible the repositioning on a 
higher quality market niche pursued in particular from the 1970s as a response to
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increased competition by emerging countries in low-price market segments. Even 
this, however, took place within the constraints of existing structures: the increase in 
the average price of Brenta shoes never exceeded a factor of two in real terms and 
therefore is not to be considered as a change of paradigm comparable to Vigevano's 
or Montebelluna's innovations.
In this light, Brenta’s strategy over half a century consists of a mixture of resistance 
to change and a deep commitment to the existing structures on the one hand, coupled 
with the careful exploitation of all possible flexibility intrinsic to its products on the 
other. Far from corresponding to the ideal-typical innovative industrial district, 
Brenta appears to be essentially conservative and its entrepreneurs to be narrowly 
focussed on “pure” production, albeit they are well aware of the flexibility intrinsic 
to the existing firms sizes, employment and district governance. Brenta’s attitude 
therefore is no simple inertia or blind refusal to consider novelties, but a specific 
balance between opposite forces which I would define as “innovative conservatism”. 
This strategy has been successful and has proved that viable districts are not 
necessarily always highly flexible. Brenta also proves that conservatism does not 
necessarily hinder the development of a number of key features of the ideal-typical 
industrial district, in particular the embodiment of districts’ collective identity in self- 
help institutions, increasingly efficient interaction with political and administrative 
national and local authorities, co-operation with trade unions well beyond the 
traditional area of working contracts.
A narrow focus on somecore functions has also reaped specific benefits in terms of 
increased specialisation of local employees (workers, designers, and also managerial 
staff of self-help organisations), who have acquired a number of skills which are not 
easy to duplicate elsewhere. In turn, this hyper-specialisation has further refined the 
smooth functioning of local networks and local formal institutions, which have been
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able to build upon previous experiences undisturbed by the strain of adjustment to 
innovation. Brenta’s ‘hyper-specialisation’ has strengthened its competitive 
advantage in a small niche of the global value chain and ensured its survival (so far) 
in the current new context in which high-level functions are increasingly detached 
from “pure” manufacturing.
Brenta’s innovative conservatism will be recalled in the analysis of Brenta* s “double 
triangle” composed of its main local actors (entrepreneurs, workers, public 
authorities) and their respective embodiments (entrepreneurial self-help 
organisations, trade unions and political parties).
In accordance with the “thin” version of industrial districts discussed above, Brenta’s 
peculiar balance between the opposite forces of innovation and conservation appears 
to be largely shaped by one, and only one, element of the above mentioned double 
triangle: entrepreneurs. In particular, no direct, automatic connection (no matter how 
tempting it could be) can be identified between the economic conservatism of local 
entrepreneurs and the socio-cultural characteristics of the Brenta area. This is true in 
particular of local political conservatism, translated into a remarkably stable 
allegiance to both Italian mass based political parties for over four decades. At most, 
an indirect role of the social context could be identified in the fact that all leading 
entrepreneurs come originally from within the Brenta area, were educated in local 
schools and spent all their working lives in local enterprises. There are no outsiders 
within the local entrepreneurial aristocracy (there are a few in trade unions, 
administration and politics).
In turn, self-help organisations cannot be more innovative than Brenta 
entrepreneurs, since they are largely controlled by the 15-20 dominant 
entrepreneurial families. As a consequence, self-help organisations have performed 
well, or even very well, in those “classic” areas of collective action which are
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compatible with the preservation of existing structures: training, provision of 
financial, administrative and bureaucratic services, negotiations with trade unions, 
collective participation in trade fairs in some extra-European countries. They have 
performed significantly less efficiently in the areas in which collective action could 
affect the preservation of existing structures and even the independence of single 
firms (collective branding, marketing, mergers, outsourcing abroad).
I have a strong personal interest in this tale of innovative conservatism, based 
on my three-pronged direct involvement with Brenta.
First, I spent some years in the area in the 1960s and early 1970s. Even from 
the perspective of a young boy, I had direct contact with the pervasiveness of the 
Catholic Church and its institutions, especially in the areas of education and 
recreational activities. The presence of the Church could be felt everywhere: in a 
wealth of associations, ranging from sport to culture and politics; in a peculiar social 
environment, half-rural and half-urban; in heated ideological debates between 
Catholics and Communists, which peaked in the early 1970s and then progressively 
declined; in a strong local identity, which took pride (parochial and provincial, but 
genuine) in its Venetian heritage and in the many villas and other buildings built 
from the 16th to the 18th centuries along the banks of the river; in the struggle for 
social recognition by local footwear entrepreneurs, who were not yet really 
considered, as happened some years later, the heroes of the day.
I then had some direct working experience as an interpreter (French and 
German) for some local enterprises in the early 1980s, in particular one located in 
Campagna Lupia, in the eastern area of Brenta, not far from the heavy industry of 
Porto Marghera but still deeply rural. I spent most of my time travelling through 
France and Germany with Sergio, one of the two co-owners of this enterprise,
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participating in the traditional spring trade fairs in Diisseldorf and Paris. Like many 
entrepreneurs described by Michael Blim in his work on the footwear district in the 
Marches, Sergio was both paternalistic and personalistic in style. (His) 
supervision was direct, and the consequences of ... (work) mistakes felt immediately, 
as (he often)... stood side by side with ... workers, getting out the product”.20 At the 
end of each month, workers were summoned one by one into the office of the 
Personnel and Administration Director and presented an envelope with the monthly 
wage and, on a separate piece of paper, an indication of the amount paid and of the 
official working hours. Everybody seemed to take for granted that the amounts 
written on those papers did not correspond either with the amount of money within 
the envelope or with the effective work done. I did not ask for details: as both an 
outsider and a close (even if temporary) associate of Sergio, I felt slightly uneasy in 
an environment which was at times perceptibly tense. Sergio’s firm exported two- 
thirds of its total production to Germany and France, and yet relied heavily on just 
one agent for both countries and refrained from using the services of the 
entrepreneurs’ association. The main channel for acquiring new clients and staying in 
contact with old ones were the trade fairs, in which Sergio’s firm participated 
individually, rather than in a group with other Brenta entrepreneurs. Shoe designs 
were produced in-house, almost on the spot by one designer, by hand, during short 
and creative visits from his native Emilia. And yet, the firm was quite successful. 
Every evening in Paris after a hard day’s work, Sergio and I used to stroll along the 
Champs-Elysees and saw some of “our” shoes in elegant shop windows. Sergio told 
me of his Socialist political affiliation (“like my father”), and of his first years in the 
trade as a footwear sales agent in northern Italy. Everything in the firm depended
20 * • •Michael L. Blim, Made in Italy — Small-Scale Industrialization and its Consequences, New York
and London, 1990, p. 159.
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heavily upon Sergio. A few years later (I had completely lost touch with him) I was 
informed of his sudden death and of the subsequent bankruptcy of his firm. 
Undeterred, his partner had started a new footwear business afresh.
In the mid-1990s I then started working on the potential value of Brenta as a 
case study for assessing the validity of the industrial district model. However, this 
very model, and its role in economic historical literature, evolved considerably 
during my work on this thesis. Widespread interest in and even enthusiasm for 
industrial districts, still evident in Italy in the mid-1990s, was giving way to doubt, 
criticism, and predictions of decline and crisis. This was leading in the end to a 
greater questioning of the core idea that favourable social and political factors can 
prompt enhanced co-operation among small- and medium-sized enterprises and 
therefore, under given circumstances, can “square the circle” and provide both 
flexibility and economies of scale. During the elaboration of this thesis, I underwent 
the rather exciting experience of both my research object (the Brenta footwear 
industry) as well as my main analytical tool (the industrial district model) enduring 
significant changes.
A genuinely comprehensive economic history of the footwear industry in the 
Brenta district, encompassing all of its main aspects (in the wake for instance of 
Blim’s study on the nascent footwear industry in the Marches region) has not yet 
been written, despite the increasing attention of specialised literature, particularly 
over the last few years. A few articles and short essays written about Brenta, or 
touching upon some of Brenta’s features, have been published in English, but most 
of the available literature on this subject, not surprisingly, is in Italian. A number of 
good analyses focus on given periods: research conducted on behalf of the Province
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of Venice in the early 1970s;21 an article reflecting the situation again in the early
1970s, paying particular regard to workers continuing part-time employment in
00agriculture; a study sponsored by a post-graduate Venetian business school in the 
late 1970s;23 an enquiry into the nascent Brenta design industry, again in the late 
1970s.24 More recently Vittorio Pampagnin has published a vivid account of early 
Brenta unionisation, drawing in particular from his experiences as footwear worker, 
trade union official and local politician (he served for several years as Mayor of
Fiesso).25 Since the 1990s, Lorenza Rabellotti and Fiorenza Belussi in particular have
0 ( \contributed in-depth research on contemporary Brenta issues. The entrepreneurs’ 
association sponsored more recent and ample research work to celebrate the 
centennial of the establishment of the first industrial firm in the area, and it delivers 
exactly what its title promises: a detailed history of Brenta footwear manufacturing, 
with an in-depth historical analysis of several aspects including the establishment and 
first steps taken by the incubator enterprise, the establishment of the training centre, 
and the de-verticalisation of the early 1970s. However, it does not pay equal attention 
to the analysis of the co-operation among local actors and therefore overlooks a 
number of elements crucial to an industrial district’s development and functioning — 
such as trade unions, relations with public authorities and political parties, the issue 
of “lavoro nero” (illegal, or rather “informal” work), or the abovementioned, equally 
fundamental issue of relations with the heavily industrial area of Porto Marghera.27
21 Paolo Ceccato and Giovanni Berlanda, II settore calzaturiero nella Riviera del Brenta, COSES-
report nr. 21, Venice, 1973.
22 •Marialuisa Gazerro, Un’industria e il suo territorio: i calzaturifici della Riviera del Brenta, Padova, 
1973.
23 Giorgio Gottardi, II settore calzaturiero nett’area del Brenta, Padova, 1978.
24 Federico Bondi and Giovanni Mariacher, La calzatura della Riviera del Brenta -  Storia e Design, 
Venice, 1979.
25 Vittorio Pampagnin, La Riviera degli Scarpari, Padova 2000.
26 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, Padova, 2000; Roberta Rabellotti, How Globalisation affects 
Italian Industrial Districts: The Case of Brenta, in Hubert Schmitz (ed.), Local Enterprises in the 
Global Economy: Issues o f Governance and Upgrading, Cheltenham, 2003.
27 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Giorgio Franceschetti and Giorgio Roverato, 100 anni di industria 
calzaturiero nella Riviera del Brenta, Fiesso d’Artico, 1998. One of the editors himself, Giorgio
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Drawing from this literature and from primary sources, my thesis tries to shed some 
light on co-operation among the three sides of the double triangle composed of trade 
unions, entrepreneurs and public authorities on the one hand, and some of their 
respective corporate bodies on the other hand: trade unions, entrepreneurial self-help 
organisations and mass-based political parties. In this light, I will assess Brenta* s 
value as a case study in the context of the current research on industrial districts, 
which in turn fits into the debate of the last 20 years on the institutional forms which 
are most conducive to economic development.
Roverato, intervening at a debate on unionism in Brenta, in the presence of former trade union 
managers -  which partly explains the content of his statements -- candidly recognised that his 
narrowly focused, firm-related approach to Brenta’s history centred on the role of entrepreneurs and 
enterprises at the expense of other actors’ contributions and was unduly selective. He even mentions 
that this perspective had led to “distortions” and omissions of “significant elements” in his work on 
Brenta, and he has tried to avoid this in his subsequent works on other Venetian areas: see Manuali di 
Storia, 18, p. 19-20.
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TABLE I 
Brenta Communes
Communes Sq km.
Camp. Lupia* 27
Campolongo 24
Camponogara 21
Dolo 24
Fiesso 6
Fosso’ 10
Pianiga 20
Stra’ 9
Vigonovo 13
Noventa 7
Vigonza 33
Saonara 14
TOTAL RB** 208
Hard Core*** 22
*Campagna Lupia: total surface 88 sq km, 69% of which is uninhabited marshland
**Total RB: total surface of communes included in the Brenta industrial district
***Hard core: total surface of Stra’, Fiesso and Noventa Padovana
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TABLE H
Communes of the Brenta industrial district: population 1871-2001
Communes 1871 1881 1901 1911 1921 1931 1936 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Camp. Lupia 1,343 1,525 1,989 2,597 3,179 3,892 4,109 4,937 4,638 4,874 5,577 6,065 6,288
Campolongo 3,644 3,857 4,863 5,602 6,608 7,545 7,475 8,300 7,688 8,041 8,769 8,952 9,196
Camponogara 2,610 3,069 3,908 4,915 5,823 6,149 6,307 7,190 7,363 8,030 9,115 9,756 10,905
Dolo 6,351 6,475 6,874 7,685 8,332 8,686 8,896 11,700 11,409 12,287 13,480 13,723 14,442
Fiesso 1,688 1,851 2,141 2,484 2,811 3,090 3,266 3,883 4,328 5,242 5,792 5,855 5,779
Fosso’ 1,632 1,921 2,309 2,923 3,379 3,553 3,786 4,258 4,280 4,674 5,259 5,331 5,922
Pianiga 3,185 3,431 4,118 5,108 5,693 6,152 6,118 6,411 6,608 7,805 8,605 8,895 9,168
Stra’ 2,132 2,417 2,713 3,250 3,808 3,951 3,945 4,793 5,038 5,540 6,253 6,710 7,031
Vigonovo 2,628 2,959 3,324 4,031 4,693 4,977 5,003 5,884 6,060 7,027 7,705 7,581 8,064
Noventa 1,630 1,904 2,014 2,435 2,845 3,104 3,264 3,745 4,395 6,709 7,688 7,508 8,083
Vigonza 4,761 5,441 6,612 7,977 9,154 9,713 10,100 11,067 11,458 13,843 15,107 16,681 19,458
Saonara 2,569 2,912 3,249 3,862 4,422 4,790 4,872 5,455 5,710 6,419 6,608 7,149 8,946
TOTAL RB 36,044 39,643 46,015 54,780 62,668 67,533 69,077 79,574 80,936 92,462 101,939 106,197 115,283
Hard Core 5,450 6,172 6868 8,169 9,464 10,145 10,475 12,421 13,761 17,491 19,733 20,073 20,893
North-east. Italy* 4,932 5,165 5742 6,550 8,235 8,596 8,682 9,417 9,504 10,026 10,410 10,378 10,635
Italy* 27,300 28,952 32963 35,842 39,397 41,043 42,398 47,516 50,624 54,137 56,557 56,778 56,996
• in thousands
Source: ISTAT, population censuses-various years
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TABLE HI
Communes of the Brenta industrial district: 
population 1871-2001 
index numbers
Communes 1871 1881 1901 1911 1921 1931 1936 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Camp. Lupia 100 114 148 194 237 290 305 370 345 363 415 451 468
Campolongo 100 106 133 154 181 207 205 228 210 220 240 246 252
Camponogara 100 118 150 188 223 236 241 275 282 307 350 374 418
Dolo 100 101 108 121 131 136 140 173 180 193 212 216 227
Fiesso 100 109 127 147 167 183 193 230 256 310 343 346 342
Fosso’ 100 118 141 180 207 218 232 261 262 287 322 327 363
Pianiga 100 108 129 160 179 108 192 201 207 245 270 280 288
Stra’ 100 113 127 152 179 185 185 225 236 260 293 314 330
Vigonovo 100 110 124 150 175 186 186 219 226 262 287 283 307
Noventa 100 117 124 150 175 190 200 230 270 412 471 461 496
Vigonza 100 114 139 168 192 204 212 232 240 290 317 350 409
Saonara 100 113 126 150 172 186 190 212 222 250 257 278 348
RB 100 110 128 152 174 187 192 221 225 257 283 295 320
Hard Core 100 113 126 150 174 186 192 228 252 321 362 368 383
North-east. Italy 100 105 116 133 167 174 176 191 193 203 211 210 216
Italy 100 106 121 131 144 150 155 174 185 198 207 208 209
Source: personal elaboration of ISTAT data
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TABLE IV
Migration to and from the Communes of the Brenta industrial district
1960-1974
years Immigrants Emigrants balance
1960 1,407 1,963 -556
1961 1,612 1,981 -369
1962 1,682 2,157 -475
1963 1,755 1,969 -214
1964 1,720 1,835 -115
1965 1,710 924 786
1966 1,668 1,962 -294
1967 1,938 2,118 -180
1968 2,062 2,012 50
1969 2,213 2,098 115
1970 2,338 2,040 298
1971 2,093 1,772 321
1972 2,033 1,748 285
1973 2,128 1,862 266
1974 1994 1,734 260
This table regards the Brenta communes located in the province of Venice only (Dolo, Stra4, 
Fiesso, Fosso4, Campagna Lupia, Camponogara, Vigonovo, Campolongo, Pianiga)
Source: personal elaboration of COSES (Consorzio per lo Sviluppo economico e
Sociale della Provincia di Venezia) data
31
CHAPTER I 
Setting the context
Industrial districts: a model under review
As mentioned above, industrial districts experienced a “golden age” in the 
specialised literature from the late 1970s until the early 1990s, with a specific (but 
not exclusive) focus on their positive, innovative aspects and with generally (but not 
exclusively) positive assessments of their achievements. As of the mid-1990s, writers 
shifted their attention to also include the limits and shortcomings of the industrial 
districts. In other words, as Wilson and Popp stated, there is a growing awareness 
that “process should not be mistaken for progress”. There are increasing doubts about 
the essentially teleological paradigm of Chandler’s mass production on the one hand, 
and of Sabel, Piore and Zeitlin’s visions of flexible specialisation on the other. 
Industrial districts and clusters “... were neither fated to be anachronisms in a 
progressively globalisation” nor the harbingers of “a future resurgence of the
OHlocal”. Therefore, there is no space either for “epic battles between systems” or for 
“epic visions of industrialisation”.29
In recent years, much attention has been devoted in particular to the main 
weakness of the industrial district model: the still largely incomplete analysis of its 
social aspects, as if Marshall’s “... barely half-formed glimpses of the importance ... 
of such aspects had not yet been really completed by the following generations of 
commentators”.30 In this context, Zeitlin and Popp call to abandon a “closed” stylised 
model of the industrial district based on the Italian experience and to move towards 
an “open” model capable of including different forms and which can account for the
28 John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp, Industrial Clusters..., quote., p. 16.
29 Joseph Melling, review of C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin (eds.), Worlds of Possibilities: Flexibility and 
Mass Production, New York, 1994, Business History -  Book Review, 40/3, July 1998, 174-5.
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fact that not all industrial districts are necessarily successful, innovative and 
flexible.31 The very heterogeneity of clusters to be found in Europe and North 
America in a decisive phase of economic developments in modem times (from the 
end of the 19th century onwards) recommends the avoidance of “constructing a 
canonical form of the industrial district model”.
The Italian industrial districts and “the renaissance of craft ... production in 
contemporary Italy” played an unquestionably crucial role in reviving and updating 
Marshall’s industrial district model.33
“Marshall’s basic ideas were taken up in the Italian literature in the late 
1970s, with special attention to the social aspects”. Becattini in particular influenced 
most of the early Italian literature on this subject, as did a number of case studies of 
districts in north-eastern Italy. “An intense debate appeared in the 1990s, about the 
most important preconditions for, and mechanisms within, industrial districts”, which 
again was triggered by new developments in Italy. In recent years, “some 
contributions have appeared that try to find a definition ... that allows for empirical 
identification. Again, the main impulse came from the Italian literature, where the 
government has implemented a programme for district identification”.34 Di 
Tommaso and Rabellotti underline that research on the “Italian case” was 
instrumental in attracting attention to clusters of firms in developing countries, in 
particular in Asia and Latin America, but recently also in Africa.35 On the other hand, 
there is a growing awareness that Italian districts, rather than being the embodiment
30 John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp, Industrial Clusters..., quote., p. 5.
31 Andrew Popp, Trust in an Industrial District, in Journal o f Economic History, 3(1), 2000,47.
32 Ibid., p. 20.
33 J. Melling, Review ..., quote, 174.
34 T. Brenner, Local Industrial Cluster: Existence, Emergence and Evolution, London and New York, 
2004, p. 10.
Marco R. Di Tommaso and Roberta Rabellotti, Efficienza Collettiva e Sistemi di Imprese -  Oltre 
I’esperienza italiana, Bologna, 1999, p. 3-4.
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of the model, are a specific version of it. Generalising the Italian experience would 
posit a form of socio-spatial organisation supportive of particular patterns of 
industrial developments”.36
For Langlois and Robertson, "... industrial districts appear to be little more than a 
term which can be applied to different realities. As applied to the Third Italy, the 
term indicates a higher degree of co-operative co-ordination than would be present in 
a Marshallian industrial district”. But “innovative networks”, as represented for 
instance by Silicon Valley and Route 128, are also “a second recent variation on the 
industrial district”.37 Langlois and Robertson quote specific examples; for instance, 
in the Australian boat-building industry, the builders’ resistance to suggestions that 
they organise along the lines of business in the Third Italy led to the result that such 
districts are now not “Italianate”, but “heavily Marshallian in their informality of 
organisation”.38 As Zeitlin and Popp underline, it would be highly illogical to argue 
that Marshall’s theoretical concept of an industrial district would find its empirical 
referent only half a century later in north-eastern and central Italy. This would 
actually be a manifestation of that “counterfactual or phantom teleology” mentioned 
by Popp.39
One of the decisive elements for the decline in the fortunes of the Italianate 
industrial district model, however, was probably the developments in the real world, 
in particular the economic performance of Italian districts. They were particularly 
successful in the 1980s, and consequently attracted increased international attention. 
Goodman’s words are eloquent: “The fastest growing economy in Europe in the first 
half of the 1980s was the Italian... it is not a matter of doubt that an ‘economic
36 John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp, Industrial Clusters..., quote., p. 11.
37 Richard N. Langlois and Paul L. Robertson, Firms, Markets and Economic Change, London and 
New York, 1995, p. 125-128.
38 Ibid., p. 127.
I Q
Andrew Popp, Business Structure... quote., p. 6.
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miracle* took place. In a surprisingly short space of time a relatively backward 
economy was transformed and Italy emerged as a major industrial power.... The role 
of the small firm in the Italian success story has been crucial: in the Terza Italia 
where the manufacturing firms are concentrated, the increase in the rate of 
production has far outstripped that of the rest of the country”.40 In fact, thanks also to 
industrial districts, Italy’s share in world exports went from less than 3.2% in 1960 to 
more than 5.2% in 198641 and the standard of living in the “Third Italy” reached an 
index of 130 with 100 being equal to the EU average 42 Goodman’s prediction that 
“better is to come”,43 however, did not come true: starting in the 1990s, Italy’s share 
in international trade declined to 3.9% in 2001.44 This again was due to several 
factors, including competition from emerging countries in mature sectors (including 
footwear) and the worldwide economic crisis which translated into reduced demand 
for those luxury goods for which Italy and its industrial districts have significant 
competitive advantages (from sports cars -  Ferrari, Maserati — to cruise ships; from 
jewellery to fashion to high quality shoes).
However, several writers expressed doubts even when the debate on the 
virtues of the Italianate model was at its height. In his comparative analysis of the 
main comprehensive theories of the contemporary world, Krishan Kumar in the mid-
40 E. Goodman, J. Bamford and P. Saynor (eds.), Small Firms and Industrial Districts in Italy,
London, 1989, p. 138, p. 1.
41 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage o f Nations, quote., 1990.
42 Emilia-Romagna’s index is 130, at the same level as other highly advanced EU areas including 
three German provinces, and ranking behind only the urban regions of London, Paris, Hamburg and 
Luxembourg. Source: Axel Moerer-Funk, Schwarzarbeit und die Folgen fuer die deutschen 
Sozialsysteme und den Arbeitsmarkt, InterNationes Basis-INFO /Wirtschaft, 25-2001, p. 5-6.
43 E. Goodman, J. Bamford and P. Saynor (eds.), Small Firms..., quote., p.2.
44 Lucio Caracciolo, A che serve l’ltalia, Limes, 5/2002,7.
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1990s provided a comprehensive overview, which stressed the relevance of the 
Italian experience and at the same time its limits as a quasi-universal, ideal model.45
Kumar identifies three major paradigms, which partially overlap: the 
information society, post-modernism and post-Fordism46. The post-Fordist paradigm 
is of particular interest here.47 Not only does it encompass elements drawn from the 
other two theories, including the emphasis placed on information technology, 
globalisation and decentralisation, but it is also deeply influenced by the industrial 
district model. Kumar underlines that its roots are based specifically in the economic 
development of Italy, even if the “Third Italy” and its districts are just a starting point 
for a wider analysis encompassing other realities.48 From this perspective, the “Third 
Italy” does not simply offer an economic model, but it is also a social, cultural and 
political phenomenon of great significance, pointing for the first time since the 
beginning of modem industry to the possibility of a convergence between manual 
and intellectual work as well as between work and community.
45 Krishan Kumar, From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society. New Theories o f the Contemporary 
World, 1995, Italian translation: Le nuove teorie del mondo contemporaneo. Dalla societa post- 
industriale alia societa post-modema, Torino, 2000, pp. 9-50.
46 According to Kumar, the “ information society” is based precisely on information as much as the 
first industrial revolution was based on steam and the second industrial revolution was based on 
electrical power. Already in 1967, according to Kumar, 46% of the GDP of the United States was 
produced by the information economy; in the 1990s, the information sector employed some 35% of 
the workforce of OECD countries. “Post-modernism” was originally elaborated in terms of culture, 
but then rapidly expanded to other fields and incorporated elements of other theories, including the 
information society and post-Fordism.
47 A definition of both Fordism and Taylorism, so frequently mentioned by Kumar but also by writers 
on industrial districts recalled in this thesis, should be recalled here. As Ford himself explained in 
1913, Fordism consisted of “the planned orderly and continuous progression of the commodity 
through the shop” and “the delivery of work instead of leaving it to the workmen’s initiative to find 
it”. “What Ford did was to put together several practices already in use in industry”: mass production 
(based on standardised and interchangeable parts, first developed in firearms); automatic cutting tools; 
moving assembly lines (already common for instance in slaughterhouses, where they were actually 
moving “disassembling lines”). Taylorism, or “scientific management”, “put emphasis on organising 
the individual worker’s labour and on careful scheduling of the flow of materials -  necessary 
prerequisites for a system employing minute division of labour”: Sidney Ratner, James H. Soltow and 
Richard Sylla, The Evolution o f the American Economy, New York, 1979, p. 284. On the social 
consequences of Fordism on society as a whole see Silvio Fagiolo, L ’operaio americano. Fabbrica e 
sindacato in USA, Bari 1980.
48 Ibid., p. 52-52.
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However, so Kumar’s reasoning runs, the Italian experience is not necessarily 
always a positive one. For some post-Fordists, the “Third Italy” was the outcome of a 
concerted effort by entrepreneurs to combat the increased influence of trade unions 
and regain control over the workforce lost in the late 1960s. The “Third Italy” and its 
industrial districts began to flourish precisely at the moment when entrepreneurs 
began to circumvent the provisions of the labour law of 1970 (and labour laws of 
subsequent years), which were quite favourable to workers at large companies but 
did not apply to small enterprises (with up to 20 employees). This resulted in 
increased outsourcing and subcontracting to small firms, where the influence of trade 
unions was more easily held in check. Networks of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises therefore are not to be considered autonomous products of local 
environments, rooted in specific local communities, nourished by given local 
cultures and civic capitals accumulated over the decades (as in Putnam’s model), but 
simply a by-product of the most classic Fordist capitalism.49
Kumar underlines that, along with the industrial district model, also “flexible 
specialisation” is a key concept in the wider post-Fordist theory: industry is no longer 
mainly based on mass production of standardised goods, but also focuses on the 
production of comparatively small amounts of specific goods for small market 
segments using new technology, in particular numeric control machine tools which 
can easily be adjusted to perform a wide variety of tasks. While flexible 
specialisation was originally a specific characteristic of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (and therefore one decisive element in the success of industrial districts), 
experience has shown that large enterprises can also use flexible technology to reap 
the benefits of flexible specialisation.Consequently, according to Kumar’s 
description of the post-Fordist theory, the distinction between “rigid” large firms and
49 Ibid., p. 57.
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“flexible” small enterprises is becoming increasingly less clear. Kumar again quotes 
an Italian example, the firm Benetton. This company has introduced an efficient 
system of sales monitoring, which has enabled it to rapidly identify changes in 
fashion trends and make relevant adjustments (within days) to its production, which 
is performed by a co-ordinated network of plants (each with 1,500 workers at most) 
and some 200 subcontractors (with 30 to 35 workers each). Germany, Japan and the 
United States have also introduced some degree of flexible specialisation (including 
in such sectors as chemical and steel), in particular through international 
decentralisation, with the best results being achieved where small and large firms do 
not compete against each other but rather co-operate.50
And yet, so Kumar, even flexible specialisation is not considered a panacea 
by everybody. Unlike for instance Sabel and Piore51, who emphasise the innovative 
and potentially beneficial character of flexible specialisation, Scott Lash and John 
Urry in particular consider the crisis of mass production as “the end of organised 
capitalism”, prompted by globalisation and entailing the decline of firm location and 
organisation within nation states, the collapse of Taylorism and firm concentration in 
industrial cities and a shift towards outsourcing to emerging countries. In this sense, 
the new “disorganised capitalism” would simply be a new phase, a different 
organisational pattern for the previous system in response to a changing 
environment. Kumar also recalls the leftist ideological orientation of several post- 
Fordist writers and mentions also the contributions by the British Marxists of “New 
Times”, first in some essays they published in “Marxism Today”, then in the 
“Manifesto for New Times”in June 1989 and finally in the book New Times, also
50 Ibid., p. 65.
51 Charles F. Sabel and Michael J. Piore, The Second Industrial Divide..., quote., p. 5 and 251-80.
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published in 1989, in which they underline the crucial role played by the Italian
52experience.
In this context, flexible specialisation would not be the dawn of new 
production principles, but simply some refinement of the traditional “Fordist” 
segmentation of the labour market according to sex, age, ethnicity/race, with social 
costs once again being imposed on the weakest segment (in particular women).
Kumar’s overview confirms that a focus on one or another component of the 
industrial district model can lead to different conclusions. In particular, “... the social 
embeddedness perspective has increasingly privileged the social and the cultural in 
explanations of the growth and developments of clustered industries”, with an 
explicit contrast... with more economistic approaches” in which "... causality is no 
longer seen as flowing primarily from the fact of clustering to a range of other 
outcomes”.53
In recent years, increased attention to the more economic aspects has led to a 
rediscovery of Marshall’s centrality of scale and volume even in his analysis of 
industrial districts. This reassessed Marshallian framework now suggests several 
important qualifications to more recent models of the industrial districts based on an 
idealised Italian experience. In particular, the “automatic induction” into a cohesive 
district-wide social economy should be replaced by the weaker assumption that 
reciprocity out of self-interest is the only necessary product of spatial proximity.54
Putting into perspective the Italianate model as a sort of noble embodiment of 
the industrial district concept also leads to a reconsideration of experiences in other
52 Krishan Kumar, Le nuove teorie..., quote., p. 69-71. On the British political magazine Marxism 
Today and Scott Lash and John Urry’s work The End o f Organised Capitalism, Cambridge 1987, see 
Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin, Flexible Specialisation versus post-Fordism, Economy and Society, 
Volume 20 Number 1, February 1991, 8-15. They criticize in particular Lash and Urry’s assumption 
that flexible specialisation strategies are a consequence of exogenous factors rhater than integrated 
elements of production organisation and business strategy.
53 Andrew Popp, Business Structure..., quote., p. 21.
54 Ibid., p. 20.
39
countries where industrial districts have indeed played a significant role in economic 
development, in particular in the United Kingdom. Quite paradoxically, the concept 
of the industrial district was elaborated in Britain on the basis of long empirical 
research into local economic realities, while the role of these districts in local 
economic development has long been neglected and constantly overshadowed by a 
Chandlerian perspective of growth dependent solely on the fortunes of large 
integrated firms. In this respect, Popp mentions a “recent turn in British business 
history”.55 “Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the industrial economy of 
England remained a patchwork of industrial districts, clusters and regional systems... 
this texture of English industrialisation ... was central to the broad sweep of the path 
towards forging an industrial society”.56 Camevali underlines that there are at least 
two reasons for this marginalisation. First, the promotion of large-scale enterprises 
became a priority for politicians and policymakers as from the early 20th century. The 
second reason was the decline in the amount of small firms and the emergence of 
“the most concentrated industrial structure in the world after that of the United 
States”.57
At the same time, an examination of the economic history of English 
industrial districts offers insight into the sustainability of a district over time, since 
they are embedded in the world’s first modem industrial economy. The long history 
of the chemical industry in Widnes, of jewellery-making in Birmingham, or of 
mechanical engineering in the East Midlands usefully complements the rather short 
history of the Italian industrial districts, some of which (although not all) can trace 
their origins back to the Middle Ages but which have taken on their current shape 
only after the Second World War.
55 Ibid., p. 22.
56 J.Wilson and A.Popp, Industrial Clusters..., quote., p. 1.
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In addition, Italian writers are now ready to consider a redefinition of the 
industrial district concept and in particular reassess the relationship between 
entrepreneurs on the one hand, and the specific social and political environment on 
the other. Ivana Paniccia draws a distinction between “canonical” and “non- 
canonical” Italian industrial districts: the empirical importance of the former is not 
particularly significant, not even in the “Third Italy”, “with just a few areas (the best 
known and most thoroughly studied) fitting the stylised model”.58 Colli speaks of the 
“black box” in the relationships between the economic actors in the districts, 
explained vaguely in terms of “cultural homogeneity”, local values, local ideologies, 
political beliefs, and so on. However, the specifically Italian long-lasting social 
structures should not be neglected. Colli himself underlines that “... the historical 
dimension is of considerable importance, especially in Italy, where industrial districts 
are generally (even not necessarily) a long-standing history in manufacturing (urban 
and rural craftsmanship) and in trading (proto-industrialisation and putting-out), 
buttressed by a tradition of civic democracy and self-governance”.59 
This last point deserves some elaboration. Several commentators have stressed the 
role played by political institutions in Italy in shaping local environments conducive 
to the emergence of industrial districts. Trigilia in particular has devoted a seminal 
in-depth analysis to the effects of political subcultures, reflected in mass-based 
parties, in ensuring smooth relations between entrepreneurs and labour. However, as 
Colli stresses, “it is surely possible to see political subcultures primarily as a result of 
traditional, historically-based social structures, and as another, important expression
57 Francesca Camevali, Golden Opportunities: Jewelry Making in Birmingham between Mass 
Production and Speciality, Enterprise and Society, Volume 4, Number 2, June 2003, 272-3.
58 Ivana Paniccia, Industrial Districts -  Evolution and Competitiveness in Italian Firms, 
Cheltenham/UK, 2002, p. 190.
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of the local complex social framework”.60 Political institutions would not be a cause 
for the emergence of industrial districts, but rather an effect (together with the 
districts themselves) of pre-existing, long-lasting social structures.
This interpretation of the cause-effect order is not undisputed. Porter, for 
instance, does not offer conclusive answers to the question of whether economic 
development determines social conditions, or whether socio-cultural preconditions 
predetermine economic development.61 Writers on Brenta are at times rather 
ambiguous in identifying the decisive trigger for the launch of the area in the late 19th 
century: at times they point to the first local mechanised enterprise, other times to the 
local cultural and social context, shaped by long-standing relations with Venice.
Useful insights into the Italian experience are offered by Putnam’s 20-year- 
long research on democracy in Italy.62 Putnam focuses his research on the connection 
between the quality of political institutions on the one hand, and the quality of civic 
life on the other. Some themes are central with regard to civic communities: civic 
engagement (active participation in public affairs); political equality (“... a 
community (which) is bound together by horizontally relations of reciprocity and co­
operation, not by vertical relations of authority and dependency. Citizens interact as 
equals, not as patrons and clients nor as governors and petitioners...”); solidarity, 
trust and tolerance (citizens are ... “trustful to one another, even when they differ on 
matters of substance”); and especially associations, which help develop capabilities 
of co-operation and the common pursuit of common goals translating in turn into “...
59 Andrea Colli, Networking the Market: Evidence and Conjectures from the History of the Italian 
Industrial Districts, in Wilfried Feldenkirchen and Terry Gourvish (eds.), European Yearbook of 
Business History, Vol. 1, 1998, p. 77.
60 Ibid., 83.
61 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage..., quote., p. 3-6.
62 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy, Princeton, 1993.
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a dense network of secondary associations, (which) both embodies and contributes to 
effective social collaboration”.63
Applying these principles to Italy, Putnam draws a distinction between 
northern regions (which includes the whole of the “Third Italy” and therefore most of 
the classic Italian industrial districts), where a thriving civic tradition has led to the 
establishment of regional governments that work quite well, and southern Italy (the 
comparatively backward “Second Italy”), where a lack of civic tradition has led to a 
rather poor performance for local governments.
Social and political networks play a key role in both areas, but are “organised 
horizontally, not hierarchically” in northern Italy, and the opposite way in southern 
Italy.64 Density of networks in itself is not the crucial factor; it is whether the 
networks enhance or rather hamper the preservation of and improvements to the co­
operative skills of the citizens, which Putnam calls “social capital”. Voluntary co­
operation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social 
capital in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement.
The higher the given social capital in a given community, the more likely its 
citizens are to co-operate for their mutual benefit. In fact, networks of civic 
engagement — be they neighbourhood associations, co-operatives, sport clubs, or 
mass-based political parties -- increase the potential costs of the defector in any 
individual transaction, foster robust norms of reciprocity, facilitate communication 
and improve the flow of information on the trustworthiness of individuals. Co­
operation experiences over the centuries provide models which can be used in the 
present.
63 Ibid., pp. 88-90.
64 Ibid., p. 115.
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Andrea Colli refers to relationships between the economic actors in industrial 
districts as a “black box of social relations”.65 Putnam offers a gallant attempt to shed 
light on this black box by a detailed empirical and quantitative analysis, including an 
evaluation of associations as indicators of the capability of citizens to embark on 
“positive” social interaction (i.e. conducive to social and political growth). However, 
Putnam does not take the next logical step and suggest any direct, automatic and 
verifiable linkage between the specific social and cultural environment which he 
investigated so carefully and specific types of local economic growth. He does not go 
beyond suggesting, rather vaguely, that “norms and networks of civic engagement 
contribute to economic prosperity and in turn are reinforced by that prosperity”.66 
In doing so, Putnam weakens the social embeddedness perspective of local economic 
development, in line with the current reassessment of the industrial district model as 
a weaker, “thin” version in which social and cultural factors are progressively put 
into perspective.
Putnam’ s detailed research on social and cultural local environments, based on the 
heritage of the past and on the path-dependency of collective behaviour, lead to a 
rather tautological thesis. He notes that “positive” , “horizontal” social networks 
(based on the equality of participants) tend to favour the emergence of political 
networks of the same kind. Inversely, “negative” “vertical” networks (based on 
hierarchical relations between unequal participants) tend to favour the emergence of 
equally negative political and administrative networks. In other words: in regions 
where most social networks are “positive”, political networks also tend to be
65 Andrea Colli, Networking the Market: Evidence and Conjectures from the History of the Italian 
Industrial Districts, in Wilfried Feldenkirchen and Terry Gourvish (eds.), European Yearbook of 
Business History, Vol. 1,1998, p. 81.
66 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic traditions in modem Italy, Princeton 1993,
p. 180.
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“positive”; the same goes for “negative” networks. The thrust of Putnam’s thesis is 
an empirical confirmation of the intuitive concept that the efficiency of democratic 
local government is linked to the capability and interest of citizens to share a set of 
common values and to pursue common goals.
It can be noted, however, that Putnam’s analysis of a number of efficient local 
governments in Italy offers a reply to Porter’s remarks on the poor performance of 
Italy’s public authorities, the main result of which would be to enhance the 
international competitiveness of Italian firms by training them to cope with immense 
domestic bureaucratic difficulties.67 Putnam’s vague allusions to indirect linkages 
between efficient local government and economic development are also in line with 
Porter’s views on the role of governments as a possible secondary element (on a par 
with chance!) which could strengthen the functioning of the competitive advantage 
“diamond”.68
Nevertheless, Putnam’s contribution can be useful in assessing a number of Brenta*s 
social and cultural characteristics. Brenta experienced a long accretion of its “social 
capital”, in particular in the period between the 16th and the 17th centuries, when it 
played host to Venetian families who spent at least two periods a year (spring and 
late summer) in their villas and estates along the banks of the waterway, giving birth 
to a quite complex network of economic and social relations in a semi-urban 
environment vividly portrayed by contemporary literature (from Sagredo to 
Goldoni). The last traces of these complex, long-lasting social networks go back to
67 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage..., quote., p. 447-9.
68 Ibid., p. 126-8.
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the early decades of the 19th century.69 However, there is no evidence of any direct 
linkage between the past and the current Brenta industrial district. The continuity 
between the Venetian artisan shoemaking tradition and the Brenta footwear industry 
of the 20th centuryis at best a useful marketing device. A final remark on Putnam’s 
note that “one key indicator of civic sociability must be the vibrancy of associational 
life (including) ... amateur soccer clubs, choral societies, hiking clubs, bird-watching 
groups, literary circles, hunters’ associations, Lions Clubs, and the like”, which are 
very numerous in Italy.70 I recall with pleasure, for instance, that the Dolo football 
club was established in 1909 and (along with just a handful of other Italian clubs, if 
not alone) has participated in all the Italian divisions, including -  once -  the first 
division. Also other sport clubs of the Riviera have performed well at a national and 
at times international level, including in skating and swimming. However, this seems 
to be utterly irrelevant for the fortunes of Brenta’s footwear industry.
Brenta as a study in contrasts
As discussed above, much of the specialised literature on Italian districts 
oscillates like a pendulum. The euphoria following the “rediscovery”, mainly by 
several Italian authors, of Marshall’s concept of industrial districts at the beginning 
of the 1970s was followed by a more cautious approach, which continues to date and 
in which Italian analysts again participate actively. This time, however, the capability 
of small firms to face increasing competition and the effects of globalisation is put 
into question, even when they interact within strongly organised clusters. More
69 Ettore Tito, at the time considered the best Venetian painter between the 19th and the 20th century, 
owned a villa in Dolo and resided there for several months a year; Cesare Musatti, who introduced 
psychoanalysis in Italy and was one of the most innovative personalities in inter-war Italy, was bom in 
Dolo during the summer sojourn of his Venetian parents.
70 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work..., quote., p. 91.
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generally, a move towards a “thinner”, more open model of an industrial district puts 
into perspective the Italian experience. De Cecco’s bleak picture (Italian districts as 
an illusion) is probably the most striking, but other authors now tend to emphasise 
the limitations (in terms of size, organisational capabilities, backward and forward 
linkages, and research and development) of most of the firms located within Italian 
districts. These limitations curb their competitiveness and are not overcome even by
* • 71some enhanced local co-operation and efficient self-help organisations.
These conflicting attitudes as well as shift of emphasis from the positive to 
negative are clearly reflected in even the scarce specialised literature available on the 
Riviera. An overly optimistic image common in the 1970s and 1980s has been 
replaced, in even the potentially most biased texts (those written on behalf of the 
entrepreneurial association), by predictions of a slow, dignified, glorious but almost 
inevitable decline (unless an unlikely thorough overhaul of the whole system is 
conducted).
Two parallel and related risks must therefore be avoided. The first is a 
consequence of the “optimistic” vision so common in the 1980s: the temptation to 
look for some intrinsic rationality in the development of industrial districts, almost a 
sort of goal-oriented evolution towards a more or less accomplished “ideal district”.
71 Marcello de Cecco, L ’economia italiana negli ultimi trent’anni, in Sabino Cassese (ed.), Ritratto 
dell’Italia, Bari, 2001, p. 59-94. According to De Cecco, the (now fading) success of the Italian 
districts depended largely on transient international factors. These include the devaluation of the lira 
following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, which gave Italian firms a significant 
competitive advantage in terms of lower prices and which favoured labour-intensive, mature and 
hence price-sensitive industries. Together with developments in labour relations, this paved the way 
for the massive outsourcing of the early 1970s, which led to the current industrial district system. 
Public authorities for their part also played a significant role, but inadvertently so, in particular 
through the labour law called “Statuto dei Lavoratori”. This law imposed a number of stringent labour 
regulations on “large” firms (with more than 19 employees) but was much more flexible with small- 
and medium-sized firms. The two oil crises of the 1970s led most European countries to more capital- 
intensive activities, to investment in research and technology and to firm concentration. In Italy, the 
reaction was the opposite and led to a decrease in the size of enterprises and to their diffusion and 
dispersion all throughout the country. De Cecco confirmed his pessimistic view of the Italian districts 
and of the Italian north-south divide during a conversation with me in Berlin in October 2000.
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Far from being a sort of conscious progress towards a well-defined objective, 
Brenta’s history (and the history of other districts) is a continuous trial-and-error 
process, with emphasis on select components of the model and with different 
possible options tested and then adopted or, when necessary, abandoned (as was the 
case with a number of attempts to increase firm size in the 1970s, the launch of a 
collective brand in the 1980s, and outsourcing in the 1990s). The second risk is a 
consequence of the new “pessimistic” vision: the economic history of the Brenta 
district as a simple series of uncoordinated, individual reactions by single firms to 
external events with little attention to the added value derived from inter-firm and 
social co-operation.
Brenta, as probably most industrial districts, exhibits certain features which 
confirm both the “optimistic” and the “pessimistic” visions. On the one hand, Brenta 
is a national and international success story based in particular on inter-firm co­
operation drawing also from the competitive advantages of an area endowed with 
specific social, cultural and political characteristics. On the other hand, as a producer 
of traditional high-quality ladies’ leather footwear, Brenta shows a remarkable 
degree of institutional inertia, in many respects lagging behind more innovative, 
flexible, forward-looking, technologically-advanced clusters of small- and medium­
sized firms, in Italy and elsewhere.72 Brenta’s successes and shortcomings can test 
the validity of the industrial district model and the need to reassess it, precisely in the 
light of the fact that “... not all districts are necessarily flexible, consensual or 
otherwise successful”.73
72 R. Langlois and Paul Robertson, Firms, Markets. . . , quote., p. 101-19.
73 Andrew Popp, Business Structure..., quote., p. 22.
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The specific strengths and weaknesses of Brenta, embodied in a history that 
extends over almost eleven decades, should however also be assessed in comparison 
with similar cases, in Italy and elsewhere.
Different patterns of development in the footwear industry: lessons from Italy 
and some emerging countries
Brenta specific brand of conservatism and its chances of remaining viable 
should be assessed against the background of developments which started in the 
1980s, when manufacturers begun outsourcing production, and led to the cuirrent 
footwear global value chain. With a few exceptions, footwear production today tends 
to be managed by global buyers and supplied by producers from developing 
countries. The traditional integrated shoemaking is superseded by a global supply 
chain stretching among different countries, zones and cultures, and where large firms 
operate internationally, position high-level functions in developed countries and 
outsource “pure” production to developing countries.
In fact, Italy (and Brenta within it) has so far represented the major exception, in 
which all functions are still usually performed by integrated firms, although with 
increasing difficulties and amidst signs that some functions, including design, have 
been partially ceded to global buyers, some of whom however, are Italian.
The transition to the global value chain was gradual, but it has changed 
radically most existing patterns. In 1968, the US imported 21.5% of its footwear 
consumption ; in 1998 it imported 92.8% with a 65.35% consumption increase over 
the same 30-year period. The UK imported 20% of its footwear consumption in 
1964, and 90% in 2000. Over just three years (1996 to 1999) the total number of 
employees in the footwear sector in Britain fell from 25,000 to just under 15,000 (as
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many as are currently employed in Brenta).74 In the last four decades Europe as a 
whole has experienced a significant contraction in the footwear sector, with a 
significant loss of jobs and a significant shift of production to overseas locations. 
As a consequence, “the main importers are developed countries and the main 
exporters are developing countries” with Italy as the major exception (although 
amidst increasing difficulties, with a share in world exports falling from over 30% in 
1985 to under 25% in 1990).76
Detailed information on the global value chain’s functioning was provided in 
April 2005 by Nike’s report on the financial year 2004, which includes data on 
outsourcing and is fully consistent with descriptions provided by the literature. The 
report confirms the clear distinction between “high-level” functions on the one hand, 
and production on the other hand, since “virtually all Nike products are manufactured 
by independent contract manufacturers” and “... most Nike products are made 
outside the USA”.77 According to its report, in 2004 Nike employed world-wide 
644,631 people in over 800 Nike branded contracted factories. A significant part of 
employees (244,735) worked in the footwear sector . Most footwear workers are in 
Asia (152,753 in Northern Asia, 88,292 in Southern Asia), and just 1,563 in Europe, 
Middle East and Africa and 2,127 in America (including the USA). Conversely, Nike 
Inc. (which acts as the hub and performs the high-quality function of the global 
system) has 24,291 employees, of whom 11,970 in the USA and just 3,282 in Asia 
and the Pacific.79
74 Paul Brenton, Annamaria Pinna and Mark Vancauteren, Adjustment to Globalization: A Study o f the 
Footwear Industry in Europe - Part 2, CEPS working documents n. 151, 2000, p.5.
15 Ibid., p. 9.
76 L. Bazan and L. Navas-Aleman, Comparing Chain Governance..., quote., p. 5.
77 www.nike.com/nikebiz
78 316,529 worked in apparel and 63,367 in equipment.
79 Footwear provides Nike’s highest net revenues: $6,569.9 million in 2004 followed by apparel with 
$3,545.4 million and sport equipment with $751, while other sectors account for $1,386.8.
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The take-off of the Italian footwear industry took place against the 
background of the above mentioned gradual shift of production from developed to 
developing countries. In I960, Italy ranked fourth in Europe behind France, Britain 
and Germany. By the mid-1980s, Italy had become the largest exporter in Europe 
and the second largest world-wide exporter after Taiwan. Until the 1960s, 
comparatively low wages not only gave Italian enterprises a significant competitive 
advantage, but also “... allowed a number of other crucial advantages for the 
following phases of development to be built up”, including those considered to be the 
components of the industrial district model.80
From the early 1970s, Italy faced increasing competition from other southern 
European as well as from a number of Asian and Latin American countries, which 
profited from cheap labour and thus obliged Italy to enhance product quality in an 
attempt to reduce price elasticity. Other factors (including the devaluation of the 
dollar and a shift in consumption habits towards shoes made of synthetic materials) 
led to a reduction of Italy’s share in exports and to a downgrading of its international 
ranking from second place in 1986 to fifth in 1990. In the 1990s, all the leading 
Western footwear producers were finding it difficult to remain competitive. Sharp 
decreases were experienced in particular between 1998 and 2000 (UK 68%, US 47%, 
France 21%, Germany 14%, but also Spain and Italy 8% each). Italy continued to be 
an exception among Western footwear producers, defending its share in high quality 
products while ceding just some of its market share in the low price segments. Italy 
has outsourced abroad frequently (which partly accounts for the 21% increase in 
shoe production in Romania, the most important country of destination for Italian 
outsourcing). This has not been the case for other European producers, where the
80 Roberta Rabellotti, Is There..., quote., p. 31.
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footwear industries were showing further shrinkage at the beginning of the 21st 
century.
In the light of the above, the following paragraphs will contextualise Brenta 
in terms of other footwear-producing areas: a number of other Italian districts on the 
one hand, and two Latin American areas on the other (Sinos Valley in Brazil and the 
loosely organised Mexican footwear clusters).
Not surprisingly, similarities but also differences exist among Italian footwear 
areas. Several “classical” Italian footwear areas feature all the fundamental 
components of the industrial district model mentioned above; but each area also 
shows some specific interaction among its components, this resulting in quite 
different historical developments. Brenta’s self-help organisations and formal 
institutions seem to be generally more developed and to have played a more incisive 
role in its historical development.81
The following paragraphs discuss some aspects of five other Italian footwear 
areas: two regions (Marches and Toscana), and three districts: Vigevano in 
Lombardy, Verona and Montebelluna in the Veneto. 82
The footwear industry in the Marches is relatively recent and encompasses 
two main areas: Sant’Elpidio a Mare and Montegranaro, totalling more than 2,500 
enterprises, 27,000 workers and 24% of Italy’s total production at the end of the 20th 
century. Both areas took off after the Second World War and were heavily 
influenced by two factors: the decline of the sharecropping system and rising
81 Ibid., p. 39.
82 Andrea Ordanini, I principali distretti calzaturieri italiani, Milan, 1995, passes a sweeping 
statement on Vigevano’s “failure” to adjust to changing environments since ... it switched from 
footwear manufacturing to the production of footwear machine tools! This seems to be rather a good 
example of functional upgrading. Moreover, in his attempt to follow a regional approach, Ordanini 
tries to identify common features for the three main areas of the Veneto region, but they are so 
different from one another that we consider them individually.
82 Illumining pages have been devoted to the Marches footwear industry by Michael L. Blim, Made in 
Italy. Small-Scale Industrialization and its Consequences, New York, 1990, in particular on the 
transition from sharecropping to small industries and the ensuing hybrid system.
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international demand.83 This in turn translated into the establishment of a network of 
small firms in less them one generation, initially through an interesting “hybrid” 
system that still combined sharecropping and footwear handicraft described by 
Blim.84 The area, however, even at this early stage, was able to produce not only for 
the domestic, but also for the international market. Ordanini underlines the negative 
repercussions of such a swift development and the ensuing gap between a rapid 
economic development and a more conservative social and cultural background. 
Some enterprises in the area have reached a considerable size, have established 
respected brands and are known individually (Diego della Valle in particular is 
currently a nationally well-known entrepreneur). Today, the Marches specialise in 
middle to upper quality leather production of which half is exported, but preserve a 
rather traditional organisation with little or no recourse to outsourcing and collective
85services.
The Tuscan area features more than 1,600 enterprises, just fewer than 20,000 
workers and just under 20% of the Italian total output at the end of the 20th century. It 
caters for different market segments: Pisa and Pistoia specialise in middle- to high-
o / :
quality shoes, Lucca in lower quality products. At the beginning of the 1970s, it 
was the largest footwear area in Italy, but its district identity has been decling 
since.This is due in particular to its heavy dependance on exogenous elements, in 
particular the vicinity to the skin and leather area of Santa Croce, the leading role of 
nearby Florence in fashion, and especially close links with the US market. This 
produced good results as long as US demand was high, but also constituted a 
permanent weakness as confirmed by the decrease of US orders from the mid-1980s.
84 Illumining pages have been devoted to the Marches footwear industry by Michael L. Blim, Made in 
Italy. Small-Scale Industrialization and its Consequences, New York, 1990, in particular on the 
transition from sharecropping to small industries and the ensuing hybrid system.
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Unlike in the Marches, Tuscan entrepreneurs seem not to be interested in outsourcing 
abroad and in non-production related activities.
The origin of the comparatively recent Verona district goes back to two main 
factors: the availability of a skilled but comparatively cheap local workforce, still 
available at a time when soaring labour costs had already obliged other Italian areas 
to shift towards higher market niches, and the favourable geographical location at the 
crossroad of connections through the Po Valley and with Austria and Germany. 
Verona has specialised in cheap shoes produced in comparatively large firms, with 
little recourse to outsourcing.
Montebellunacan trace its origins back to a local hiking shoe tradition 
established at the end of the 19th century. It has evolved into an original, capital- 
intensive, highly-specialised footwear district, featuring world brands, strong 
backward and forward linkages and increasing recourse to outsourcing, thanks to the 
optimal interaction between its components in the way described by Porter. 
Vigevano (in Lombardy) has experienced a similar, although less spectacular, 
evolution. Established at the same time as the Riviera, at the end of the 19th century, 
it evolved into a high-quality leather footwear area and then partially shifted to 
footwear machine tool production as of the late 1970s. Vigevano encompasses today 
both a traditional high-quality footwear sector (50 enterprises, 20 million euro in 
total production, the largest enterprises featuring a total production of 16 million 
euro) and an even larger footwear machine tool cluster (890 enterprises with a total 
production of approximately 300 million euro).
Direct domestic competition among the abovementioned widely varying 
districts (which account for more than two-thirds of total Italian footwear production) 
is therefore comparatively rare. Each one has followed specific development paths,
85 Andrea Ordanini, Iprincipali..., quote., p. 40 and 140.
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drawing upon its own strengths and facing the consequences of its own limits, and 
has therefore specialised in distinct niches.87 These districts cover a large range of 
products and product qualities on the one hand, and of internal organisational and 
inter-firm co-operation patterns on the other hand, and they have provided specific 
responses to specific historic and social challenges. The history of the Italian 
footwear industry confirms that industrial districts even within a single nation and 
within a specific, barely innovative and technologically mature sector can differ 
widely among themselves.
As recalled above, Italy is not only a leader in footwear design but also a 
major producer. It could therefore be useful to examine a number of relevant aspects 
of the footwear industry in those emerging countries which focus mainly on purely 
production-related aspects and compare them with Italy (and Brenta) with a view to 
identifying possible similarities in the starting conditions on one hand, and diverging 
subsequent developments on the other. This comparison would also underline that 
the industrial district model is not necessarily the only one, or the best analytical tool 
which can be applied to local economic developments in mature sectors where 
economies of scale are limited. On the contrary, excessive focus on this model can be 
misleading.
Sinos Valley, the Brazilian giant cluster of footwear enterprises, is particular 
interesting in this regard. Within just a few decades, it has evolved from a typical 
local cluster of small firms and artisan workshops, catering for the domestic market 
(not very different from the Riviera in the early second post-war period) to a sort of 
super-cluster deeply plugged into the international footwear value chain.
86 Ibid., p. 61.
87 A. Ordanini,1 principali distretti..., quote., p. 137.
Both Brenta and Sinos Valley to a large extent are export-driven success 
stories; both have drawn on capabilities developed by a cluster of small firms and 
artisan workshops in catering for the domestic market; both share the same basic 
weakness of an overemphasis on manufacturing and less developed capabilities in 
branding and marketing. However, Brenta represents a case of endogenous 
development based on flexible specialisation; Sinos Valley experienced a long period 
of exogenous accelerated growth based on the production of large batches in large 
factories, before the growing uncertainties of international markets prompted far- 
reaching reforms. Until the 1960s, Sinos Valley was essentially a cluster of 
craftsmen.; A survey in 1968 listed 454 small or very small firms which produced for 
the domestic market. .A second phase was triggered in the late 1960s by the export 
boom, which was prompted by US shoe importers looking for suppliers in low-wages 
countries. The boom was further enhanced by export incentives provided by the 
Brazilian government and probably also by the well co-ordinated collective response
Q Q
of local entrepreneurs through their self-help institutions. In Schmitz’s words, this 
paved the way for “... Fordist giants: ... factories of over 2,000 workers (huge for an 
industry in which scale economies are low)... organised along conveyors, engaged in 
highly fragmented repetitive work, making large volumes of standardised products”
flQ
of medium quality. This also had an impact on Brenta, where producers were 
forced to shift to higher market segments to face increased competition from Brazil 
and other emerging countries. In Sinos Valley, demand for local input and machinery 
grew rapidly to the extent that “within a radius of 50 kilometres of Novo Hamburgo, 
the economic centre of the Valley, most inputs (were) produced ... (and) most of the
88 The number of firms with more than 500 workers went from five in 1971 to 33 in 1983. Data for 
1991 relating to the whole state of Rio Grande do Sul (the bulk of which is represented by Sinos 
Valley) put the figure for firms with more than 500 workers at 75 and for firms with between 100 and 
500 workers at 150. At the same time, small firms still represented a sizeable segment along with the
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machines to turn these materials and components into shoes (were) made locally. 
Roughly speaking, for every job in shoe manufacturing there (was) a job in the local 
supply industry”.90 Politically, however, the cluster was weakened: the cluster 
became more hierarchical and faced a severe functional downgrading, which affected 
its capabilities in design, branding and marketing.
The 1990s marked the end of the development based solely on production 
processes. Large firms decentralised internally into mini plants, discarded their 
conveyors, introduced cellular manufacturing and internal just-in-time procedures, 
tried to stabilise their workforce, and invested more in training and building more co­
operative relationships with their suppliers.91 Some writers see in this a transition 
from “Fordism” to flexible specialisation “in both its small and large-firm variant”, 
encouraged by the adoption of Total Quality Programmes supported by buyers and 
local/federal authorities.92 In turn, this led to significant improvements in quality and 
delivery times but also “left many casualties” in the form of bankruptcies, firing of 
personnel and downsizing of firms, all of which was unavoidable as the globalisation 
wind blew harder and translated into cyclical crises 93
Sinos Valley has been presented as being in many respects “a highly developed 
industrial district”, although it is conceded that major deviations from the classical 
model make it rather a “hybrid” which encompasses elements of the competing
medium and large firms. Production grew from 20 million pairs of shoes in 1970 to 170 million in the 
late 1980s, while exports in the same period went from nothing to 100 million.
89 L. Bazan and L. Navas-Aleman, Comparing Chain Governance..., quote.., p. 11.
90 Ibid., p. 11.
91 Ibid., p. 11.
92 Hubert Schmitz, Small Shoemakers..., quote., p. 22.
93 As in Brenta, currency fluctuations had a major impact on export levels in Brazil. The overvaluation 
of the new currency, the real, in 1994 was damaging; the mini-devaluations of the subsequent years, at 
7% a year, were beneficial. Exports passed form 900 million US dollars in 1985 to 1.8 billion US 
dollars in 1993, 1.5 billion in 1994 (the year of the “Plan Real”) and even further down to 1.3 billion 
in 1999. An escape from the by then structural crisis was sought (in addition to traditional, short-lived 
measures such as a devaluation by half for the real in 1999), through a move up in the value chain and 
a shift away from mere manufacturing to design, branding and marketing channelled through the 
“Shoes from Brazil Multilateral Programme”.
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Fordist model.94 Consequently, distinctions between the two paradigms become 
blurred and their relevance as analytical tools is strongly reduced.
A more constructive approach would rather consider Sinos simultaneously from both 
perspectives of industrial districts and the global value chain. This would offer 
insights on how local and global governances coexist, rather than suggesting 
comparisons with “traditional” clusters leading to yet other versions of the industrial 
district model.
It was the orders placed by large USA buyers that prompted the entry of Sinos into 
the global value chain and translated into the emergence of comparatively large, 
integrated “Fordist” firms strictly focussed on the production process and therefore 
undergoing a simultaneous functional downgrading. In turn, this altered significantly 
the previous networks of small and medium-sized enterprises, which catered mainly 
for the domestic market and performed a wider array of function including design, 
branding and marketing.
However, Sinos* new “Fordist” structure was never monolithical. Not only the 
degree of control exercised by final buyers varied and was not always equally 
intrusive, but also significant clusters of small and medium-sized firms continued to 
produce for the Brazilian domestic market and escaped pressure from USA and 
European buyers to concentrate exclusively on production and economies of scale. 
The continued existence of flexible, small and medium-sized firms and of their 
mutual relations made possible what Bazan and Navas-Aleman term “underground 
revolution”, which has been underway since the mid-1990s and consists essentially 
in a retreat from Fordism and a return to flexible specialisation. 95
94 Hubert Schmitz, Small Shoemakers..., quote., p. 22.
95 L. Bazan and L. Navas-Aleman, Comparing Chain Governance..., quote.., p 13.
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In the light of the above, periodisations are merely indicative and should also be put 
into perspective. Hubert Schmitz’s tripartition of Sinos’s history (craft until the late 
1960s, Fordism in the 1970s and 1980s, flexible specialisation afterwards) underlines 
correctly the most striking feature of each period, but also tends to convey the rather 
misleading impression that Sinos’s development was an oscillating movement of the 
whole area from an industrial district-like situation to Fordism and back, prompted 
by evolution in the international markets. In reality, Sinos’s craft production and 
local networks not only prospered even in the 1970s and 1980s, but even provided 
the preconditions for the “underground revolution” which has so far ensured the 
survival of the area (including its Fordist components) in a changing environment.
The same note of caution should be applied also to footwear clusters in 
another Latin American country, Mexico, where inter-firm relations are essentially of 
a market-type. The Mexican areas of Leon and Guadalajara had 1,700 and 1,200 
footwear firms respectively (i.e. approximately 60% of the national total) at the time 
of Rabellotti’s comparison with Italian areas (including Brenta). As in Brazil and 
Italy, the Mexican footwear industry produced initially for the domestic market and 
reached a certain level of sophistication. Unlike Brazil, where the internationalisation 
of the footwear industry was prompted by US buyers looking for alternative and 
cheaper production locations, the Mexican footwear industry was exposed to 
internationalisation by national political developments, in particular the 
establishment of the Free Trade Area in North America. Rabellotti notes that 
Mexican footwear enterprises are not significantly larger than those in the Riviera 
and are definitely smaller than their Brazilian counterparts. They have established 
some good self-help organisations as well as providers of some common services,
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but inter-firm division of labour is not common and firms tend to be vertically 
integrated, internalising all possible production phases and keeping sub-contracting 
to a minimum ... the relationship between suppliers and shoe producers are less 
collaborative than in Italy and are based mainly on a pure market mechanism”.96 This 
is partly due to the persistent lack of reliability among local suppliers and in general 
of forward and backward linkages. Commercialisation, in this case very similar to 
the Italian case, also continues to be one of the weakest points. However, social ties 
and local cultures are apparently very strong and provide informal but effective 
interaction among economic actors, to a higher degree than, for instance, in Italy. 
Rabellotti found in Mexico “a social environment characterised by strong family ties, 
proximity of economic agents and existence of a sense of community among 
entrepreneurs and workers which favour exchanges of information and help firms to
0*7share their problems and to find common solutions”.
At most, it can be said that the Mexican footwear industry is still in a state of 
flux and could evolve in the direction of structures resembling the industural district 
model: in Mexico, “... footwear enterprises and suppliers are now starting to realise 
the importance of a systemic view of the production process... (there are) a few 
examples of initiatives to foster the systemic approach, showing a real effort towards 
building up a system of production in some way inspired by the industrial district 
model”.98
96 R. Rabellotti, Is There ..., quote., p. 36.
97 Ibid., p. 38.
98 Ibid., p. 36-7.
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Fordism versus flexible specialisation in Brenta: a local east-west divide
The comparatively successful large scale shoe factories of Sinos Valley
confirm that even the footwear industry can benefit from economies of scale and that
not all footwear firms are necessarily destined to be small or medium-sized. As
mentioned above, the debate on large versus small firms has a particular relevance
for Brenta, which hosts the industrial footwear district in its western section and a
cluster of large heavy industries (Marghera) in its eastern part. Large-scale
industrialisation in eastern Brenta started already in the mid-19th century, with a
candle factory established in Mira in 1835, which had some success and eventually
grew into Mira Lanza, one of the largest Italian chemical concerns."
The Riviera’s experience with both types of development paths can be
relevant in the current reassessment of the role of large enterprises in the economic
development of Italy. “Once almost moribund, the field is now alive and well and
100loaded with opportunities for exciting and important research”. In particular, there 
is a growing awareness among economic historians that the rapid increase in labour 
and total factor productivity during the Italian “economic miracle” of the late 1950s 
and early 1960s was due to increased economies of scale along with structural and 
technological changes. Increased economies of scale were particularly evident in 
activities such as steelmaking, chemical production and oil refining, where the role 
of the public sector was particularly relevant.101
99 Zamagni V., The Economic History o f Italy1860-1990: Recovery after Decline, Oxford 1993, p.19.
100 John Cohen and Giovanni Federico, The Growth of the Italian Economy1820-1960, Cambridge 
2003, p. 107.
101 Consequently, growing attention is now paid to the main instrument through which the public 
authorities intervened in the Italian economic system: IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale). 
Some writers in Britain in the late 1960s and early 1970s presented IRI as an example of how Britain 
could build new public economic structures, building on the role played by Italian holding companies 
in the rapid growth of the Italian economy during the “economic miracle”. Such attention eventually
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Marco Bellandi underlines that local systems reach their maximum efficiency 
if the production process is decomposable and its components are actually 
conveniently divided among the firms in the system”.102 Consequently, according to 
Colli, industrial districts are in fact present in those industries "... where it is 
economically feasible to split the production process between a number of small 
simply structured firms, each of them performing a special phase” (which does not 
mean that in real industrial districts some or even several firms can be vertically 
integrated).103 Shoe manufacturing is indeed easily decomposable, both in terms of 
components (heels, uppers, soles) and production phases (cutting, stitching and 
sewing, finishing), and it seems therefore eminently well suited for small-scale, 
flexible production. However, there are no “natural” boundaries between large-scale 
and small batch production based solely on the intrinsic characteristics of the goods 
produced, as Sinos Valley (but to some extent also Brenta, in particular during its 
early “Fordist” stage) confirms. Mass and batch production actually should be seen 
as complementary and coexisting rather than as mutually excluding alternatives. This 
is true for production in which the skills of individual workers are decisive. 
Camevali for instance notes the absence of a rift between small- and large-scale 
producers in Birmingham’s jewellery industry by the turn of the 20th century, which 
leads her to refute “... the existence of a divide between the artisan and factory 
production and, as a consequence, the sequential interpretation of the process of 
industrialisation”.104 But this can hold true even for scale-intensive activities such as 
those mentioned above, including for instance steel production. Ruggero recalls that
contributed to the establishment in 1976 of the NEB (National Enterprise Board), which “owed much 
to the arguments of those who presented IRI as an example to be followed”: Jim Tomlinson, Learning 
from Italy? The British Public Sector and IRI, in W. Feldenkirchen and T. Gourvish (eds.), European 
Yearbook o f Business History, Vol. 2,1999, 109-19.
102 Marco Bellandi, The Industrial District in Marshall, in E. Goodman, J. Bamford and P. Saynor 
(eds.), quote., p. 138.
103 A. Colli, Networking the Market..., quote., p.77.
104 F. Camevali, Golden Opportunities..., quote., 279.
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all steel companies acquired by the 1933 established IRI (and accounting for 
approximately 50% of Italian steel production) were placed within FINSIDER, one 
of IRI’s newly-formed sub-holdings, which consequently made it the largest national 
steel producer. After the destruction brought on by the Second World War and in the 
wake of the subsequent recovery, the two largest private steelmakers were the 
automobile maker Fiat and the family-owned Falck group. “The dispute between 
FINSIDER and the Falck family on the terms of post-Second World War 
reconstruction is regarded as a classic of Italy’s industrial policy debate... FINSIDER 
insisted on rebuilding large integrated coastal plants based on standardised mass 
production, whereas the Falcks believed that Italy should eschew the large scale and 
concentrate on high value-added, small batch production”.105 Although losing market 
shares to FINSIDER, private smaller companies continued to grow and launched a 
powerful challenge through the mini-mill sector. Mini-mills, located around the city 
of Brescia, were originally makers of very small electrical steel and scrap re-roller. 
Michael Porter mentions this cluster as an example of small firms being able to 
utilise sophisticated technology. Again some of them (among which Riva and 
Lucchini) were able to emerge from the mini-mill sector and become significant 
international private companies.106
Mass production and flexible specialisation appear as parallel, rather than 
competing paradigms of industrial organisation, also in the history of Ansaldo, a 
Genoese engineering and shipbuilding company. Dewerpe shows that craft 
organisations controlled Ansaldo before the First World War, with little managerial 
control, and that Taylorism and Fordism were first applied only in the early 1940s, in 
order to meet the increased requirements of wartime production. However, relations
105 Ruggero Ranieri, Steel and the State in Italy and the UK. The Public Sector of the Steel Industry in 
Comparative Perspective (1945-1996), in W. Feldenkirchen and T. Gourvish (eds.), European 
Yearbook o f Business History, Vol. 2, 1999, 127-8.
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proved uneasy between a new managerial model and the underlying structure of 
Ansaldo, which was still largely dependent on handicraft: in the end “flexible 
specialisation won out”.107
In light of the above, the following paragraphs highlight some aspects of 
Marghera’s economic history which are particularly relevant to Brenta* s 
development.
Public works began in 1919, aimed at transforming a vast swamp at the 
eastern end of the Riviera and on the internal shore of the Venetian lagoon into an 
entirely new industrial area comprising a port as well as adjacent naval, chemical, 
petrochemical and mechanical industries. At the end of the 1930s, Marghera 
produced 88% of Italian aluminium, 59% of alumina, between 90 and 100% of 
cadmium, 33% of zinc, 47% of ammonium phosphate, 100% of plexigas, and 100% 
of propan and butane gas.108 At the height of its development in the early 1970s, 
Marghera had approximately 55,000 workers, most of whom were either immigrants 
or commuters from the rural adjacent areas and from the eastern and central parts of 
the Rivera. The subsequent turmoil — in particular the two oil crises of 1973 and 
1979, the downsizing of large industries in Italy, growing labour unrest and a 
growing environmental awareness -- plunged Marghera into a crisis which led inter 
alia to a decrease in employment to 14,000 workers. The area has experienced some 
recovery in recent years, in particular in shipbuilding and industrial chemistry, still 
drawing from ist main characteristic: “the complex and widespread interaction
106 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage..., quote., p. 128-9.
107 William Lazonick, Review of C. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, Flexibility and Mass Production in Western 
Industrialisation, New York, 1997, Business History Review, v. 73, Number 2, Summer 1999, 310-1.
108 Vera Zamagni, The Economic History..., quote., p. 292.
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between the principal productive cycles in the chemical and electrometallurgical 
industries”, as Petri defines it.109
In some respects, the relationship between the Riviera and Porto Marghera 
mirrors the divide between the industrial districts and the Fordist enterprises 
described by Sabel and Piore: two worlds apart, with little or nothing in common. 
The former features small enterprises, flexible specialisation, labour-intensive 
technology, availability of a skilled workforce, and “informal” part-time domestic 
work; the latter meanwhile features economies of scale, technological progress but 
also fragmented work at the assembly line, heavy environmental costs and labour 
conflicts. If Brenta is in many respects (not in all) an autonomous, endogenous and 
spontaneous district, Marghera is the result of exogenous and planned interventions 
brought about by state and private actors and by specific political decisions taken at 
the highest national level.
Marghera has consistently been the object of heated debates, defined by 
Sergio Romano, the author of possibly the best research on its origin, as very 
“Venetian”: passionate, intense, but also emotional, imprecise, self-indulgent and not 
action-oriented. 110However, writers have not devoted adequate attention to 
Marghera’s role in the economic development of the adjacent Riviera industrial 
district despite their physical propinquity which resulted in some reciprocal 
influence. Some of the resulting effects (in particular, the availability of labour in 
Brenta, unionisation, an indirect push to move to upper market niches, and political 
affiliations) will be discussed in following chapters of this thesis. The next 
paragraphs highlight the aspects of Marghera* s economic history which are most 
relevant in this regard.
109 Ibid, p. 292.
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The literature on Marghera swings from an overall positive assessment to 
agitated criticism. In a first long phase, from 1919 until the late 1960s, it mainly 
focused on the economic recovery of Venice brought about by the new industrial 
area after decades of decline, and on the innovative new “industrial port” which 
combined a port (on the internal shores of the Venetian lagoon at the eastern end of 
the Riviera, just 800 meters away from Palladio’s villa “Malcontenta”) with an 
industrial park to process the commodities delivered by ship and which in turn was 
connected with the mainland by waterways, roads and railways. Transportation costs 
for bulky, heavy commodities were therefore minimised. Marghera’s initial success 
led to the doubling of its area between 1950 and 1960. Plans for further expansion 
were approved in 1963 but were brought to a halt by the disastrous flood of Venice 
on 4 November 1966 and by the crises of the 1970s. Attention then turned to 
Marghera’s shortcomings, in particular the environmental problems caused by highly 
polluting chemical enterprises and its insufficient forward- and backward linkages 
with local enterprises. As far as the latter are concerned, Marghera’s shortcomings 
seem to confirm that “the large enterprise cannot go it alone... (and that) to remain 
strong, the core firms (of large industries) require a network of related and 
supporting activities carried out by small, medium-sized and even large firms”.111 
The birth of Marghera was due to a single leading personality: the Venetian Count 
Giuseppe Volpi di Misurata (1877-1949), who played a significant role in many 
major events in Italy in the first half of the 20th century as the founder of one of the 
largest Italian power supply companies, governor of the Italian colony of Tripolitania
110 Sergio Romano, Giuseppe Volpi. Industria e finanza tra Giolitti e Mussolini, Venice, 1997.
111 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Takashi Hikino and Alice Teichova, International Economy and Large 
Industrial Enterprises in the Twentieth Century, in Margarita Dritsas and Terry Gourvish (eds.), 
European Enterprise..., quote., p. 37.
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(Libya) and Italian Minister of Finance. By the time he started his plans for 
Marghera, he was a successful businessman. In particular, he had established 
Societa’Adriatica di Elettricita’ (SADE) in 1904, with the aim of providing electrical 
power to the largest cities of Veneto by connecting the several scattered small power 
stations into a unified network. SADE’s first intervention took place precisely in the 
Riviera, connecting the small plants of Mestre, Mira, Dolo, Stra’, Noventa and 
Padova, and thus connecting Padua to Venice and indirectly helping the firm Voltan 
take its first steps. Volpi’s excellent political and social connections were 
instrumental in the success of his initiative. This speaks volumes on the alleged 
isolation of the Veneto region from the national economic and political powerhouses 
of the time.
Volpi’s vision of Marghera drew upon a number of previous projects and 
should be set in the context of an ongoing debate on the future of both the port and 
industry in Venice.112 Marghera certainly shared one of the main characteristics of 
the industrial districts: the co-location of a number of firms within a comparatively 
small, homogeneous area. However, the lack of real specialisation in a given sector 
hampered local inter-firm co-operation and vertical division of labour. The gap 
between its comparatively advanced technologies and the comparatively backward 
local economic environment hindered the development of significant backward and 
forward linkages.
112 In 1905, Erminio Cucchini presented a plan for a new commercial port not in Venice itself, but 
rather on the internal shores of the lagoon, near the old Venetian Marghera fortress in a swampy area 
at the estuary of the Brenta waterway. This proposal was the last and most serious of a number of 
plans to counter the economic decline of Venice. Surveys conducted in 1904 had confirmed that a lack 
of adequate space was an insurmountable obstacle to the industrial recovery of Venice itself, where 
just a few hectares were available.
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Indicators confirm a significant development in industrial activities as the 
new port and the new industrial area were completed and extended.113 As a 
consequence, the population of the adjacent village of Mestre and the new residential 
area of Marghera increased steadily: 7,500 inhabitants in 1901, 30,000 in 1926,
80.000 in 1945, 130,000 in 1958 and 210,000 in 1974. By that time, there were more 
people there than in Venice proper, where the population decreased to fewer than
100.000 over the same period. In 1971, at the peak of is fortunes, Marghera had
45.000 industrial workers employed in 248 industrial enterprises and 10,000 workers 
employed in supporting commercial enterprises. Many came from the rural adjacent 
areas and from the Riviera, which in fact lost up to 5,000 skilled workers who found 
better pay and more stable employment in Marghera. The following three decades of 
crisis subsequently reduced employment to fewer than 14,000, although the number 
of firms remains stable at around 300.
As mentioned above, Riviera’s propinquity to Marghera is a significant 
element which has been frequently overlooked by the specialised literature. In the 
Brenta historical area, stretching from Padua to Venice, an industrial district coexists 
with one of the largest Fordist clusters of heavy industry in southern Europe. Both 
were established at the beginning of the 20th century, both experienced a significant 
expansion in the second post-war period, and both underwent restructuring and 
downsizing as of the 1970s. Marghera’s industries split the Riviera into two 
economic halves, with different labour markets and different economic structures. 
But Marghera also influenced the Riviera footwear districts in several, indirect ways. 
Commuting had already begun in the 1930s, but increased significantly after the
113 The 5,000 tons transported to Venice by railway in 1920 grew to over 60,000 tons in 1932. The
240.000 tons shipped to the new port in 1925 increased to 850,000 tons in 1932 and to 2 million tons 
in 1938. In 1928, 81 factories employed 5,000 workers. By 1938, the number of factories had 
increased to 94 with 15,000 workers: Guido Zordan, La Laguna e la terraferma, in the collective book 
Venezia, Milan, 1985, p. 702-703.
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completion of the second industrial zone in 1965, depleting the Riviera’s traditional 
pool of skilled, cheap workers and therefore helping to force Brenta’s production into 
upper market niches, which are less price-sensitive. Marghera’s Fordism favoured 
the unionisation of workers, which was mirrored by a parallel unionisation at least in 
the largest footwear firm in the Brenta. A reaction to growing unionisation was a 
closer co-operation among Brenta’s entrepreneurs and the establishment of their 
association as a counterpart to trade unions. The subsequent crisis at Marghera and 
the return of several workers to the Riviera again favoured Brenta’s outsourcing to 
smaller firms and even artisan workshops, which could draw from this newly 
available and comparatively cheap source of labour.
At a more general level, Marghera’s history confirms the somewhat hybrid 
nature of the Veneto region within the Third Italy. Far from corresponding to the 
traditional image of the pre-district Third Italy — largely rural and dependent on 
sharecropping — Veneto had already experienced a significant industrial 
development after the unification with Italy in 1866. The census of 1911 put Veneto 
third among Italian industrial regions, behind Lombardy and Piedmont, with 32% of 
the working population in the provinces of Venice and Vicenza being employed in 
industry. Volpi’s connections to both Rome’s political world and Lombard and 
Milanese financial circles, which were instrumental to Marghera’s success, confirm 
the existence of solid networks in the Veneto region. Alessandro Rossi, founder of 
Italy’s largest textile industry near Vicenza in 1873, and Stefano Breda, founder of 
Italy’s largest steel producers at the time, are just a few other names which verify 
that at the beginning of the 20th century, when the Riviera footwear system was still 
nascent, industrial entrepreneurship was comparatively widespread in Veneto. 114The
114 Giorgio Roverato, L’industria nel Veneto: storia economica di un “caso” regionale, Padova, 1996, 
p. 16-18; 231-232.
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history of Brenta’s nascent footwear industry, set in the context of other industrial 
initiatives in the Veneto region, questions the usual distinction between the Italian 
“industrial triangle” and a persistently rural northeastern and central Italy based on 
sharecropping, to which a very different type of industrialisation would come only 
several decades later.
Voltan and a number of other local entrepreneurs show that at the time of the 
first Italian industrial take-off, the whole of northern Italy was much more 
homogeneous that in the traditional bipartition between an advanced industrial 
“triangle” in the northwest and a backward northeast (destined to fill the gap almost a 
century later, before turning itself into the core of the “Third Italy”). In particular, a 
skilled, capable and comparatively large entrepreneurial class throughout 
northeastern Italy at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, at the 
helm of small- and medium-sized as well as large enterprises of national relevance, 
was instrumental in the economic developments of the following decades.
Brenta’s development in the context of Italy’s economic history
Brenta’s birth and growth did not take place in a vacuum, but were deeply 
affected by national and international events. The following paragraphs recall some 
major developments of the Italian economic history which were closely mirrored by 
corresponding developments in Brenta. These paragraphs do not offer a summary of 
Italy’s economic history from the late 19th century, but rather underline some crucial 
elements confirming that Brenta, like probably most other industrial districts, was 
deeply shaped by exogenous events at the national, European and international level. 
The role of the main actors of an industrial district, and in particular their degree of 
autonomy in the definition and pursuit of growth strategies, can only be properly 
assessed in this wider perspective. It is necessary to go beyond the emphasis on
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purely local factors, which is preferred by much literature of the “golden period” of 
the industrial district model.
The following paragraphs focus on post-World War II developments, when 
Brenta had already taken up the structure of an industrial district. However, some 
aspects of the early Italian industrial take-of at the beginning of the 19th century will 
also be briefly mentioned, in order to underline that even the modest industrial 
initiatives in Brenta during the 1890s would probably not have been possible without 
a national positive economic cycle and its spill-overs to the still comparatively 
peripheral Veneto. References to the Italian economic history are drawn in particular 
from Zamagni’s classical work and from the more recent Cohen and Federico’s new 
interpretations based on revised quantitative data.115
At the time of unification in 1861, the main features of Italy’s economic 
system were its comparative backwardness, its nascent industrialisation, and cyclical 
trends which depended largely on international factors. A long positive cycle lasted 
from the mid-1890s to the First World War. It paved the way for the emergence of 
the Milan-Turin-Genoa “industrial triangle” which was to shape Italy’s economy 
throughout most of the 20th century. However, a number of significant industries was 
established in other areas, including Veneto. Some leading Venetian entrepreneurs 
played a role even at the national level, including Alessandro Rossi, who established 
the largest national textile industry near Vicenza, and Stefano Breda, who established 
his steel company in 1884 in Padua. State intervention in the economy focused on a 
progressive shift from liberalism to protectionism and some direct interventions in 
heavy industry and infrastructure. Some public works were also carried out in 
Brenta, including the electric tramway from Venice to Padua, new bridges and locks
115 V. Zamagni, The Economic History o f Italy..., quote.,; John Cohen and Giovanni Federico, The 
Growth o f the Italian Econom... quote., p. 1-2. A reassessment of economic history as a key to a better
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on the waterway, and several small power plants in each of the largest Riviera 
communes. At the time of the establishment of Voltan’s first partially mechanised 
enterprise, Veneto was playing a significant role in the first national take-off and was 
taking significant steps towards industrialisation, well before the “Third Italy” caught 
the attention of observers.116
However, as mentioned above, the interaction between the local and the 
national/international levels in Brenta* s development is best underlined with 
reference to the post-World War II period. In In general, the literature emphasizes 
continuity rather than radical innovation in post-war Italy, which was made possible 
in particular by comparatively limited war damage. By 1946, Italy’s GDP had 
already reached 60% of the pre-war level, i.e. twice as high as in Germany. Brenta is 
a case in point: the network of small firms established by 1940 was still largely in 
place in 1945, and even Voltan was able to resume its activities without delay.. The 
industrial structure of Italy was therefore still largely that of the Fascist period and 
led by three sectors: textiles, electricity and food. In the following years, the 
relatively small steel, automobile and chemical enterprises, established at the turn of 
the century and therefore able to build upon decades of preparation, experienced 
good growth rates. Protectionism was progressively abandoned and the opening of 
the national economy especially towards other European countries pursued. Italy 
joined the the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1946, the OEEC 
in 1949, the European Payments Union in 1950, ECSC (European Coal and Steel 
Community) in 1953 and the EEC (European Economic Community) in 1957. Not
understanding of Italy’s current situation is offered by Pierluigi Ciocca, II tempo dell’economia. 
Strutture, fatti, interpreti del Novecento, Torino 2005.
116 on the role played by the two comparatively large industrial areas of Vicenza (textile) and 
Marghera (steel, shipbuilding, chemicals) on the economic development of Veneto well before the 
take-off of the ‘Third Italy”, see Giorgio Roverato, L ’industria net Veneto: Storia economica di un 
caso regionale, Padova 1996.
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surprisingly, Brenta too experienced an export-driven growth from the 1950s (well in 
advance of other Italian footwear areas).117
Italy experienced a phase of intense growth between 1956 and 1963, often 
termed the “economic miracle”. At the end of this period, Brenta emerged as a fully- 
fledged cluster of footwear firms. The debate is still open as to which was the leading 
factor in the economic miracle and whether it was due to exports (which really grew 
only after 1955 and only for a limited number of products, among which 
automobiles, oil products, textiles, rubber and footwear) or to a general environment 
conducive to capital accumulation, in particular through the co-existence of an 
abundant workforce (which in turn ensured low salaries and moderate labour 
conflicts), self-financing, and initial technological backwardness, which allowed 
rapid increases in productivity. A combination of both of these factors probably 
provides the best answer, as shown by Brenta which experienced growing export 
rates from the early 1950s but equally profited from an abundant low wage 
workforce and a rapid increase in productivity due to its comparative technological 
backwardness.
Brenta appears also to confirm some of Vera Lutz’ remarks on the “dualism” 
of the Italian industrial system.118 Trade union action, which was effective in large 
enterprises, would have led to significant salary increases which in turn would have 
compelled such industries to shift towards capital-intensive production. Small 
enterprises, where trade union action was much less effective, would have been able 
to continue their traditional labour-intensive production. In turn, this dichotomy 
would have led Italy to a three-pronged structure based on labour costs. Enterprises 
based on economies of scale and therefore obliged to reach an adequate size would
117 Augusto Graziani, L ’economia italiana dal 1945 ad oggi, Bologna, 1972, p. 26.
118 Vera Lutz, 11 dualismo dell’economia italiana, in Augusto Graziani (ed.), Ueconomia italiana dal 
1945 ad oggi, Bologna, 1972, p. 227-34.
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have been ready to pay higher wages. Enterprises where economies of scale were not 
particularly significant (commerce, some services, etc.) tended to pay lower wages. 
For a third group of enterprises, economies of scale would have been beneficial, but 
not essential. According to Lutz, this led to the establishment of numerous firms in 
which economies of scale could be compensated by savings on labour costs and 
where, consequently, high and low wages co-existed. The small artisan workshop 
and the “large” industry, pursuing different strategies, could therefore live and even 
prosper side by side. This did indeed happen in the Riviera del Brenta, which 
featured both“large” firms with more than 100 workers, open to some technical 
innovation but also struck by early industrial action, alongside small labour- 
intensive artisan workshops with just a few employees s.119
The situation changed in the decade from 1963 to 1973. The nation-wide 
“crisis” of 1963 (in reality, a temporary slowdown of exports) halted Brenta's growth 
for a couple of years, prompting its first, limited internal reorganisation which 
included a more intense working pace, overtime and individual incentivesA second, 
by far more far-reaching restructuring took place between 1970 and 1974, under 
much more difficult international circumstances (such as the suspension of the dollar 
convertibility in 1969, the dollar devaluation in 1971, increases in commodity prices 
in 1972, and the collapse of fixed exchange rates in 1973) and domestic 
circumstances (in particular the labour conflicts in 1969 -  the so-called “hot 
autumn”, and the free floatation of the lira in 1973). It affected Italian industry in all 
aspects, financial, territorial, technological, and affected both capital- and labour- 
intensive enterprises. In particular, enterprises tended to outsource all phases of 
production which could technically be performed elsewhere, with only the core 
production phases remaining in-houseln Brenta (and in other footwear areas as well)
119 A. Graziani (ed.), L'economia italiana..., quote., p. 229.
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the production of soles and components (for instance, heels) tended to be outsourced, 
but not the most difficult production phases like stitching and finishing. In the crucial 
years between 1970 and 1974, Brenta’s largest entrepreneurs similarly to the rest of 
Italy. At the same time, in line with the Brentan conservatism described in preceding 
paragraphs, innovations were comparatively limited and did not fundamentally alter 
its characteristics including, as in Vera Lutz* model, the co-existence of small and 
large firms. On a whole, Brenta’s largest entrepreneurs reached the three objectives 
recalled by Graziani with reference to Italy as a whole: labour costs were reduced; 
flexibility was enhanced since production could be increased or reduced without 
modifying the level of employment; and the bargaining power of the trade unions 
was weakened, since the workforce was now dispersed.120 According to Vera 
Zamagni, two factors are particularly important in this context: first, the existence of 
local traditions conducive to the emergence of micro-entrepreneurial skills and 
capable of making up for some unfavourable conditions; second, difficult industrial 
relations in large firms which made small-scale firms more attractive to 
entrepreneurs (although the growth of small business took place also outside the 
decentralisation process).121 Both factors were at work in Brenta.
In recent years, however, Brenta seems to have lost touch with the most 
promising developments in comparable areas, in particular the emergence, if not of 
large firms, at least of an adequate number of medium-sized concerns, specialising in 
mechanical engineering products and in textiles and clothing, often led by the 
founding families who are rooted in industrial districts (including in Veneto). De 
Cecco compares this new layer of enterprises to the German “Mittelstand”, which 
has played a significant role in the economic prosperity of post-war Germany (at 
least as long as the informal but efficient semi-institutional co-operation between
120 Ibid., p. 103-5.
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firms, trade unions, public authorities and banks has worked properly). Their future 
will depend on the responses they will provide to at least five challenges: an Italian 
banking system still less efficient than its European counterparts; the end of 
competitive devaluations; the reform of the tax system, which since the late 1990s 
has significantly eroded the possibility for (and interest in) undeclared labour; the 
generational transition among entrepreneurs; the lack of skilled workers.
Andrea Colli considers these new medium-sized firms (“pocket 
multinationals”) as harbingers of a fourth phase of Italian capitalism, after those 
embodied in large firms (public and private) and in small- and medium-sized 
enterprises often located in industrial districts. A large number of these new Italian 
“pocket multinationals” are entrenched in industrial districts, which were 
instrumental for their birth and growth and which now tend to be restructured along 
the lines of the hub-and-spike model. A number of these firms are indeed footwear 
enterprises, located in southern Italy, the Marches, Montebelluna.122 Even Brenta’s 
largest enterprises, again in line with their conservatism, are still far from the 
minimum critical mass which could trigger entry into this new phase.
Some preliminary conclusions and an outline of the following chapters
The preceding paragraphs have underlined the need for a reassessment of the 
industrial district model based on its Italianate version, and they have set the context 
for the analysis of Brenta’s economic history as a case study relevant in this respect. 
It can be useful now to recall the intrinsic function of industrial districts: a model As 
such, they are not expected either to capture all facets of the real world or to provide 
the ultimate explanation of events. A model, much in line with Kuhn’s concept of a
121 Vera Zamagni, The Economic History..., quote., p. 251-2.
122 Andrea Colli, I volti di Proteo-Storia della piccola impresa in Italia nel Novecento, Milan, 2002, p. 
293-4.
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paradigm, provides a set of rules of interpretation which can be useful in identifying 
some relations between specific aspects of the real world and some cause-effect 
relations.123 A model always implies some degree of simplification and a focus on 
certain elements at the expense of others, in order to allow for the comprehension of 
the general functioning of the observed reality and to formulate predictions about 
future trends. As such, different models can be compatible or even mutually 
reinforcing. Models do not exist in the real world; they are products of analysts’ 
minds. Industrial districts, including Brenta, are no exception: consequently, a 
“perfect” industrial district, fully corresponding to the ideal model, does not exist. 
All comparisons between a given district and a given model have, quite predictably, 
come up with a list of aspects in which reality falls short of ideal.124 A model, like a 
Kuhn-ian paradigm, can be replaced by a new, more accurate one, more suitable for 
shedding light on some aspects of reality. And the new model in turn will sooner or 
later be discarded and replaced. This does not mean that the model was wrong in
11Sitself, or that it did not serve its purpose as a tool for analysis or even for action.
In the case of the Third Italy, however, after more than three decades of 
contributions, debates and discussions, industrial districts have also become more 
than a mere model.
First, they have become a pattern of self-perception by local clusters of small- 
and medium-sized enterprises. Observation is rarely neutral and tends to modify the
123 On Kuhn’s concept of paradigm: Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilisations, London 1997, 
p. 29-30.
1 *)JL Some writers refer mention the Riviera as a test case: see Roberta Rabellotti, Is There an Industrial 
District Model? Footwear Districts in Italy and Mexico Compared, World Development, January 
1995,29-42.
125 •Huntington lists five criteria to assess a model’s validity. It should enable us to: “1. Order and 
generalise about reality; 2. Understand causal relationships among phenomena, 3. Anticipate and, if 
we are lucky, predict future developments; 4. Distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; 
and 5. Show us what paths we should take to achieve our goals”: Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash..., 
quote., p. 30. The industrial district model, preferably in its broader version, would probably satisfy 
even the most demanding interpretation of these criteria.
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realities observed: this is true of the natural as well as of human sciences. The 
persistent attention to the added value of inter-firm co-operation, self-help 
organisations, local cultures and traditions, collective local identities, synergies 
within a given area, even direct political and financial incentives, have led the actors 
operating within a district to pattern their conduct on the industrial district model. To 
some extent, we are what we perceive ourselves to be and what others perceive we 
are. In the case of Brenta, the term “industrial district” was almost unknown locally 
until the early 1990s, and Brenta was seldom listed among Italian districts. Over the 
last ten years, however, entrepreneurs, trade unions and public authorities alike have 
increasingly used this concept in referring to Brenta, tending to act accordingly and 
consequently stressing its collective dimension.
Second, industrial districts have also become a legal concept in Italy. 
Incentives are foreseen for individual districts, the borders of which are defined on 
the basis of some (vague and flexible) criteria established by the law. Incentives are 
granted to both individual enterprises and collective local organisations. In practice, 
Italian legislation encourages local clusters to present themselves as industrial 
districts and, in some cases, to act accordingly. The Veneto region, which includes 
the Riviera, is particularly active in this area.
Finally, industrial districts have also become a tool of Italian foreign policy. 
For instance, during the Italian presidency of the Council of the European Union (the 
second half of 2003), the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs devoted attention to the 
industrial districts and launched several initiatives aimed at helping to establish 
industrial districts in countries such as Croatia, Tunisia and Romania.126
126 www.esteri.it
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A study of the Riviera del Brenta, i.e. a comparatively small local reality, can 
help shed some light on the above issues. Discussions on the “positive” or “negative” 
nature of industrial districts within the wider context of the debate on post-Fordism 
reflect, at a higher level, discussions on the nature of specific developments in 
Brenta’s history. These developments include in particular the restructuring in the 
early 1970s, which on the one hand pushed the local footwear industry to higher 
market segments and triggered enhanced inter-firm co-operation, but on the other 
implied fragmentation and dispersion of the workforce and at times a deterioration in 
working conditions. They also include the impact of globalisation and 
decentralisation in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, often perceived as a threat to the 
district identity, as well as the role of flexible technology and its adoption by Brenta 
firms as one key to flexible specialisation. Finally, they also encompass the decline 
of the political and ideological post-war context, centred on mass-based parties, and 
the emergence of localist movements such as the Northern League as well as other 
local movements.
We have already considered Brenta’s specific “innovative conservatism”. 
This puts into perspective the very concept of the economic, social and cultural 
quantum leap implied by the Italianate industrial district model or, more generally, 
by the post-Fordist approach. The cautious “Fordist” innovations in Brenta — 
including early recourse to some aspects of Taylorism at Voltan, the decline of the 
old team work replaced by vertical integration in “large” factories in the late 1940s, 
the wide-spread adoption of a sort of assembly line in the 1960s -  did not have more 
far-reaching effects than the incremental changes brought about in the early 1960s 
and, later, in the 1970s and 1980s (in particular enhanced inter-firm co-operation, a 
certain fragmentation of larger enterprises, some attempts at outsourcing and even a 
co-operative approach in relations between entrepreneurs and trade unions). Both
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sets of changes, that inspired by Fordism and that inspired by flexible specialisation, 
did not translate into any decisive fracture in the development of Brenta, which has 
grown incrementally and has preserved its core capabilities over ten decades.
Even internationalisation and globalisation in themselves do not alter this 
picture. They have always been a characteristic of capitalism and can scarcely be 
considered a complete novelty (however, their current scale may well be 
unprecedented). Apart from being part of the Italian economic system, which is 
particularly exposed to international fluctuations, Brenta already faced international, 
“global” challenges, in particular immediately after the end of the Second World War 
in the context of the progressive opening up of the European economy. It was then 
able to react, in particular with steadily growing exports and by upgrading its product 
quality.
As a conservative yet successful area, Brenta confirms that the innovations 
summarized by the industrial district model (or, more generally, by the post-Fordist 
paradigm) are significant, but have not yet reached (as it seemed a few years ago) 
that critical mass which would translate into a real new Kuhn-ian paradigm of 
economic (but also social and political) life. The necessary reappraisal of the role of 
Italian industrial districts (including Brenta) as harbingers of a new economic and 
social system, however, does not diminish their continuing relevance in fostering and 
stimulating current debate. The industrial district model has proved to be flexible and 
capable ofincorporatingnew elements (for instance more attention to backward and 
forward linkages). It is therefore still potentially useful even in shedding light on 
more recent developments.
The interest of an additional case study, like this one on the Brenta, depends 
ultimately on keeping the appropriate balance between the analysis of the specific 
case and the relevance of its conclusions for the general model. This thesis therefore
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will focus equally on the three key concepts highlighted in its title: innovative 
conservatism as the essence of the specific Brenta economic history, to be assessed 
on the basis of the industrial district model.
Consequently, Chapter II sets the context of the Brenta history, presenting an 
outline of the economic history of the Brenta footwear industry from the 
establishment of the first industrial firm in 1898 to date.
Chapter IB’s three sections deal with the three main local collective actors 
(the local “triangle”) respectively: entrepreneurs, workers and public authorities, 
analysed in particular in the context of their respective main formal organisations 
(entrepreneurs’ self-help associations, trade unions, mass-based political parties).
Chapter IV deals with a specific subject on which all three main actors to 
various degrees co-operated and continue to co-operate: the Brenta training centre, 
established in 1923, which has played a role not only in transmitting and enhancing 
professional and technical skills, but also in forging a collective district identity.
The conclusion refers to the empirical evidence discussed in the chapters in 
order to emphasize the need to move away from the social embeddedness 
perspective, in particular through a reassessment of the key role played by local 
entrepreneurship.
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CHAPTER II 
The Brenta industrial district from 1898 to 2004
An historical outline
This chapter offers an overview of the Riviera del Brenta economic history 
from the inception of the footwear industry in 1898 until today, drawing from both 
secondary and primary sources. The latter include in particular documents kept in 
Voltan’s archives and data provided by the entrepreurs’ association ACRIB 
(Associazione Calzaturieri della Riviera del Brenta -  Brenta Footwear
127Entrepreneurs’ Association).
My vision of Brenta as an example of “innovative conservatism” is not shared 
by a number of writers, who rather highlight innovations and qualitative 
developments. This is true in particular for the distinction between two alleged 
distinct Brenta’s “pre-district” and “district” phases, with little or nothing in 
common. Fiorenza Belussi and Marisa Scarpel list some characteristics of the pre­
district phase (in particular “Fordist” methods, low quality products, access limited to 
local markets, significant role of public orders, an “artisan model” based on a “large” 
enterprise and a constellation of small workshops) which would be the opposite of 
those prevailing in the district phase (artisan methods, high-quality products, 
growing international exports, decreasing direct role of public authorities, decreasing
127 I have obtained from ACRIB a set of data concerning the whole district (not just ACRIB’s 
members) for the period 1960-1979. Data include the number of workers, firms (“industrial”, i.e. 
“large”, and “artisan”, i.e. “small”), total sales, export, total production and average prices. For the 
period 1980 onwards, the data I have obtained from ACRIB also include the number of workers and 
firms in each of the Brenta communes. From 1998 onwards, ACRIB data are given for the district as 
a whole, not for individual communes. Comparisons with preceding years are impossible since 
ACRIB has adopted a broader definition of the district, which translated into higher numbers of 
employees, firms and total production. Some data are also provided by the Italian censuses of 1911, 
1927, 1937, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, elaborated by ISTAT -  Istituto Nazionale di Statistica. 
Data at a communal level however are provided only by the censuses of 1961 and 1971. All other 
censuses provide data at a provincial level.
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relevance of “large” core firms).128 Roberta Rabellotti notes that major changes 
are (now) taking place: an international relocation of production, increasing 
competition in distribution, mergers of fashion firms and acquisitions of additional 
brands and the formation of financial multi-project giants. Nothing remains the same, 
not even in a long-established industrial district like the Riviera del Brenta”. She 
underlines the need to “... integrate the typical industrial district approach, 
traditionally focussed on analysing the local sources of competitive advantages, with 
the global value chain approach which stresses that activities such as design, 
production and distribution are often located in different regions or countries”.129
Some literature also conveys the view that Brenta’s economic history, having 
gone through the three traditional phases of birth, growth and decline, has already 
have come to the end of the district as such and to the shift towards other forms of 
inter-firm and intra-firm organisation, if not to the end of the local footwear industry. 
Joerg Meyer-Stamer for instance considers the contemporary Riviera as a typical 
example of growth and crisis of an industrial district. Its expansion phase is marked 
by progressive functional specialisation achieved through overproportional increase 
of small supply firms and through the establishment of common services. Since the 
mid-1980s however the limits are reached of local/regional innovation capabilities, 
of the accumulation of technical knowledge and of the training of skilled workforce. 
The co-operation with firms in other regions and countries, as well as outsourcing
128 Fiorenza Belussi-Maria Scarpel, II distretto della Riviera del Brenta come comunita’ di 
popolazioni organizzative, discussion paper presented at the University of Padua, 2001, p. 10-11.
129Roberta Rabellotti, How globalisation affects Italian industrial districts: the case o f Brenta, in 
Hubert Schmitz (ed.), Local enterprises in the global economy: Issues o f Governance and Upgrading, 
Cheltenham, forthcoming.
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abroad, tends to erode local competitive advantages.130 Corinna Hilbert and Hening 
Metz recall Brenta’s three-pronged growth path (incubation until the second world 
war; the establishment of a network of firms in the 1950s and 1960s; a blooming 
period in the 1970s and 1980s). This co-exist however with weaknesses in horizontal 
co-operation, the loss of the competitive advantage of low labour costs, and the loss 
of experience and know-how due to succession problems. All this leads inter alia to 
the dilution of the traditional district organisation and to the adoption of alternative 
options, including outsourcing to south-eastern Europe and closer links with large
131fashion groups based outside the district.
Unlike these writers, I will underline the continuity in the economic history of 
the Riviera and the persistence, over more than one century, of a significant set of 
common features.
The chapter is divided into the following sections:
• the establishment of the first “industrial” footwear enterprise and the firm 
Voltan;
• the inter-war period;
• the slow transition to the industrial district;
• the “watershed” of 1969;
• restructuring and outsourcing;
• internationalisation;
• conclusion.
130 Joerg Meyer-Stamer, Clusterforderung als Element lokaler und regionaler Standortpolitik: 
Optionen, Hindemisse und Grenzen -  Perspektiven fuer NordRhein-Westphalen, discussion paper 
submitted at the University of Duisburg, 2000, p. 52.
131 Corinna Hilbert - Hening Metz, [Constitutive Elemente regionaler Irmovationsmodelle: Netzwerke, 
Cluster, Industriedistrikte, Lemende Regionen: Grudlagen, Raumverstaendnis, Akteure, Lemen durch 
systemische Innovation, raumdifferenzierende Faktoren, discussion paper submitted to the University 
of Hannover, 2003.
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The establishment of the first "industrial" footwear enterprise
The role of Giovanni Luigi Voltan, who established in 1898 the first (and still 
existing) footwear factory in the area, has been discussed in particular in the study 
published in 1998 to mark the centennial of the Brenta footwear industry.132 The 
following paragraphs will assess the impact of Voltan in the larger context of a 
nascent cluster of small firms, including some reference to Voltan* s "myth”; the birth 
of the first, embryonic district structures; the relationship between endogenous and 
exogenous factors.
An overview of Voltan's biography and o f his American experience
The oldest original and unpublished document which I have been able to trace 
in Voltan’s archives is a small receipt, issued on 26 August 1898 by the director of 
Stra’ tramway station for some shoes ("weighting less than ten kilos”) sent to one 
Signor Petrini in Venice. Even this small receipt, on red cardboard, filled in with 
elegant handwriting, tells something on the first steps of this entrepreneurial 
adventure: at a very early stage, Voltan tried to reach out from the small Brenta 
world, to Venice itself where he had some clients; the location chosen for his 
enterprise enabled him to profit from existing infrastructures, including the local 
comparatively good public transport system connecting Stra’ with Venice and Padua; 
at least initially, he worked on small batches, even single pairs of shoes.
At that time, Giovanni Luigi Voltan was twenty-five, having been bom on 24 
May, 1873 in Stra* to a comparatively well-off family, familiar with dealing with 
both rural and urban environments. His father Carlo owned two footwear workshops,
132 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, L ’azienda incubatrice: Luigi Voltan e la nascita dell'industria 
calzaturiera, in Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Giorgio Franceschetti and Giorgio Roverato (eds.), Cento 
anni di industria calzaturiera sulla Riviera del Brenta, Fiesso d’Artico 1998, p. 35-136.
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in Stra’ and Padua respectively, ran a rented footwear shop in central Venice (in San 
Giovanni Crisostomo, very close to the Rialto Bridge) and was also active as a real 
estate agent. In 1892, the nineteen-year-old Giovanni Luigi faced the turning point of 
his personal and professional history: a working experience in the United States. He 
sought employment in Boston, at the time one of the thriving shoe-production centres 
of the United States, and had the chance to observe closely the local footwear mass 
production. He then returned to Stra’ with some footwear machine tools, and 
launched his own “mechanised”, comparatively very competitive footwear 
enterprise, soon to be known as “the first mechanised in Italy” and to employ 400 
workers by 1904. At least, this is the established version of the story, which links the 
birth of Brenta’s industrial district with the “American dream” of a single, very 
capable local entrepreneur.133
More accurate research however has led to a reassessment of the above.134 
The much celebrated American period lasted just seven months and its influence on 
the future entrepreneurial life of Voltan was at most indirect. According to a 
document signed by the Mayor of Stra’ in 1896, he obtained an entry visa to the 
United States on 21 December 1896.135 His stay in America is described in a number 
of letters to his relatives in Stra’, which highlight his specific interest in the footwear 
sector, his bent for innovation and exploration, and his good family connections in 
the US. He first moved briefly to New York and then stayed in Chicago for several 
months, where he failed to find employment and experienced growing tensions with 
his relatives both in the USA and in Italy. Eventually, he had no other choice than to
133 See for instance Francesco Jori, 1961/2001-40 anni di ACRIB, Fiesso d’Artico 2001, p. 58-59. In 
this version, Voltan returned to Stra’ after some years spent working in the United States in the 
footwear sector and brought home some “revolutionary machine tools” acquired from his former 
American employer. Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, Padova 2000, p. 36, mentions a “breathtaking 
growth” during the fist ten years of the 19th century, based on Fordism and innovative technology with 
which Voltan had become acquainted during his stay in the USA.
134 Ibid., p. 35-48.
135 Ibid., p. 43.
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return home between June and August 1897. This was a bitter return: he considered 
his lack of success as a personal failure.
In the following months, after a working experience as an emigration 
subagent for a travel company in Genoa, he joined the family activities in the 
footwear sector and entered into business relations with firms in Padua, Venice and 
Milan.136 He launched his own business by establishing a footwear workshop in May 
1898, less than a year after his return to Stra*. He married Romilda Viola, whose 
brother was a Navy officer serving as a military attache at the Italian Legation in 
Tokyo. The couple had three sons and two daughter, two of whom continued the 
family enterprise.
But Giovanni Luigi Voltan did not act in a vacuum, even if the Riviera of the 
time was a rural, comparatively backward environment. Contrary to the established 
“myth”, he was influenced more by the new Italian footwear enterprises established 
in nearby Lombardy than by the America he had seen for some months. Some of 
these new enterprises should be mentioned here.137 Luigi Bocca established the first 
Italian non-mechanised “large” footwear factory in 1872, by simply concentrating all 
manual work in a single building so as to achieve better control of his workforce, 
output quality and delivery times. The first partially mechanised firm was opened by 
Raimondo Rovatti in Mirandola, in the heart of the Po Valley. By 1891 he already 
owned four factories employing 350 workers and operating a network of 14 shops. In 
the same period, the footwear firm Borri, in Busto Arsizio, was the first to use the 
American “Goodyear” sewing machines. In 1898, Luigi Trolli and other 
entrepreneurs established the “Societa’ Anonima Italiana per Industria di Pellami,
136 Vittorio Pampagnin, La Riviera..., quote., p. 44-5.
137 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, L ’azienda incubatrice: Luigi Voltan e la nascita dell’industria 
calzaturiera, in Giovanni Luigi Fontana (eds.), Cento anni..., quote., p. 53.
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Calzature e Affini” in Varese. They all strove to replace imports from the UK, 
France and the United States and to profit of a steadily growing domestic demand.
Two early balance sheets (January and June 1899) report a value of 
approximately 9,000 Lire of stock and just 1,000 Lire of machine tools 
(corresponding to 30,000 and 2,5000 Euro respectively - 2004 value), and therefore 
show that Voltan’s core business was still retailing and not yet manufacturing. 
However, in the same year 1899, Voltan ordered several machine tools to the 
Deutsch-Amerikanische Maschinengesellschaft of Frankfurt, Germany. Even the 
headed notepaper used by his firm at the time, with its emphasis on “colossal new
138American systems”, confirmed his intention to innovate production methods.
In the early stages, Voltan’s activities encompassed men’s, ladies’ and 
children’s footwear. Commerce however continued to play a crucial role. Just a few 
months after the opening of the new workshop, a shop was opened in Stra*. A second 
shop followed suit in Padua, in Via Sant’Apollonia, at least from 1. February 1899, 
on condition that it would not carry out commercial activities in Stra’ and Fiesso. 
Voltan’s shops also sold children’s shoes bought from other producers in Venice and 
in Milan.139
A turning point occurred in 1904. Voltan transferred his enterprise to a new 
area of some 8,000 square meters between the Brenta and another smaller canal, the 
Tergola. The “myth” mentions a production of some 1,000 pairs of shoes daily and 
some 400-500 employees in that year. The increases in production and in the size of 
the enterprise were probably lower. However, “mechanised” footwear factories, 
besides Stra’, existed only in Milan, Turin, Varese, Busto Arsizio and Naples.
138 Although soon Voltan’s “high quality”, and no longer his “advanced” technology (and standardised 
“mass” production) were emphasised; the headed notepaper changed accordingly: ibid., p. 58.
139 Fontana considers this an attempt to pursue a diversification strategy even at this early stage: ibid.,
p. 66.
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Voltan used machine tools produced by the German firm Moebius. In August 
1906, Voltan inquired about machine tools with a daily production of 400 pairs of 
shoes. In November 1906, the firm Moebius provided 7 machine tools worth 7,500 
lire (corresponding to 25,000 Euro in 2004); other machines were purchased 
thereafter, for a total value of 14,815 lire (slightly under 50,000 Euro in 2004: small 
amounts, but not insignificant in the Riviera at the turn of the century).
Documents signed by all employees put the total number of workers at 164, 
of whom 43 were female, 121 male (but several domestic workers should also be 
considered). These are significantly fewer than the several hundreds described by the 
“myth”, but still a significant industrial reality at the time.
Improvements in the sales organisation took place alongside production 
innovations.140 A network of commercial outlets was established, and offered price 
reductions of up to 40%. In addition to the shop in Venice, other were rented, or 
directly owned, in Milan (two), Verona (three), Mantua, Ferrara, Vicenza, Udine and 
Bologna. A factory shop was also open in Stra* on Sundays morning. In turn, these 
positive developments are to be seen in the general context of a rapidly growing 
Italian footwear sector, in which the Veneto region played a role. In 1914, at the eve 
of the first World War, Italy was home to 75 mechanised industrial footwear 
enterprises, mainly located in the North-West. Five were in Veneto, including 
Voltan* s.
The first World War was in many respects a watershed for the Italian 
footwear industry. Imports grew in the first couple of years, from just over one 
million pairs in 1914 to over 4 and a half million in 1916, to be followed by a sharp 
reduction to under three million in 1916 and just above one million in 1918.
140 Ibid., p. 87.
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Assessments on Voltan* s reactions to these major events diverge. Roverato 
underlines his ability in seizing the opportunity provided by military orders. The firm 
Voltan, “unlike other areas of the Italian footwear sector - unable to enter the field of 
military orders - from 1915 onwards, took advantage both of its production 
specialisation and of its timely deliveries”.141 In 1914, Voltan had already asked the 
German firm Moebius, his traditional supplier, for a turnkey plant with a daily 
productive capacity of one thousand pair of shoes; and his military production began 
as soon as Italy entered the war (on 24 May 1915, which was also Voltan’s birthday). 
However, available data are scarce and only refer to single batches. In September 
1915 for instance, a batch of 2.008 pairs of military boots was tested, and just eight 
of them found defective. This happened despite the state of war against Germany, 
which had severed the links between Voltan and his German suppliers. But the 
scarce data available points rather to orders in the region of a few thousands pairs of 
military boots and to the continuation of some production for civilian use throughout 
the war. There are documents pointing to an increasingly tense situation in the 
management of the firm, partly due to Voltan* s poor health (which compelled him to 
leave his wife Romilda and Ernesto Boldrin in charge of the day-to-day running), 
partly to frictions with other close collaborators who had even been granted a 
participation in the profits of the enterprise and in particular those of the Sunday 
shop in Stra*.
In the light of the above, and contrary to Roverato* s thesis, the First World 
War was not an “immense opportunity” for Voltan. He provided just a negligible 
share of the Army’s total orders: during the war, three hundred Italian firms had 
supplied 42 million pairs of shoes to the army, paving the way to a growth of the 
Italian footwear sector which was to peak in 1930, with a production of just under 30
141 Ibid., p. 94.
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million pairs (and made Italy the fifth-largest European shoe manufacturer). It was 
rather a challenging period which threatened the very survival of his firm, with 
military orders being a poor substitute for the reduction of demand for civilian 
products. The vicinity of Stra’ to the front line certainly helped supplies to the troops 
and therefore played some role in ensuring military orders. However, this vicinity 
also disrupted the comparatively well developed commercial network existing in 
1914. Several of the largest shops were even located in cities which came under 
Austrian military occupation as from 1917 (including Udine, Pordenone, 
Portogruaro). A letter of Voltan, dated 1916 and reporting serious problems with his 
close collaborator Giuseppe Leandro, conveys a rather bleak picture.142
The inter-war period
Writers are more interested in the first year of Voltan* s history than in the 
inter-war period, and even less in the post second World War events, when their 
attention is attracted by the nascent industrial district and no longer by the 
vicissitudes of single enterprises. However, my research in Voltan’s archives, 
combined with existing secondary sources, confirm that at the eve of the second 
World War, Voltan’s had not only survived, but had turned into a solid if 
unspectacular medium-sized enterprise, rooted in a local economic environment 
where also other footwear firms had began their trade, selling its products all over 
Italy, well informed of technological innovations in more advanced countries like 
Germany, and even considering export.
Giovanni Luigi Voltan retired in 1934, precisely at the beginning of a short­
lived period of economic recovery following the international crisis of 1929. He 
devoted himself to experiments with fur-bearing animals and died on 23 April 1941.
142 Ibid., p. 96.
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The firm was converted into a limited partnership with two associates: Emanuele 
Voltan, Giovanni Luigi’s son, bom in Stra’ on 25 September 1904, and Cafiero De 
Pol, his brother-in-law, whose family has had contact with Voltan since 1898. 
Emanuele Voltan married the daughter of a tannery industrialist in 1940. A second 
son, Fortunato, also played a role as the initiator of the only significant 
entrepreneurial initiative in the after-war period: the establishment of a new firm, 
“Tiziana”, specialised in high quality ladies’ footwear. It was a short-lived initiative: 
“Tiziana” was taken over by the parent firm in 1940 and reduced to a mere brand 
mark. Even while nominally independent, the links between the two firms were very 
close: a list which I found in Voltan’s archives refers to 78 invoices concerning 
transactions between the two firms in the few weeks from 8th November 1939 to the 
end of the year.
I have traced in Voltan’s archives fifty-eight insurance and paybooks, 
covering some weeks in April 1934 and then the period between November 1934 and 
the beginning of 1936. These books convey a rather detailed picture of the firm 
during the limited recovery following the international crisis of 1929-1933 and 
Giovanni Luigi Voltan’s retirement. The books were duly stamped by the 
Inspectorate of the Istituto Nazionale Fascista per l’Assicurazione contro gli 
Infortuni sul Lavoro - INAIL (Fascist National Institute for the Insurance against 
Work Accidents), Marghera branch. Each book provides weekly data on employees, 
wages, working hours, absences, type of work contract (piece or daily work), number 
of apprentices, taxes, rents paid by employees on firm houses, outsourcing, holidays.
The books convey the picture of a comparatively large firm, employing up to 
eighty workers, some five clerks and employing twenty to thirty temporary workers. 
Over the period considered, the number of officially registered (and therefore
insured) employees fluctuated slightly between 85 and 79 (with some exceptions). Of 
these workers, 44 to 48 were males, 35 to 40 females. Flexibility was provided by 
temporary workers, listed separately in the books. Their number went from none to 
thirty-three (September 1934) and even forty (October 1934). Additional flexibility 
was provided by interruptions of work listed as “absences”. A number of absences 
was certainly due to illness or other contingent reasons. However, long absences (for 
a week or over) tended to be rare (two or three workers at most) but also increased 
sharply in specific moments, at times with an unequal distribution of sexes, with 
peaks of 19 female workers; 2 males and 8 females; 40 males and 33 females, in the 
third week of June, the first week of July and the second week of July 1934 
respectively. A seven day holiday was granted in the third week of July 1934 (paid 
according to status and seniority). The virtual standstill to which the factory came in 
that month was evidently due to the harvest, the busiest time of the year in the still 
predominantly agricultural Brenta, when the help of everybody, including the 
comparatively few industrial workers, was badly needed. This summer slack was 
partially compensated by an increased recourse to some 25 additional workers in 
June and July, ensuring some production continuity even during the harvest period. 
An even more precise picture of production fluctuations is provided by the total 
amount of working hours. Apart from the exceptionally low amount registered in the 
week preceding the “harvest holiday” (with just 70 hours worked by four people), 
figures fluctuates widely from 549 at the end of January 1934 to 6,074 in mid-August 
1935 (i.e. about 13 working hours per day per worker). Again, these shifts were 
determined partly by agriculture, with the busiest period (between October and 
December) coinciding with the traditional slack in field works. In those periods, the 
total number of working hours was just under 6,000, with an average of over 12
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hours a day per worker, and even reached 6,326 in the second week of November, 
i.e. over 13 hours per day per worker.
Salaries fluctuated accordingly. The data listed in the books indicate that 
virtually each worker was paid on an ad hoc basis, depending on his or her type of 
contract (daily or piece work), seniority and status (apprentice or regular worker). 
Not surprisingly, salaries for male were higher than for female workers. In the week 
starting on 16th July 1934 for instance the highest wage was paid to a piece worker: 
167 Lire for a 48 hours week. For 27 hours (the average duration of that particular 
working week) salaries varied from 45 to 58 lire, with the lowest (18 Lire) obviously 
paid to an apprentice. 27 working hours by female workers were paid 25 to 35 Lire, 
with the two highest wages (just over 100 Lire) paid for a 48 and a 40 hours working 
week respectively.
The total amounts of wages paid varied from the peaks of 9,025 Lire in 
November 1935 and 7,224 in July 1935 respectively to a minimum of 667 in June 
1935 and to 153 in the week preceding the “harvest holiday”. All wages mentioned 
here were gross. Taxes paid (and listed in the books) varied between 5 and 10% of 
gross salaries. Salaries paid to the four of five clerks were usually constant, as did 
their working hours.
The average gross salary per worker was therefore in the region of 1.2 lire per 
hour, corresponding approximately to 0.9 Euro in 2004 value. The weekly wage of 
Voltan’s clerk was approximately 155 Lire, corresponding approximately to 3.8 Lire 
per hour (2.8 Euro in 2004 value). There are also traces of upward mobility within 
the firm: in the period covered by the books, at least one worker (obviously male) 
was promoted to the status of a clerk.
The books also shed some light on Voltan’s role as an enlightened 
entrepreneur. They indicate rents paid by workers on houses owned by the firm
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(probably those built along the small river Tergola, just behind the factory). The 
amount is fixed for clerks but varies for workers according to their salaries. The total 
rents went therefore from 86 Lire per week in the busy autumn 1934 to a minimum 
of 7 lire just before Christmas of these same years.
Not only workers, but the Voltans themselves continued some family 
business in agriculture, as was to expect given the rural character of Brenta at the 
time. In the firm’s archives, I have traced a statement by the Mayor of Stra’ 
confirming that on 22 September 1940 one Luigia Baldan weighed 602 kg. of grapes 
on behalf of Voltan. The same archives also indicates that on 11 November 1941, the 
same Luigia Baldan received an order to pay 680 Lire for debts related to the rental 
of a house and some fields owned by Voltan. Wide fluctuations in particular, 
affecting both production and employment, seem confirmed by one isolated firm 
book covering the week starting on 16 July 1934. This book conveys the picture of a 
significantly larger firm, with 151 officially registered workers (95 male, of whom 
12 apprentices, and 6 female, of whom 8 apprentices). Consequently, although nine 
workers were absent during the whole week, the total number of working hours 
(6,944) was higher than at any time during the year fully documented by the other 
books for the subsequent period September 1934-January 1936. The low amount of 
per capita working hours (twenty-seven, concentrated in just three days for most 
workers) was probably due to the harvest, very much as happened the following year 
when the footwear production literally came to a halt.
Some data I also traced in Voltan’s archives additionally confirm that even 
the most advanced Brenta footwear industry of the time remained heavily labour- 
intensive, dependent on foreign technology and confined to the national market.
According to a number of documents which I also found in the firm’s 
archives, Voltan relied on some German suppliers of machine tools well into the
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Second World War. This is hardly surprising, given the close political and economic 
links of Italy with Germany in the mid-1930s and the high quality of German 
footwear machine tools of the time. A list of invoices received from German firms in 
the period 1936-1940 amount to 62,767 Lire, of which 43,640 paid to just one firm 
(Vorsteler and Buerge of Obenbarmen). By comparison, the total salaries paid to 
workers in 1935 amounted to approximately 160,000 Lire. The only new documents 
I traced in Voltan’s archives concerning its attempts to export regard the failure to 
launch a partnership with an Italian firm based in Asmara (the capital city of the 
Italian colony of Eritrea in the Horn of Africa) and the cancellation of a number of 
orders placed in May 1939, partly due to the insufficient local demand for Voltan’s 
shoes (including the brand shoe “Solleva”, which sold quite well in metropolitan 
Italy).
The 58 firm books and the other documents which I traced in Voltan’s 
archives, covering the mid-1930s (the lull before the storm of the 2nd World War), 
portray the picture of a comparatively large and structured firm, with long but 
tolerable working hours, low but still attractive salaries, regulated apprenticeship, 
some social security and benefits (some paid holidays, some housing), some cases of 
vertical mobility within the firm, relations with domestic workers, established 
relationships with machine tools suppliers abroad, even some attempts at exporting. 
At the same time, the firm remained heavily labour-intensive, deeply rooted in an 
agricultural environment which dictated to some extent its production rhythms; it 
was exposed to wild production fluctuations which translated into recurrent 
temporary loss of work (and therefore of incomes) for large parts of its workforce; 
and was far from treating equally male and female workers.
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Soon, however, new difficulties arose, coming in particular from increased 
competition inter alia by the large enterprise Bata based in the Czech city of Zlin143 
and from the high prices of raw materials encouraged by an Anglo-Argentin cartel. 
Emanuele Voltan, who by then held the reins of the firm, described a tense 
atmosphere in some letters in which he complained of the “uncooperative” behaviour 
of artisan shoemakers on one hand, and of the problems deriving from international 
prices and competition on the other hand.144 A new difficult period began with the 
Italian war decade, prompted by the invasion of Ethiopia in late 1935. Again, some 
letters by Emanuele Voltan to the local Fascist party conveyed a bleak picture, but 
probably exaggerated since he sought a permission to reduce wages.
The uncertainty of the general economic situation is also reflected in a rather 
contradictory approach to production planning. A letter by Emanuele Voltan in 1934 
stated that his firm only produced ladies’ footwear (but a small men’s production was 
continued throughout the period, with just a short interruption in 1938). Some sport 
and military footwear were also produced. As to the commercial network, the peak of 
the early 1920s (35 shops in North- and Central Italy) was never reached again. 
Documents concerning sales in some shops in Milan, published by Roverato, show a 
decline (from 82,000 Lire in 1926 to 32,000 in 1939). This is particularly significant 
since the commercial network was in some respects Giovanni Luigi Voltan’s core 
business and remained under his direct supervision even after the hand-over to his 
son Emanuele. After the closure of the “historic” shop of San Giovanni Grisostomo 
in Venice in 1935, just a few shops remained (Venice, Vicenza, Verona, Cremona, 
Mantua, Adria and Bologna, i.e. those closer to Stra’). Other shops passed to other 
members of the extended family. Some breathing space was obtained by switching
143 Giovanni Luigi Fontana and Vera Raggi, II calzaturificio Voltan tra le due guerre, in Giovanni 
Luigi Fontana (ed), Cento anni..., quote., p. 105.
144 Ibid., p. 122.
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from shops to a network of commercial agents (six in 1937, eight in 1939, covering 
inter alia Florence and Rome).
At the eve of the Second World War, Voltan still ranked among the few 
“large” Italian footwear firms. An overview of the Italian industry published by the 
National Fascist Association of Industrialists in 1939 underlines that “... the large 
factories, which constitute the backbone of the Italian footwear industry, are 
concentrated almost exclusively in Milan, Turin, Bologna, Parabiago and Stra’” 
(emphasis added).145
After Italy entered the war in 1940, production was again shifted to military 
orders, although a limited civilian production was still continued. All in all, the 
disruptions caused by the war were worse than in 1915. During the German military 
occupation of Northern Italy (September 1943 to April 1945), Voltan was a “German 
protected industry”, meaning that a small production of some thousands of pairs of 
shoes was continued until the end of the war. On 24 April 1945 the factory was 
occupied by the local section of the Italian Committee of National Liberation 
(Comitato di Liberazione nazionale-CLN). It remained under its direct control until 
31 May 1946, when it was returned to the Voltan family.146
The slow transition to the industrial district
The life and work of Giovanni Luigi Voltan and the first steps of his firm 
should be set in the economic, social and political context of contemporary Brenta 
and of the networks in which local actors participated.
Voltan’s family, as mentioned, was comparatively well-off and had a 
comparatively good education. This is evident in the ample correspondence with
145translation from the Italian original, in Confederazione Fascista degli Industrial^ L'lndustria 
dell’Italia Fascista, Roma XVII-1939, p. 528.
146 Vittorio Pampagnin, La Riviera ..., quote., p. 85-9.
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Giovanni Luigi during his stay in the USA: all letters are written in almost flawless 
Italian, at a time when over 90 per cent of the Italian population was only really 
acquainted with the local regional languages (and this was the case particularly in the 
Veneto region, where the regional language still thrives today). Voltan’s personal 
and social contacts reached well beyond Stra’ and he attached at least as much 
importance to his commercial initiatives as he did to his factory. In this sense, 
Giovanni Luigi Voltan, the initiator of the local footwear industry but also proud of 
his American experience and interested in developing commercial networks in a 
number of Italian regions, is perhaps the least locally rooted entrepreneur in the 
entire Brenta economic history.
Voltan’s participation in local political life has not attracted much attention in 
literature, also because his contacts, and those of his sons and relatives, with the 
ruling fascist Party do not fit very well with the traditional “myth” of an enlightened 
entrepreneur, although he only rose to the local dignity of town councillor in Stra’ 
and Dolo.147 Pampagnin underlines that he joined the Italian freemasonry. Given the 
hostility between the Catholic Church and freemasonry in Italy, this can shed some 
light on the inertia of the Catholic Church (so omnipresent in Venetian rural society 
of the early 20th century, especially in the education field) not only in Voltan’s 
entrepreneurial efforts, but also in the local patronage initiatives including the 
training centre established in 1923 which remained for a long time one of the very 
few education facilities in the Riviera.
Giovanni Luigi Voltan’s environment was positively influenced by the 
contemporary industrial and technological developments.148 Fontana mentions a
147 Ibid., p. 79-89.
148 On the role of Veneto at the time of the “industrial triangle’” s take-off, see Giovanni Luigi Fontana 
and Giorgio Roverato, Processi di settorializzazione e di distrettualizzazione nei sistemi economici 
locali: il caso veneto, in F.Amatori and A.Colli (eds.), Comunita' di Imprese. Sistemi locali in Italia 
tra Otto e Novecento, Bologna, 2001.
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letter sent to Voltan by a representative of the Belgian firm Dupont, written in 1898,
• 149in response to an enquiry about a possible partnership in a footwear enterprise. 
Voltan* s proposal was turned down. According to the letter, three large footwear 
factories were already operating in Italy in 1898; production of low-cost shoes by 
machine tools required significant investments; growing competition by new firms 
and consequent overproduction were to be expected. Dupont mentions Rovatti 
(whom we have already mentioned as one of Voltan’s sources of inspiration), but 
also other “large factories” in Northern Italy. In the light of this correspondence, 
Voltan does not appear as an innovator and the founder of the first Italian 
mechanised footwear enterprise, but rather as one among a few Italian footwear 
entrepreneurs. Voltan*s vicissitudes in particular seem to mirror very closely those of 
Pietro Bertolini, who at the beginning of the 20th century founded not only the still 
existing “Footwear Museum” in Vigevano, Lombardy, but was also one of the 
promoters of the local footwear industrial district. Exactly like Voltan, Bertolini was 
created a knight of the Crown of Italy before the Great War and is still considered a 
sort of founding father of that industrial district. These two parallel histories seem 
actually to fade into a single standardised biography, which includes the genius of a 
single entrepreneur, his innovative skills in mechanising old artisan procedures, his 
capability to exploit the legacy of a glorious past (the Republic of Venice or the 
Duchy of Milan), a direct continuity between the first local enterprises and the 
contemporary firms, wide local social recognition through the status conferred by the 
order of the Crown of Italy.150
149 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Cento anni..., quote., p. 100
150 The roots of several Italian industrial districts can be traced back to a more or less remote past. 
Michael E. Porter, The competitive advantage..., quote., p. 211, notes that the "... history (of the 
ceramic tile industry in Sassuolo) can be traced back to the thirteenth century”. In general however 
such references simply point to the obvious but quite vague concept of uninterrupted economic life 
over centuries and the consequent accumulation of a social, economic and cultural common 
background over the generations. Belussi’s reference to the supposedly “late medieval origins of the 
Brenta district” including a role for its “shoemakers guilds” falls within this category, even if the
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Voltan’s impact on the nascent Brenta industrialisation should also be 
assessed against the background of the contemporary local economic situation. In 
this respect also, evaluations diverge, despite some good quantitative data carefully 
investigated by Baldan.151 The literature on our subject often underlines the fracture 
with the past, brought about by Voltan and his followers. Brenta is portrayed as 
backward if not underdeveloped, so that Voltan* s initiatives (and the birth of a local 
footwear industry as a whole) appear as unexpected, unforeseeable and (on the local 
scale) major exogenous developments. At the same time, the same literature 
underlines the continuity with the past embodied in a strong, self-conscious local 
culture rooted in the legacy of the ancient Venetian Republic, the role played in the 
centuries by the Brenta waterway, the constant relationship with the nearby cities of 
Padua and Venice which partly offset the rural character of the area. Belussi even 
mentions “the medieval origins” of the local footwear district.152 The situation of the 
early 20th century, rapidly changing even in the Brenta area, can be better described 
in terms of timid, partial and unequal development, of which the nascent footwear 
industry (and the Voltan firm itself) were both the precondition and the consequence. 
In this perspective, even Brenta first industrialisation was the result not of a quantum 
leap but of a developmental process following a wavelike path, with continuity 
between one wave and another rahter than discontinuity, as Vera Zamagni notes with 
regard to the whole economic history of Italy since its unification.153 Voltan therefore 
did not act in a vacuum and did not graciously offer some industrial development to a 
hopelessly backward area. He rather pursued a skilful strategy (including the 
relocation of his premises in 1906; the opening of shops in Dolo and Stra’; his active
origin of some specific cultural traits of the Riviera can indeed be traced back even to pre-unitary Italy 
(Fiorenza Belussi, II distretto industriale della Riviera del Brenta: tipologia delle imprese e tenderize 
evolutive, Oltre il Ponte, 43-44,1993,118.
151 Alessandro Baldan, Storia della Riviera del Brenta, Villadelconte 1980.
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participation in the local party and political life; his preference for local labour) 
based on rational use of the limited local resources. Such a development in turn had 
been prompted by a combination inter alia of a growing population, a pool of 
comparatively skilled workforce and some public works.154 Among the latter, a
thmention should be made at least of the electric tramway, opened at the end of the 19 
century and connecting Venice with Padua through Stra’, Fiesso, Dolo and Mira155; 
and of the public works on the Riviera canal, including the dredging and 
refurbishment of bridges and locks.156 National developments of which Voltan also 
profited has been mentioned in Chapter I (including the increased domestic demand 
for footwear, with imports growing from just 73,000 pairs in 1906 to over one 
million in 1910).
Several writers refer to Voltan’s local dominant position at least until the 
1940s. Belussi in particular considers the second World War as a fracture between a 
pre-district phase, centred on one single “large” factory, and the subsequent sudden 
emergence of a proper district, with its cluster of several enterprises.
However, there is evidence of a gradual transition from one model to the 
other.A small but vital cluster of firms and an embryonic co-operation among 
entrepreneurs were established as early as the 1920s. A few artisan workshops were 
able to turn into small but solid family enterprises, sometimes with some niche 
specialisation. Domenico Menin, bom in Campoverardo, ten kilometres south of
152 Fiorenza Belussi, D distretto industriale..., quote., 118. She also mentions a role for Brenta’s 
alleged “shoemakers guilds”.
153 Vera Zamagni, The Economic History..., quote., p. 380.
154 Stra’ passed from 2,132 inhabitants in 1871 to 3,945 inhabitants in 1936; Fiesso from 1,688 to 
3,266; Fosso’ from 1,632 to 3,786. Source: 1ST AT (Italian National Institute of Statistics), 
Popolazione residente dei Comuni, Rome 1994.
155 But it remained too expensive and slow to allow regular commuting: see Vittorio Pampagnin, La 
Riviera..., quote., p. 69-70.
156 The bridge and lock in Stra’ were rebuilt around 1890; a bridge, a new lock and major hydraulic 
public works were carried out in Dolo around 1930. See Pietro Casetta (ed.), Memoria idraulica sulla 
regolazione dei fiumi Brenta e Bacchiglione di Pietro Paleocapa, Roma 2002, in particular p. 71 and 
p. 150-152; Pietro Casetta, U colmellone di Limena in un’osella settecentesca: la sistemazione 
idraulica dell’Alta Padovana, Alta Padovana, nr. 2,2003, 24-33.
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Dolo, was a sort of community leader in his sector. One of his apprentices, Pietro 
Cabbia, bom in 1898, opened a workshop with six collaborators in 1928.157 Some 
evidence indicates that one Gaetano Carraro run a comparatively “large” workshop 
already in 1865. His apprentices Giuseppe and Vittorio Neri opened their own 
workshop in 1900. Vittorio Pampagnin recalls the vicissitudes of the firm “Norge” 
established after the war by Luigi Agnoletto and Camillo Contin, with fifteen 
employees in the mid-1920s, large enough to participate with some success in the 
Rome Fair in 1926 and to open a shop in Venice in 1928 (but only to go bankrupt the 
following year).158 Many such small enterprises were located in Fiesso, where they 
could profit from the limited tax exemption decided by the two local government- 
appointed mayors (“podesta’”) who served in 1926-1933 and 1935-1943 
respectively.159 The 1927 and 1937 censuses confirm the existence of some 
“industrial shoe factories” in the province of Venice: 14 in 1927 (including Voltan) 
and 19 in 1937.160 The same figures are listed in a convocation letter addressed by 
Emanuele Voltan to his local fellow entrepreneurs, in his capacity of Political 
Secretary of the Fascist Party local branch, again in 1937. In 1938, Emanuele Voltan 
requested the registration of two artisans in the entrepreneurs’ corporation, “taken 
into account the number of their employees and the type of machine tools used in 
their production”.161 By the end of 1939, Stra’ apparently hosted, besides Voltan, 
some ten enterprises with approximately 100 employees.
157 Giovanni Luigi Fontana-Elvio Tuis, II contesto delle origini.Economia e societa’ lungo il Brenta 
tra Otto e Novecento, in Giovanni Luigi Fontana (ed.), Cento anni..., quote., p. 29.
158 Vittorio Pampagnin, La Riviera..., quote., p. 74-5. The firm “Norge” was named after the Italo- 
Norwegian airship which successfully overflew the North Pole under the command of the Italian 
general Umberto Nobile: an attempt to find a fashionable name for an enterprise which tried to be 
fashionable.
159 Gino Garbin and Antonio Smania respectively: see Vittorio Pampagnin, La Riviera..., quote., p. 74.
160 Source: ISTAT (Italian National Institute for Statistics).
161 The firms were Calzavara and Sartori, both located in Stra’: see Giacomo Masato, Per una storia 
dei distretti industriali: La Riviera del Brenta e il Calzaturificio Voltan (1898-1946), thesis, Padua 
University, 1998, p. 66.
162 Giovanni Luigi Fontana and Vera Raggi, II calzaturificio Voltan..., quote., p. 121.
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The “myth” portrays Voltan as a benevolent incubator of spin-off firms, to 
which he gave orders and sometimes even financial support, very much along the 
lines of Michael H. Best’s model.163 However, the relationship between the leading 
firm and the others was at times rather tense. In 1937, Emanuele Voltan wrote to the 
fascist Industrialists Association of the Province of Venice that, despite the economic 
crisis, “artisans still work well enough, especially because domestic work does not 
entail the large expenses of large industries. Artisans should of course continue their 
activities; but even they should abide by the laws, for instance in respecting official 
working hours”. In 1938, again, Emanuele Voltan requested the punishment of those 
who “evade taxes and do not respect labour laws”.164
With these provisos, the role of Voltan as (voluntary or involuntary) 
incubator of spin-off smaller enterprises is confirmed by some interviews published 
by Roverato. Spin-off small enterprises in general were typically established by 
former employees of Voltan, who had begun working as apprentices at the age of 15 
and then started their own business (small workshops of up to ten workers) after the 
first World War.165 Pietro Gobbo is the most interesting case. Bom in 1899, he 
started working with Voltan already before the war and set up his own business in 
1918. Two years later, together with some other former Voltan workers, he started a 
small enterprise in Celeseo, south of the Brenta waterway, in the future southern part 
of the industrial district. In his interview, Gobbo underlines that political life was 
“quieter than in the politically high-spirited Riviera”. South of the waterway, 
standards were even lower than in Dolo, Stra’ and Fiesso, shops (including shoe 
shops) were few and local products (including shoes) were of lower quality. Gobbo 
started a lower-quality production, to be sold locally but also in nearby Padua. It was
163 Michael H. Best, The new competition, Cambridge 1990, p. 207.
164 Giovanni Luigi Fontana and Vera Raggi, II calzaturificio Voltan..., quote., p. 123.
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the harbinger of a division of labour between a core area and the periphery of the 
industrial district.
As underlined in the preceding paragraphs, the Brenta footwear industry at 
the eve of the Second World War, far from being confined to a single “large” firm 
surrounded by some micro-workshops, had already evolved into a complex system 
drawing from those “social networks” described by Colli as “extremely long lasting” 
and able to survive in the face of radical changes in production organisation.166 
Belussi also recalls Brenta’s “stable social relations which favoured economic
1 f i lgrowth and local entrepreneurship”.
This system was centred on a larger enterprise; some ten to twenty firms with 
a dozen or so workers each168; several very small artisan workshops; an emerging 
territorial hierarchy with a distinction between core and periphery; an embryonic 
policy of tax incentives to locate in a given commune; a variety of products targeted 
at different market niches; an emerging “entrepreneurial class” whose names were to 
be encountered again in the following decades (Caovilla, Gobbo, Ballin, Gasparini, 
Gastaldello, Beda, Canova, Contin, Agnoletto...)169; a network among entrepreneurs 
in the context of the Fascist organisations; the training centre established in 1923 (to 
which I devote a separate chapter of this thesis). These features survived the second 
World War and provided the stepping stone for the post-war take-off in the early 
1950s, when some still dormant local potentials bloomed. This pattern of economic 
growth is similar to that of some Italian major industries (automobile, chemical,
165 Giovanni Luigi Fontana (ed), Cento anni..., quot., p. 135; Vittorio Pampagnin, La Riviera..., quote., 
p. 73-78.
66 Andrea Colli, Networking the market: Evidence and Conjectures from the History of the Italian 
Industrial Districts, in Wilfried Feldenkirchen and Terry Gourvish (eds.), European Yearbook o f 
Business History,, Vol.l, 1998, 80.
167 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, Padova 2000, p. 14.
168 With close linkages with one another: see for instance the “authorisation” given by Emanuele 
Voltan to the firm Ferraresso of Stra’ to hire a milling machine operator who had previoulsy worked 
with Voltan himself: Giacomo Masato, Per una storia..., quote., p. 64.
169 Ibid., p. 78.
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steel): established in the rapidly expanding northern Italy of the early 20th century as 
comparatively modest concerns, they managed to survive the First World War and 
the Fascist period, went through a phase of consolidation with the support of 
protectionist governmental policies, and grew steadily in size, technology and output 
after the war, profiting inter alia from national and international circumstances 
favourable to exports. Not only the social, but also the physical structures of the 
Brenta footwear industry survived the second World War almost intact. Voltan had 
even been able to continue its production under German “protection” between 1943 
and 1945. No decisive damage was inflicted to other firms, all small and even more 
labour-intensive. The local infrastructure (railways, roads and waterways) also 
remained largely unscathed, including the electric tramway which was reinstated 
immediately after the war.
Again, the vicissitudes of Voltan after the Second World War, and in 
particular the way in which ownership and control were retained by the founder’s 
family, shed some light on the peculiar combination of continuity and high flexibility 
in post-war Italy. Voltan is an example of the Italian family capitalism, based on a 
flexible and “creative” use of family and personal connections in order to maintain 
the control of the enterprise regardless of its growth or external changes.170 Voltan's 
post-war experience is typical of some persistent features of Italian capitalism: as 
Stella writes in the year 2000, if a Venetian enterprise becomes too large for a 
family, then the family is made larger.171
As mentioned above, Emanuele Voltan had played some local role in the 
Fascist party as the owner of the sole “large” industrial concern in the Western part
170 Andrea Colli, II quarto capitalismo. Un profilo italiano, Venice 2002, p. 68-9 and 51-4, analyses 
the creative forms through which family control is maintained also through generational changes. In 
this sense, not much has changed since the times of Voltan indirect control of his firm in the late 
1940s.
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of Riviera, but had been reinstated at the head of his family enterprise as early as 31st 
may 1946. However tensions continued, to the point that he started discussions on 
the possible transfer of the management of his enterprise, while retaining his 
ownership. Talks with “Industria Calzaturiera” of Padua, negotiated in 1947, were 
unsuccessful. An agreement however was reached in June 1948 with “Industria 
Calzaturiera Scoiattolo”, an ad hoc limited liability company of Padua established 
just a few months earlier by five persons, four of whom were close acquaintances of 
Voltan. In particular Corrado Puchetti, a lawyer and law professor from Southern 
Italy, had been for years the legal counsel of Giovanni Voltan, as proven by 
documents I traced in his firm’s archives. Valdemar Schu and Giovanbattista Bemo 
were Voltan’s former employees. Giuseppe Romanin only did not belong to this 
inner circle, having been appointed as a managing director by the Comitato di 
Liberazione Nazionale and been called to take part in the new endeavour as a sort of 
guarantor. On the basis of this politically expedient agreement, Emanuele Voltan 
rented his firm, which was officially managed by “Scoiattolo”. Accordingly, the 
headpaper used in these years was “Calzaturificio Voltan gestione Scoiattolo” 
(Voltan Shoe Factory, managed by Scoiattolo). In reality however Emanuele Voltan
179continued to follow closely, and to influence heavily, the conduct of business.
In the initial post-war years, the firm’s strategy was based on low costs, 
obtained also by compressing production costs through some technical incremental 
improvements. Manlio Baba, one of the members of the new managing board, 
suggested for instance to enlarge the existing assembly lines so to better 
accommodate machine tools and even obtain additional space for new machines.
171 He also mentions a report by the Udine University according to which 60% of Venetian 
entrepreneurs employ in their firms all their children: Gian Antonio Stella, Schei, Milan 2000, p. 173.
1721 have obtained the information mentioned in the text on Voltan’s post-Second World War history 
in a meeting in Stra’ with Giovanni Luigi Voltan, owner of the firm and grandson of the founder, on 
22 October 2004.
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Interesting enough, this proposal was formulated in a letter sent to Emanuele Voltan 
for his “approval”. The recovery was steady but slow, especially if compared with 
the rapid growth of the Italian post-war economy. The board of Directors considered 
the 1951 budget as “satisfactory”, but only in January 1955 did the Board recognise 
that the situation had “fully returned to normal”. Quite interestingly, Emanuele 
Voltan regained full control of his enterprise in the same month, by acquiring all 
shares and then by transforming it into a limited partnership in order to benefit from 
a more favourable tax regime.
Despite the problems outlined above, Voltan showed some dynamism also in 
the decade between the end of the war and the return to the full control by the family 
of its founder. In September 1946 there were some inconclusive talks about the 
establishment of a joint venture in South Africa (a shoe factory controlled by a group 
of Italian small firms led by Voltan) and in Venezuela (again, a local factory 
managed by some 15 Italians). More concrete results were achieved in the field of 
exports towards the USA. Contacts were established through the “Agenzia 
Commerciale Italiana”, an import-export agency based in Venice and led by Count 
Dino Dona’ delle Rose. In 1955, the Republican Commercial Corporation, member 
of the American Chamber of Commerce for Trade with Italy, wrote to Dona’ delle 
Rose: “... Voltan has done an excellent job on the lasts and the workmanship and 
materials used were rated superior than necessary but that increased the cost. A high 
quality standard can be maintained but it is not necessary to be superior as to make 
an article too costly... There must be no deviations form the instructions given but 
perhaps later on this will be easier” (emphasis added).173 Low prices were what the 
American partners were after, and superior quality was welcome only as long as it
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did not translate into higher prices. Probably, this is why these first talks with the 
Republican Commercial Corporation were not continued. However, after control was 
returned to Emanuele Voltan, exports to the USA actually began in 1955, always 
through Dona’ delle Rose and thanks to a partnership with one Philip Green who 
owned a shoe factory near Boston and looked for ways to reduce labour costs. Voltan 
exported men’s shoes (less subject to fashion) to America with the trade mark 
“Verde” (an Italian translation of its American partner’s name). In 1957, some 60% 
of Voltan’s production was exported to the USA. This co-operation required an 
increased flexibility, including the use of American measures, the conversion from 
ladies’ to men’s footwear production, adjustments in design to take into account 
American rather than Italian tastes, and also additional administrative procedures 
imposed by export legislation. The partnership came to an end in the early 1960s and 
Voltan returned to its original specialisation in ladies* footwear. By that time, the 
Brenta industrial district was a reality: data for 1951 report 1,260 officially registered 
workers in the seven Riviera communes, employed in 300 enterprises (but several 
irregular, unregistered workers should also be added).174
A leaflet printed by the organising committee of the Footwear Trade Fair of 
Stra' reports 1,987 workers in 1936, increased to 7,699 by 1955.175
Both the reduced significance of Brenta at the national level and the first steps 
of the industrial districts are confirmed by a new survey of the Italian industry 
published by the (no longer fascist) Association of Italian Industrialists in 1953. The 
picture it conveys is very different from the previous survey mentioned above, 
published a mere 14 years before. Instead of mentioning factories in just five
173 Transcript of the letter by Republic Comercial Corporation of New York to Agenzia Commerciale 
Italiana of Venice, 3 August 1955, provided to me in Stra’ by Giovanni Voltan (grandson of the 
founder of the firm) on 26th October 2004.
174 Source: ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di Statistica, National Census 1951.
175 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a Spillo, quote., p. 36-8.
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locations including Stra’, the 1953 study lists some twenty main footwear centres 
including Montebelluna, but refers only in passing to a number of secondary 
industrial locations including not only Stra’ but also Fiesso.176 It is worth underlining 
that the small commune of Fiesso, traditionally Communist (6 square kilometres, a 
population of just over 4,000 in 1961 and under 6,000 in 1991) has been the most 
heavily industrialised in post-Second World War Brenta, both with regard to the 
number of firms (49 in 1980, 58 in 1990,49 in 1994) and employees (1,767 in 1980, 
1,919 in 1990, 1843 in 1994), and has therefore been, together with Stra’, the real 
hard core of the local industrial district.177
Brenta’s post-war development was, to a significant extent, export-driven. 
According to the data provided by the Footwear Trade Fair of Stra’, export 
accounted for 2.7% of the Riviera’s total sales in 1938 (including towards the Italian 
colonies in Africa and the Italian islands of the eastern Mediterranean). There were 
some attempts: Voltan even flirted with the idea of launching a business with the 
Netherlands, but the war put an end to it. By 1948 however, the export share on total 
sales had reached 6% and grew constantly in the following years to become a 
significant driving force of Brenta’s expansion. By 1958, exports amounted to almost 
half of total production (46.4%).178 Export grew both in percentage and in absolute 
terms, with Brenta’s total output going from 1,100,000 pairs in 1938 to 2,000,000 in 
1948 and 8,000,000 in 1958. Unlike other Italian footwear areas, most Riviera 
exports went not to the USA but to the relatively easily accessible Germany and 
other areas of central Europe.
176 Confederazione Generate dell’Industria Italiana, VIndustria Italiana alia meta ’ del Secolo XX, 
Roma 1953, p. 872.
177 Source: ISTAT; ACRIB.
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In many respects, Brenta experienced its halcyon days between 1965 and 
1969, with 12,000 employees and a production of 11 million shoes, while wages 
continued to remain among the lowest of the manufacture sector (the gap with 
average salaries was closed only by the early 1970s).179 By that time, Voltan had 
turned into a sort of “first among equals”, although for instance it still exhibited the 
largest number of shoe models at the first trade fair in Stra’ in 1955.
Most “large” Brenta enterprises performed all production phases in-house.
Outsourcing to local artisan workshops was rare. Belussi mentions a growing vertical
180integration of Brenta enterprises as a distinctive feature of this period. Fontana 
refers to the same phenomenon, but prefers to use the term “industrialisation of the 
footwear artisanship”.181 Correspondingly, the average size of Brenta enterprises 
increased from 5 employees in 1951 to 21 in 1961. As underlined in the preceding 
chapter, this is a common feature in Italy at the time, and certainly is not a unique 
feature of the Brenta area. However, this more-than-fourfold increase over one 
decade almost closed the gap with the average firm size of the Italian footwear sector 
as a whole (21.7 employees per firm in 1951 and 27.4 employees per firm in 1961 
respectively).
The "watershed" of 1969
A new phase began in the early 1970s, marked by a decline both in total sales 
and in production of around 10%. With regard to production, the main innovation 
was the shift towards a higher market segment. With regard to organisation, the main 
innovations were the decrease in the number of the “large” vertically integrated
178 Giovanni Luigi Fontana (ed), Cento anni..., quote., p. 322.
179 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Dall’industrializzazione dell’artigianato alVesplosione distrettuale. 
Strategie e trasformazioni del calzaturiero brentano tra gli anni Cinquanta e gli anni Settanta, in 
Giovanni Luigi Fontana (ed.), Cent'anni..., quote., p. 276.
180 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, quote., p. 38.
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factories, the increase in the number of small firms and enhanced production 
decentralisation. All this took place under circumstances less favourable than in 
previous years.
Growth rates were significantly lower. As production fell (by 15% in 1970, 
by 8,7 in 1971), so did employment and total sales. Growing national and 
international competition was one of the main reasons for the crisis. Italian 
production increased from 139 to 270 million pairs, mainly produced in expanding 
industrial districts such as Vigevano and those located in Tuscany, the Marches and 
Naples. But competition now came from those countries (Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia, 
but also Brazil) where an acceptable quality was achieved with low labour costs, 
while Brenta’s wages, in line with Italian footwear wages in general, had by now 
aligned to those prevailing in the manufacture sector. Also non-labour costs 
increased, in particular those of raw hides and skins, and so did labour conflicts.
The impact of labour relations will be analysed in a separate chapter. Here 
however it should be recalled that by the late 1960s trade unions had taken root in the 
“large” factories but continued to be extremely weak, if at all non-existent, in smaller 
artisan workshops. Labour conflicts never reached the same intensity as in nearby 
Marghera, and the so-called “hot autumn” of 1969, with its strike waves in the 
largest industrial enterprises, did not reach Brenta. Nevertheless, the idyllic image of 
harmonic co-operation between workers and entrepreneurs is far from the conditions 
prevailing in the Riviera of the early 1970s. A significant participation in strikes and 
other trade union initiatives was the norm in the largest enterprises (those with 50 
and more employees) at highly sensitive times such as the re-negotiations of 
collective work contracts. Brenta was by no means an island of social peace in a sea
181 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Dall’industrializzazione..., quote., p. 277.
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of social unrest, and was in turn heavily influenced by outside events, in particular in 
nearby Marghera. A permanent flow of information and perceptions, as well as a 
close co-ordination of labour actions, was also favoured by the fact that trade unions 
were (and still are) organised at the level of provinces, so that the same trade unions 
offices and branches, and the same trade union local leaders and managerial staff 
were (and are) in charge of both Marghera and Brenta. The several commuters 
between Brenta and Marghera also played a role in this respect. Their number peaked 
precisely between the late 1960s and the early 1970s.
The increased assertiveness of trade unions was also due to new employment 
opportunities in Marghera, resulting in a decrease of labour supply in the Riviera 
until the mid-1970s with the loss of up to five thousand often skilled Brenta workers.
As mentioned above, the trade unions increased their bargaining power at the 
national level, resulting in the adoption of increased legal protection for workers in 
“large” enterprises (with twenty or more employees) but not for those in “artisan” 
enterprises (with up to nineteen employees). Therefore, small firms competing on 
higher added value in niche productions acquired a higher flexibility than larger 
firms pursuing economies of scale through increasingly large, labour-intensive 
plants. The average price of a single Brenta pair of shoes was three times higher at 
the end than at the beginning of the 1970s. Brenta shifted from the traditional mixed 
production combining men’s’, ladies’ and children’s footwear of various quality and 
ranging from the cheap to the luxurious, to a small, upper market niche (mainly 
ladies’ footwear). Exports grew from 60% of total production in 1968 to 73% ten 
years later.
As a consequence, the average size of “industrial” enterprises declined, going 
from 40 employees in 1968 to 23 by 1976; but at the same time, the number of
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enterprises increased from approximately 300 to almost 400. This increase was due 
in particular to specialised firms. There were 86 accessories firms in 1975, but 153 
by 1981.182 The most labour-intensive production phases were decentralised, this 
leading to the decline of the traditional vertically integrated firms. Consumer goods 
enterprises increasingly confined themselves to shoe design, collection of orders and 
the management of some decisive production phases. Subcontractors and specialised 
firms took care of the rest. Fontana identifies two decentralised subsystems: the 
supply of components by specialised enterprises on the one hand, and supply of 
workforce by artisan workshops and by domestic workers on the other.183 However, 
decentralisation remained confined to some phases and never involved the decisive 
final phases of lasting, finishing, boxing and shipping.
Restructuring and outsourcing
According to the specialised literature, the above mentioned developments 
represent a fracture in Brenta history, affecting both its structure and its choice of the 
market segment. This view, however, should be qualified.
As mentioned above, responses given by Brenta entrepreneurs 
(decentralisation, a fall in the average size of firms, a shift to higher market niches) 
were not endogenous, typically local reactions to external developments. They were 
similar to those given elsewhere in Italy in the same period, not only in mature, but 
also in comparatively advanced sectors. Far from being original developments, 
Brenta* s events offers a local version of nation-wide trends which were to shape the 
economic system of the whole Italy for several years to come. It is therefore worth 
exploring to which extent Brenta really departed from previous patterns and to which 
extent its responses were adequate.
182 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi..., quote., p. 39.
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Comparatively major changes did take place in Brenta between 1969 and 
1975. Until then, the area had known twenty years of increasing production, 
employment, total sales and, at least in the final years, also higher wages. All this 
came to an end in 1969.184 Constant growth was replaced by irregular peaks and 
troughs. At the same time, nearby Marghera experienced a progressive decline, 
including a considerable decline in employment partly due to increasing 
environmental awareness. The influence of the trade unions was also significantly 
checked. These developments did have a lasting impact.
However, they favoured the incremental development of specific aspects 
already present in the district rather than prompted the alleged qualitative fracture 
recalled by a number of writers. This is true in particular for the allegedly clear-cut 
shift from a middle-quality to an upper-market production. Throughout Brenta’s 
history, low cost and high quality productions were never mutually excluding 
alternatives. Giovanni Luigi Voltan himself constantly tried to combine both. He 
certainly introduced some form of standardised, mechanised production precisely to 
reduce costs, combined with an aggressive market policy. Actually, part of his 
marketing strategy was meant to counter psychological resistance of some consumers 
vis-a-vis the new “mass” production, which was perceived as inferior in quality. 
Even advertisement brochures shifted from the initial emphasis on the “colossal 
American machine tools” to the “high quality at reasonable prices”. However, Voltan 
continued also a separate consumer-tailored handicraft production. In the first post­
war period his firm was already increasingly specialised in quality ladies’ footwear, 
and his son Fortunato launched a specialised daughter firm in the late 1930s. In the 
1920s, Brenta’s southern part (Vigonovo, Saonara) had already achieved some
183 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Dall’industrializzazione..., quote., p.298.
184 Higher levels of employment and production will be recorded by the end of the 1990s: such results, 
however, are linked to a redefinition of the district’s borders.
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specialisation in low-cost, more simple footwear which differed from the 
comparatively higher quality of Stra’ and Fiesso production.
Assessments on Brenta’s responses to the challenges of the 1970s and 1980s 
vary significantly according to the academic (and to some extent ideological) 
background of commentators. For some of them, Brenta followed a comprehensive 
strategy which drew upon collective skills and expertise in the area, leading to a 
voluntary exit from standardised production and to the shift towards higher market 
segments. For others, Brenta simply failed to make the necessary quantum leap 
towards larger enterprises, which only could have led to a new, but also increasingly 
complex firm organisation.
Fontana considers the “increased rate of mechanisation” as the main feature 
of the evolution of the late 1960s, this being in turn the result of increased labour 
costs (higher wages, regulation of apprenticeship, regulation of home work). By the 
end of the 1960s, so Fontana, Brenta was confronted with the choice between “a 
mass production with a comparatively high degree of mechanisation on one side, and 
a high quality production drawing upon a skilled local workforce and building upon 
the pre-existing local handicraft tradition. Confronted with these two options, 
Brenta had no hesitation in choosing the latter” (emphasis added).185 Among the 
reasons for this choice, Fontana mentions the structure of the local system, centred 
on a handful of “large” factories and on several medium-and small ones; local 
cultural and social characteristics, including social stability, scarce labour conflicts, 
availability of a skilled workforce with adequate artisan skills; the presence of 
several local shoe designers, decisive in the shift towards upper market niches; the
185 Ibid., p.278.
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scarce relevance of economies of scale.186 Fontana acknowledges that this led also to 
a decrease in the average size of enterprises and in the establishment of a number of 
new artisan workshops. He also acknowledges that labour conflicts also played a role 
in the reduction in enterprise size, “since many employers preferred to deal with 
single workers rather than with impersonal collective works”. However, so Fontana, 
all this played only a limited role, since “labour conflicts in Brenta were traditionally 
much lower than elsewhere in Italy” and also thanks to “the mediation role played by 
the entrepreneurs’ association”.
According to Fontana, therefore, the decrease in the average size of firms was 
the consequence of a rational choice, consciously taken in order to profit of Brenta’s 
resources and competitive advantages. In other words, the responses to the new 
challenges of the late 1960s and early 1970s were provided by a “return” to the local 
“typical qualities”.
According to Belussi, however, Fontana simply turns a blind eye on reality: 
“The history of that period (as reconstructed by Fontana) is clearly influenced by 
recent events in the district, in particular by the production decentralisation, and does 
not reflect properly the events of that time. (Fontana) unconsciously does not 
even want to consider the existence of those events, and even less is ready to 
discuss them” (emphasis added).187
According to Belussi, Brenta enterprises did not choose freely downsizing 
and production decentralisation. They simply had no choice, given the intrinsic
186 the limited relevance of economies of scale is a “classical” element in footwear production: 
mentioning the benefits of the concentration of close to a quarter of the world's production of 
kerosene in three refineries, operated by Standard Oil Trust at the end of the 19th century, Chandler 
suggests to “... imagine the diseconomies of scale ... that would result from placing close to one-fourth 
of the world's production of shoes, textiles, or lumber into three factories or millsL.the administrative 
coordination of the operation of miles and miles of machines and the huge concentration of labor 
needed to operate those machines would make neither economic nor social sense” (emphasis added): 
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope. The Dynamics o f Industrial Capitals, London 1990, p. 25. In
short: “...different production technologies have different scale-or-scope economies... the potential for 
exploiting the economies of scale varied widely from industry to industry”: ibid., p. 27.
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weaknesses of the local system. No Brenta enterprise was large enough to perform 
adequately all production phases, including design, brand promotion and 
commercialisation. However, so Belussi, this was no foregone conclusion: by the end 
of the 1960s some enterprises did try to enhance their size, but to no avail. Belussi 
rejects the traditional picture of a contemporary Brenta composed almost exclusively 
of small and very small enterprises and a large number of artisan micro-workshops. 
She recalls that by 1981, 49 firms still employed each more than 50 people. Half of 
the total workforce of the district (about 4,200 persons) was still employed in such 
“medium-sized” enterprises. Eleven out of these 49 enterprises (mostly located in the 
historic core of Stra’ and Fiesso) employed more than 100 people each. She 
acknowledges that between 1968 and 1976 the average size of “industrial” firms fell 
from 40 to 23,5 employees, in particular as a result of the establishment of several 
small and micro-firms and the ensuing outsourcing. However, she notes, this trend 
coexists with the persistence of a core of larger enterprises, which was to collapse 
only a decade later.188
Roverato sees also a qualitative distinction between the decentralisation in the 
1970s and the decentralisation in the 1980s. 189 In his view, the former had been 
partial, limited in scope, more a reaction to external pressures than a shift in strategy, 
and only meant to meet temporary, brief demand increases. To this end, two sub­
systems were established: supply of components on one hand, supply of domestic or 
unskilled labour on the other hand. The coexistence of these two sub-systems gave 
Brenta enterprises an even higher degree of flexibility, enabling them to draw on the 
existing pools of skilled home workers for upper market productions and on
187 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, quote., p. 49.
m  Ibid., p. 39.
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subcontracting small factories for larger batches. Imperfect as this decentralisation 
can have been, it helped bring about some recovery: production in 1979 reached 
almost nine million pairs of shoes.
In the 1980s, so Roverato, decentralisation became more stable and linked to 
specific integrated phases of production. Brenta came therefore to resemble more 
closely the ideal-typical industrial district, based on significant division of labour and 
local inter-firm co-operation. This shift of production patterns was no longer 
intended, so Roverato, to achieve labour costs reductions, but to achieve economies 
of scale.
However, it should be underlined that decentralisation in the Brenta was 
always confined to a few, typical production phases. The proliferation of 
subcontracting small firms focussed on just uppers (with producers going from a 
handful in 1974 to over 160 by 1988) and shoe designs (with designers going in the 
same period from fewer than 100 to over 400). The increase in the number of other 
types of enterprises (in particular producers of heels and soles) was much more 
limited.190
Another element of the “fracture” underlined by the literature is the export 
increase following the shift towards an upper market niche. An increase did occur: 
exports passed from 60% of production in 1969 to 67% in 1975. However, this can 
scarcely be considered a quantum leap and seems to be rather the continuation of 
long- lasting trends, with export shares progressively going from 6% in 1948 to 60% 
at the beginning of the 1960s. The export share on total output did grow after 1969,
189 Giorgio Roverato, Composizione e caratteristiche. Anni 1980-1990, in Giovanni Luigi Fontana 
(ed), Cent’anni..., quote., p. 338-9.
190 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, , quote., p. 57.
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but exports declined in absolute terms since production fell from 11 million of pairs 
in 1969 to fewer than 9 in 1978.
Despite the emphasis put on quality, price remained a key factor even after 
the move to a higher market niche. The production decentralisation was not 
accompanied by significant technological progresses, not even by the adoption of the 
comparatively simple new techniques adopted in other footwear districts (such as the 
cutting of hides and skins by laser or water-jet systems).191 Nominal increases in the 
prices of the Brenta footwear were eroded by a comparatively high inflation 
(although increases in real terms remained still significant, peaking at 15% in 1974). 
It should also be recalled that prices increases were not unknown even before 1968 
(an average increase of 6% in real terms was for instance recorded in 1965).
Writers on Brenta mention only in passing the effects of a major international 
development: the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates in 1971. The 
largest increase in Brenta’s exports occurred between 1975 and 1978, in coincidence 
with both the highest increase in the prices of footwear and with a major devaluation 
of the Italian lira (the exchange rate went from 653 lire per dollar in 1975 to 882 in 
1977). For the first time, Brenta took advantage of the devaluation of the Italian 
currency; it will do so again, especially in the 1990s and until the introduction of the 
Euro in 2001.
However, even after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, Italy achieved 
relatively stable exchange rates sometimes over periods of several years. During the 
1980s in particular, the Lira exchange rate floated within the 6% fluctuations margins 
allowed by the European Rates Mechanism (ERM), and later on within the standard 
narrow band of 2,5%. However, at the same time Italy's domestic inflation was 
higher than in many other European states (in particular Germany). This led to
191 Giorgio Roverato, Composizione e caratteristiche..., quote., p. 341.
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increased prices of export goods, which obliged Italian firms to explore alternative 
ways to maintain their competitiveness, either by reducing costs (for example by 
outsourcing abroad) or by increasing quality.
The rigidity of the Italian exchange rate coupled with an inflation higher than 
that of its international competitors produced the same effects as a rise in the 
exchange rate of the Italian lira. This translated into one of the selective factors 
disadvantages mentioned by Porter, which can be beneficial to economic 
development: “In actual competition... the abundance or low cost of a factor often 
leads to its inefficient deployment. In contrast, disadvantages in basic factors, such as 
labour shortages, lack of domestic raw materials, or a harsh climate, create pressures 
to innovate around them. A steady rise in the nation’s exchange rate can have the 
same effect (italics added). The result it that the firm’s competitive disadvantage in a 
narrow conception of competition can become an advantage in a more dynamic
,,192one.
In September 1991, the ERM experienced its worst crisis ever: the Lira and 
the British pound left the system, while all other currencies, except the German mark 
and the Dutch guilder, were allowed to fluctuate by a 15% margin either side, 
corresponding to a maximum of 30% appreciation or depreciation. As a 
consequence, the exchange rate of the Lira against the D-mark went from 760 to over 
1,100 in a few months, before stabilising at, or just below, 1,000. Italian exports 
received a significant boost. Brenta was no exception, with the export share on total 
production going up to over 90%. In some respects, the situation was similar to that 
of the 1970s, when devaluation also had brought about increases in exports. 
However, in the 1970s such advantages had been short-lived and had been promptly
192 Michael E. Porter, The competitive..., quote, p. 82. Porter mentions the mini-mill technology (in 
which Brescia-area steel producers have emerged as perhaps the world leaders) as a result of inter alia 
high logistical costs in a country that like Italy lacks local raw materials.
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eroded by higher domestic inflation rates. This did not occur in the 1990s: domestic 
inflation did scarcely increase as a consequence of the devaluation, so that those 
Italian firms (including Brenta’s) which had been able to defend their positions 
during the preceding years (either by reducing costs or by increasing quality) could 
now also reap the additional benefits of significant reductions in selling prices.
Internationalisation
Such a combination of merely incremental progresses, reluctance to 
undertake structural reforms and heavy reliance on external factors is assessed quite 
critically by recent writers.193 The latest period in particular (from the early 1990s 
until today) has been investigated in some studies focussed on specific issues.194
However, a serious obstacle to a comprehensive analysis is the availability of 
time series data about the district only until 1989. In 2000, Brenta’s entrepreneurs* 
association modified the definition of the district so to include a larger area. Data are 
now given at a higher level of aggregation, and details on single communes are no 
longer available.195 Thanks to this new territorial definition, ACRIB can report since 
the year 2000 an annual output in the region of 20 million pairs of shoes, annual total 
sales of 1,6 million Euro, 14,000 employees, a share of 14% of the Italian 
production, almost 1,000 firms. These figures are all well above the peak reached in 
1969 under the old definition of the district.
193 Which at the same time underestimates developments and innovations such as those cost 
reductions and quality improvements which allowed Brenta to maintain its export shares despite 
higher domestic inflation.
1 See in particular Fiorenza Belussi, Industrial Districts: networks without technologies? The 
diffusion o f Internet applications in three Northeast Industrial Districts (Ids) o f Italy: results from a 
survey, discussion paper presented at the DRUID Summer Conference on Industrial Dynamics ot the 
New and Old Econmy- who is embracing whom?, Copenhagen-Elsinore 6-8 June 2002; and Fiorenza 
Belussi-Maria Scarpel, II distretto della Riviera del Brenta come comunita’... , quote., discussion 
paper presented at Padua University, 2001.
95 Roberta Rabellotti, How globalization affects..., quote.
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This modification probably attempts to attract a larger share of public 
incentives provided under the new national and regional legislation for industrial 
districts, but also tries to enhance Brenta’s image. Not surprisingly, the new method 
was adopted during the centennial of Brenta’s footwear industry. Quite 
paradoxically, the current definition of the district encompasses urban areas (Padua 
in particular) which do not share any of the characteristics of Brenta proper. No data 
on outsourcing abroad are provided: “firms do not like to talk about this process of 
external relocation, because they are worried about the possible negative impact on 
their image as top quality producers and, indeed, there are signs of decreasing 
quality”.196
Quite confusingly, the most recent specialised literature refer both to the old 
and to the new delimitation of the Brenta district. Belussi’s study, published in 1998, 
puts the total sales at 1.9 billion lire (under one million Euro). The study promoted 
by the entrepreneurs’ association in the same year refers of course (how could it have 
been otherwise?) to the “new” definition and mentions a total production of over 2,6 
billion lire (1,3 million Euro); and so does “Club dei distretti”, a network of local 
entrepreneurs’ organisations. The Italian Trade Office (Istituto per il Commercio con 
l’Estero-ICE, a subsidiary of the Ministry for Foreign Trade) again refers to the “old” 
version.
As mentioned above, the recent specialised literature tends to convey a rather 
bleak picture. According to Belussi, “the downgrading of the Brenta district into a 
mere cluster of small artisan workshops (artigianalizzazione) is now irretrievably 
accomplished, in parallel with the further decline of the medium-sized enterprises”. 
During the early 1990s, “a fracture with the previous trends occurred: decrease of 
employment by 18%, increased enterprise mortality, decreased enterprises natality,
196 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, quote., p. 6.
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increased industrial turbulence”, which all translated into closure of enterprises,
107 •  •  •further decrease in their size and further outsourcing. Belussi’s analysis underlines 
in particular trends in the number of enterprises: it increased in the 1980s, peaked 
between 1987 and 1991 and decreased afterwards. Since 1990, so Belussi, firm death 
rates in the area are higher than firm birth rates. Both remain high in comparison 
with the total number of enterprises: the former between 14 and 18%, the latter at 
about 10%, with a particularly negative year in 1993 with over 17% and 9% 
respectively.
Workforce mobility is consequently very high: every year between 14 and 
24% of workers change their employers. As a consequence, so Belussi, “the possible 
beginning of a structural crisis linked to the decline of competitiveness, and in 
general symptoms of enterprises fatigue”, were apparent in the early 1990s. This was 
due to “the organisation patterns of the area, which are not in tune with the new 
international division of labour and to the new models of enterprise 
organisation” (emphasis added).198 Brenta, so Belussi, was still a “traditional” 
industrial district based on low labour costs, including costs of skilled workforce, and 
not a “post-Fordist” industrial district, based on synergies between production, 
distribution, marketing and innovation. Technological innovations in particular 
remained only incremental, with negative effects only partially offset by an 
“obsession” to production (which in turn made abroad outsourcing particularly 
difficult, if not impossible for most firms).199
Even the research promoted by the entrepreneurs* association recalls 
“problematic elements in Brenta’s success”. “The high quality of its production
197 With a peak in 1993, with a loss of 2.037 footwear workers in the whole of the Venice province of 
which the Brenta constitutes 80%.
198 Ibid., p. 64.
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alone”, so Roverato, “is not sufficient to ensure success on its own”.200 This is due in 
particular to the shift towards upper market niches by competitors specialised until 
recently in low-cost production, both foreign (Spain, Poland) and Italian, to growing 
costs and decreasing demand, to the loss of traditional solutions (in particular 
increasing difficulties in having recourse to undeclared labour, because of more 
stringent control by public authorities and the decrease in available workforce). 
Brenta has reacted, so Roverato, with further increases in quality (e.g. in terms of 
delivery times), cost reduction and also diversification of the traditional Western 
European export markets. However, no significant progress was made to reduce the 
traditional weakness in the commercialisation of its products, not even after the 
failure of the Brenta brand mark launched in the 1980s, which “did never really take 
off, not because of the arbitrary link made between the modem Brenta industry and 
the artisan tradition of Venice, but because of the insuperable individualism of 
entrepreneurs”.201 Several of them, so Roverato, did not really believe that their 
success was at least partly due to the localisation of their enterprises in the Brenta 
area.
The added value of firm location within the Brenta industrial district was 
made apparent precisely by unsatisfactory results of outsourcing abroad. In turn, this 
has increased the interest on a possible real Brenta brand mark (in other terms: of a 
potentially powerful symbol of collective identity): that “Cheshire cat” which so far 
has regularly failed to materialise and whose failure has led to the current situation in 
which commerce remains firmly in the hands not of commercial departments of local 
firms or even less of the entrepreneurial association, but of commercial agents acting 
on behalf of several firms, wholesalers, large foreign purchase companies.
199 Ibid., p, 68.
200 Giorgio Roverato, Composizione e caratteristiche..., quote., p. 347.
201 Ibid., p. 351.
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A number of writers (but also ACRIB in a study published in 1992) agree that 
Brenta’s survival depends on overcoming the current fragmentation in a large 
number of small and very small firms. A renewed hard core of strong, comparatively 
large leading firms is badly needed, in order to prove the whole district with 
“adequate local leadership on technology, marketing and commercialisation; 
capability to compete with the global system; achievement of a certain degree of 
outsourcing abroad”, all of which is impossible “in the present circumstances”.202
There are some signs however that things could evolve in this directions. 
Since 1995, the increase in employment is higher than the increase in the number of 
firms. At the same time, some firms have explored production outsourcing abroad, in 
the broader context of the traditional integrated production of shoes and other leather 
articles being increasingly replaced by a global supply chain which cuts across 
different cultures and countries.
In recent years, Italian outsourcing abroad has usually taken the form of 
“Traffico di Perfezionamento Passivo” (TPP): footwear components (usually uppers) 
are temporarily exported, usually to Central and Eastern European countries (in the 
early 1990s Hungary and the Czech Republic, nowadays Romania), are worked there 
and then re-imported into Italy. Italian firms maintain the ownership of such 
materials, and therefore no custom duties are levied. Belussi has described four cases 
of outsourcing abroad by Brenta enterprises (one based in Fiesso, three in Fosso’), 
with various degrees of success.203 To some extent, these cases represent four 
possible strategies: a) outsourcing limited to one production phase (the case 
discussed is quite successful but is not particularly innovative: it simply replaces 
national with international outsourcing); b) establishment of a network of daughter
202 Ibid., p. 354.
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firms (one Brenta enterprise leads a network of small and very small firms in 
Hungary, Bosnia, Slovenia with approximately 300 employees and provides the 
necessary training); c) outsourcing of a number of production phases (this imply 
close and constant contacts with daughter firms abroad: in the case discussed, this 
has been made possible by improved road and air connections between Timisoara, 
Romania); d) international division of labour according to the quality of final 
products (with a two-tier system based on a higher quality production performed in 
Brenta and a middle-quality production performed in Hungary).
National and regional legislation has also played a role in recent years. The 
national law on industrial districts was implemented by a decree of the President of 
the Veneto Regional Council (Assembly) n. 79 of 22 November 1999, which 
identified 19 industrial district in the Veneto region.204 On this basis, the Brenta 
entrepreneurs’ association and the local trade unions agreed on a “Patto di Distretto” 
(district covenant) for the development of the footwear industry and employment. 
The law of the Veneto Region n. 8 of the year 2003 has allowed the 19 Venetian 
districts to submit a total of 28 such District Covenants, consisting of a total of 122 
projects, out of which 115 (including those on Brenta) have been granted public 
financial support for a total of 15 million Euro.
Brenta entrepreneurs have assessed positively the experience gathered so far 
and in particular the efficiency of the regional authorities. They feel however that
203 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, quote., p. 273-303.
204 some are “classical” districts, located within clearly identifiable borders, such as the Riviera del 
Brenta, Murano, Montebelluna, Arzignano. Far from being a proper district, Schio-Valdagno is the 
historic core area of the textile enterprise Marzotto, established in the nineteenth century and one of 
the leading Italian enterprises in this sector. Other “districts” are provinces or portions of provinces 
(Vicenza, Verona) with thriving mixed clusters of small and medium-sized enterprises, but lacking 
those characteristics associated with proper industrial districts. The list therefore appears to have been 
drawn on the basis of an empirical, sometimes politically oriented combination of criteria.
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some improvements are needed, in particular as far as the transparency of the calls 
for bids is concerned.205
On a more general level, the distribution of relatively limited funds to over 
100 projects dispersed in almost 10 districts in a region of 5 million inhabitants 
resembles very much the old Christian-Democrat trickle of small financial supports 
to the largest possible amount of firms. This is very likely to have helped establish a 
wide-spread social cohesion and institutional peace, but had failed to steer effectively 
the spontaneous, somehow anarchical economic development of the second post-war 
period in the Veneto region.206
However, even with these limits, the new legislation plays indeed a role, 
although an indirect one. Entrepreneurs in particular have increased their 
commitment to the dialogue with public authorities. The self-perception of Brenta as 
an industrial district and therefore to some extent as a collective actor has also been 
strengthened and is now almost common-place among entrepreneurs. This translates 
into better co-operation within the district but also in an increased role for the district 
in dealing with other interlocutors. A good example is the recently concluded 
agreement with the southern Italian region of Calabria (the poorest in Italy, with an 
average per capita income corresponding to 69% of the EU average, as opposed to 
125 for Veneto).207
Although family firms still constitutes the vast majority of Brenta firms, a 
small group of executive managers is now coming to the fore. Professional 
managers now hold the reins of common services providers and are acquiring more
205 Source: Entrepreneurs’ association, Verona.
206 This is the essence of the “white”, Christian Democrat model. A more “rational”, cooperative, 
intrusive and “district-like” approach was pursued in “red”, Communist and Socialist-led regions like 
Emilia, where public authorites and political leades did not confine themselves to support spontaneous 
growth but played a direct role in shaping local economies. It is hardly surprising that the ‘^ ed” model 
attracted more attention and was mentioned for instance by Porter and Best. A chapter of this thesis is 
devoted to the co-existence in the Riviera of elements perraining to both models.
207 Source: ACRIB.
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and more visibility as the relevance of the “corporate” identity of the Brenta grows. 
Some of them have been in their current positions for years and have reached a 
higher profile than most entrepreneurs (for instance Mattiazzo, Director of ACRIB, 
or Tescaro, Director of Centro Veneto Calzaturiero).
The emergence of managers seems to go together with the decline of the 
traditional Riviera entrepreneurial class and with the control of some enterprises 
being handed over to outsiders, usually large Italian and foreign fashion groups. 
Luigino Rossi in particular transferred 90% of his enterprise (RossiModa, one of the 
largest in Brenta with some 150 employees) to the French group Yves-Saint Laurent 
in 2002. At Brenta’s level, this is a major development.208 Rossi was in many ways 
the symbolic successor of Voltan as the leading local personality, not only as an 
entrepreneurs but also in a range of other activities including as editor of “II 
Gazzettino” (the largest and most authoritative Venetian newspaper, ranking eight 
among the largest Italian daily newspapers) from 1983 to 2003 and as Brenta 
representative in a number of regional, national and European fora. Rossi is the only 
Brenta entrepreneur after Giovanni Luigi Voltan to have played a truly national role, 
in particular through his unsuccessful attempt to take over a number of conservative 
daily newspapers in north-eastern Italy in the mid-1995.209 One year earlier, Rossi 
had already tried to take over the Milanese daily newspaper II Giomo.210
Rossi’s case confirms that ownership and control of Brenta footwear firms 
can now be de-linked from family control and even pass in foreign hands. Ballin, 
current Chairman of Acrib, considers this “a significant step towards the 
internationalisation the district”.211 However, Brenta’s internationalisation remains
see the interview published in Padova Economical 1995/3, p. 9-12.
209 Giuseppe Sarcina, II Polo alia veneta, Corriere della Sera, 13* March 1995.
210 ^Marco Travaglio, Montanelli e il Cavaliere. Storia di un grande e di un piccolo uomo, Milano
2004, p. 91.
211 Source: ACRIB.
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for the time being strongly asymmetric: while foreign firms have demonstrated that 
they are willing and able to take control of local firms, Brenta entrepreneurs so far 
have not gone beyond the control of small artisan unit in emerging countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This need not be the unavoidable fate of a mature 
industrial district, as shown by the other Venetian districts of Montebelluna and 
Cadore where internationalisation goes in both directions.212
In this context, Brenta’s strong “corporate identity” could be partly seen as an 
attempt to mount a “corporate defence” against hard, intrusive competition from 
abroad which has now come to threaten the very heart of the central, time-honoured 
local institution: the family firm. Belussi goes even beyond that, writing that the 
strengthening of local identity is partly a consequence of the insufficient returns of 
outsourcing abroad, which so far has proven largely incompatible with the peculiar 
Brenta high-quality, comparatively labour-intensive, locally rooted specialised 
production.213
Brenta has experienced peaks and throughs, positive and negative phases, 
apparently repeating themselves in cycles of approximately twenty years. A 
promising phase of development began at the end of the 19th century, in particular 
with the establishment of the firm Voltan, and peaked in the first decade of the 20th 
century. A phase of stagnation followed between the two World Wars, heavily 
affected by the world recession of 1929 and by the ten years of war started in 1935. 
A twenty-year expansion phase followed as from the early 1950s, export-led and
212 As far as Montebelluna is concerned, the following developments took place between 2000 and 
2001: Benetton took over Asolo (mountain shoes) and Nordica (ski bots); Nike (USA) tok over 
Canstar (unknown to the general public but with a key niche position in last production for in-line 
skater rollers and ice-skaters); Tecnica (ski boots) took over Think Pink (clothing) and Lowa 
(Germany); Rossignol (France) took over Caben; Salomon took over Rover and subsequently San 
Giorgio; Head-Tyrolia-Mares merged with Brixia and took over Munari and San Giorgio. In Cadore 
(eyeglasses district) Luxottica took over RayBan (USA).
21 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, quote., p. 299.
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fostered by the opportunities provided by the European Community. The 1970s and 
1980s again were difficult, overshadowed by labour conflicts, increased competition 
from emerging countries, international crises.
The 1990s, especially in heir second half, experienced growth of 
employment, production, exports and total sales, prompted also by the unexpectedly 
positive effects of the Lira devaluation in 1992.
Each phase has been profoundly influenced by exogenous factors, be they 
regional, national or international. Belussi’s vivid description of the district as an 
endogenous, indigenous and spontaneous phenomenon, though not entirely 
inaccurate, should therefore be put into perspective.214
Conclusion
Several of the characteristics underlined in the preceding paragraphs, 
including the resilience of the local “entrepreneurial aristocracy”, the re-active, 
seldom pro-active responses to challenges, the incremental evolution of technologies, 
inter-firm organisation and commercial structures, the role of families, confirm that 
the Brenta is an intrinsically conservative industrial district. Flexibility, quick 
reactions and capability to adjust to evolving environments, which are also 
considered typical characteristics of successful industrial districts, are usually 
confined to specific, “institutionalised” (although decisive) phases, like shoe design. 
Other significant aspects have not changed since the early 20th century: Brenta was 
and still is a cluster of small and medium-sized enterprises, led by a handful of larger 
firms all based in a few small communes (a sort of geographical “hard core”), 
employing labour-intensive technologies,215 specialising in leather ladies’ footwear
214 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, quote., p. 43.
215 With labour costs still as a significant component of the final value of products: see Andrea 
Ordanini, I principal! distretti calzaturieri italiani, Milano 1955.
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of good quality but competing also on price, with a constantly growing interest in 
inter-firm co-operation and in export. Developments have been incremental and have 
not altered the overall picture. Even alleged “fractures” or “quantum leaps” are at 
most accelerations of ongoing processes and shifts of emphasis from some aspects to 
other.
The specialised literature on Brenta has proposed a division in phases of the 
local economic history. This can be certainly useful; but such phases are not distinct 
periods, different in nature or even separated by quantum leaps. For instance, 
Belussi’s distinction between a “district phase” after 1950 and a phase completely 
dominated by a single “large” enterprise before the Second World War appears to be 
an oversimplification. As mentioned above, a small cluster of firms, co-operation 
among entrepreneurs and even some common services existed already well before 
the second World War, and provided the stepping stone for the subsequent take off.
In the same vein, the shift towards upper market segments so vividly 
underlined by Roverato and Fontana was in reality the continuation of trends already 
set by Voltan in the 1930s, when the distinction between a “hard core”, high quality 
cluster of firms in Stra’ and Fiesso and a “peripheral” handful of artisan workshops 
south of the river Brenta was established.
Technological and organisational quantum leaps are not uncommon even in 
mature Italian industrial districts. In Chapter I, I have recalled Porter’s comments on
A i r
the impact of technological innovations in the ceramic tiles district of Sassuolo. A 
number of the traditionally small artisan workshops of the Venetian island of 
Murano, specialising in artistic glassware, have in several cases merged with large
216 “Highly visible energy and labor cost pressures led to the next major breakthrough by the Italian 
industry, die rapid single-firing process... the first efforts ... had taken place in the United States in the 
late 1950s... Italian companies began experimenting with the technique in the early 1960s. ... 
Continued rivalry led to a break-through in 1972-1973 with the introduction of the rapid single-firing
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international companies. Activities like marketing, commerce, international alliances 
and production outsourcing to mainland Veneto are now more significant than the 
preservation of century-old traditional artisan skills.217 The conservative character of 
Brenta is underlined by a comparison with similar footwear districts of Northern 
Italy, which successfully completed the transition from one type of production to 
another. Although established at the same time as Brenta, Vigevano shifted to the 
production of footwear machine tools after the second World War. Montebelluna has 
switched from traditional footwear to ski boots and later on to comparatively 
innovative products like Geox, which in turn implies the adoption of different 
technologies and organisation patterns.
However, a debate on Brenta* s “quality” would not take us very far, since 
even the Bank of Italy has recently questioned the possibility of distinguishing 
between “good” and “bad” industrial districts. Brenta* s history should rather be 
considered as a series of uninterrupted, continuous efforts of local entrepreneurs to 
use rationally the limited resources available locally. Brenta’s current structure is the 
result of these efforts, spread over decades as an incremental process, usually in 
response to specific problems and not to be seen as a comprehensive, global strategy 
pursued individually or collectively. Brenta’s approach has been traditionally 
reactive, not pro-active. Still, this approach proved not only to be successful but also 
sustainable in the medium and even long term, in conjunction with the local high 
degree of flexibility provided by a number of factors including the limited size of 
firms, low entry barriers, available skilled workforce.
process by Marazzi... (in a few years) the cycle time dropped from sixteen to twenty hours to fifty to 
fifty-five minutes”: Michael E. Porter, The competitive..., quote., p. 217.
217 Paolo Crestanello, L’industria del vetro artistico di Murano, Oltre il Ponte, 1995/49.
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Inter-firm co-operation in Brenta is certainly rooted in a local tradition with some 
specific characteristics going back to historical, geographical, social and economic 
factors. This background enables Brenta to act, to some extent, like the “collective 
entrepreneur” mentioned among others by Best.218 However, this community 
dimension coexists with the role played by a handful of real, individual 
entrepreneurs, some of whom were able to shape the local footwear industry over 
decades. Giovanni Luigi Voltan until the 1930s and and Luigino Rossi from the 
1950s to the late 1990s were just the most prominent in an a sort of local 
“entrepreneurial aristocracy”, composed of a handful of recurrent names (Ballin, 
Caovilla, Calzavara, Gobbo, Caovilla...). In the same vein, the current managers are 
the heirs to some key figures of the past, from Trois (the Director of the Training 
centre in the 1930s) to Zandarin (promoter of the Stra’ Trade Fair in the 1950s) to 
Donadelli (who chaired the entrepreneurs’ association, without being an 
entrepreneur, from 1962 to 1981). To a large extent, Brenta’s is a history of persons, 
not of networks and institutions. This will be discussed further in the following 
chapter.
218 “A fully developed industrial district would behave like a collective entrepreneur: it would possess 
the capacity to redesign process and organization as well as product”: Michael H. Best, The new 
competition, quote., p. 207.
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TABLE V
FIRMS IN THE BRENTA INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT
YEARS INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES
ARTISAN
ENTERPRISES
COMMERCIAL
ENTERPRISES
TOTAL
1960 93 160 31 284
1961 93 160 32 285
1962 95 162 31 288
1963 94 165 36 295
1964 96 166 33 295
1965 97 166 34 297
1966 97 155 35 287
1967 104 161 37 302
1968 109 164 41 314
1969 101 162 46 309
1970 97 172 37 305
1971 89 183 50 322
1972 86 209 50 345
1973 94 222 50 366
1974 95 219 51 365
1975 97 223 52 372
1976 107 243 46 396
1977 111 242 47 400
1978 121 259 56 436
1979 133 272 60 465
1980 140 288 69 497
1981 147 302 74 523
1982 149 349 73 571
1983 154 385 73 612
1984 170 406 76 652
1985 177 436 77 690
1986 183 515 77 775
1987 195 546 81 822
1988 194 548 88 830
1989 200 602 90 892
1990 190 603 93 886
1991 193 562 77 832
1992 173 524 74 771
1993 172 535 68 775
1994 180 529 68 777
1995 179 522 71 772
1996 171 495 61 727
1997 174 484 61 719
1998 163 470 66 699
Industrial enteprise: with more than 19 employees 
Artisan enterprise: with 19 or fewer employees
Source: ACRIB
135
TABLE VI
EMPLOYMENT IN THE BRENTA INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT
YEARS EMPLOYEES
1960 9,100
1961 9,155
1962 9,520
1963 9,700
1964 9,920
1965 10,500
1966 11,900
1967 11,770
1968 12,100
1969 12,000
1970 10,500
1971 10,200
1972 9,200
1973 9,300
1974 9,354
1975 9,352
1976 9,306
1977 9,367
1978 9,924
1979 10,120
1980 10,165
1981 10,181
1982 10,120
1983 10,107
1984 10,131
1985 10,067
1986 10,008
1987 9,971
1988 9,823
1989 9,751
1990 9,597
1991 9,419
1992 9,007
1993 9,101
1994 9,137
1995 9,139
1996 9,003
1997 8,912
1998 8,791
Source: ACRIB
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TABLE VD
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES IN THE BRENTA INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT
YEAR INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES
EMPLOYEES % INDUSTRIAL 
EMPLOYEES
AVERAGE 
ENTERP. SIZE
1979 133 5,234 51.7 39.4
1980 140 5,375 52.9 38.4
1981 147 5,371 52.8 36.5
1982 149 5,275 52.1 35.4
1983 154 5,077 50.2 32.9
1984 170 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1985 177 5,102 50.7 28.8
1986 183 4,954 49.5 27.1
1987 195 4,941 49.7 27.1
1988 194 4,819 49.1 24.8
1989 200 4,477 45.9 22.4
1990 190 4,296 44.8 22.6
1991 193 4,234 44.9 21.9
1992 173 4,117 45.7 23.8
1993 172 4,194 46.1 24.4
1994 180 4,238 46.4 23.5
1995 179 4,297 47.0 24.0
1996 171 4,219 46.9 24.7
1997 174 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1998 163 4,171 47.4 25.6
Industrial enterprises: with more than 19 employees
Employees: number of employees in fotwear industrial enterprises in Brenta industrial 
district
% industrial employees: percentage of employees in industrial enterprises on total 
employment in Brenta footwear sector
average enterp. size: average size of footwear industrial enterprises in Brenta industrial 
district
Source: personal elaboration on ACRIB data
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TABLE V m
BRENTA INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT: PRODUCTION
(in pairs of shoes)
YEARS PRODUCTION
1960 6,018,000
1961 6,269,000
1962 6,430,000
1963 6,548,000
1964 6,682,000
1965 6,819,000
1966 8,620,000
1967 9,650,000
1968 10,387,000
1969 10,970,000
1970 9,310,000
1971 8,500,000
1972 8,500,000
1973 9,100,000
1974 9,050,000
1975 9,010,000
1976 8,650,000
1977 8,615,000
1978 8,700,000
1979 8,930,000
1980 8,120,000
1981 8,580,000
1982 8,270,000
1983 8,005,000
1984 8,600,000
1985 8,660,000
1986 8,420,000
1987 8,175,000
1988 7,929,000
1989 8,005,000
1990 7,895,000
1991 8,100,000
1992 8,072,000
1993 8,505,000
1994 8,690,550
1995 8,809,600
1996 8,509,200
1997 8,398,580
1998 8,138,220
Source: ACRIB
138
TABLE IX
BRENTA INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT: TOTAL SALES
(in thousands Lire)
YEARS Total sales 
current prices
Total sales at 
1998 value
Total sales at 
1998 value/IN
1960 15,947 300,135 100
1961 17,553 320,979 107
1962 19,804 344,568 115
1963 21,084 341,193 114
1964 22,919 350,127 117
1965 23,868 349,444 116
1966 31,033 445,429 148
1967 35,244 495,953 165
1968 39,474 548,487 183
1969 45,540 615,493 205
1970 40,986 527,141 176
1971 40,500 496,088 165
1972 50,250 582,770 194
1973 64,600 678,802 226
1974 86,900 764,474 255
1975 108,400 813,884 271
1976 133,200 858,294 286
1977 165,850 904,899 301
1978 188,660 915,412 305
1979 240,164 1,006,853 335
1980 247,660 857,063 286
1981 287,430 837,983 279
1982 305,990 766,766 255
1983 344,215 750,116 250
1984 388,720 766,059 255
1985 420,443 762,955 254
1986 433,630 741,641 247
1987 435,727 712,353 237
1988 428,166 678,726 226
1989 440,275 643,296 214
1990 450,015 619,731 206
1991 477,900 618,453 206
1992 516,640 634,319 211
1993 591,097 696,459 232
1994 643,100 729,027 243
1995 704,768 758,346 253
1996 719,027 744,632 248
1997 739,494 752,767 251
1998 743,019 743,019 248
Source: personal elaboration of ACRIB data
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TABLE X
BRENTA INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT: AVERAGE PRICES
(in Lire, per pairs of shoes)
YEARS Averge current 
price
Average price at 
1998 value
Average price at 
1998 value-IN
1960 2,650 49,875 100
1961 2,800 51,201 103
1962 3,080 53,588 107
1963 3,220 52,107 104
1964 3,430 52,399 105
1965 3,500 51,242 103
1966 3,600 51,672 104
1967 3,650 51,362 103
1968 3,800 52,800 106
1969 4,150 56,089 112
1970 4,400 56,590 113
1971 4,800 58,795 118
1972 5,900 68,424 137
1973 7,100 74,605 150
1974 9,600 84,452 170
1975 12,000 90,097 181
1976 15,400 99,232 199
1977 19,250 105,030 211
1978 21,685 105,219 211
1979 26,894 112,749 226
1980 30,500 105,549 212
1981 33,500 97,667 196
1982 37,000 92,716 186
1983 43,000 93,705 188
1984 45,200 89,076 179
1985 48,550 88,101 177
1986 51,500 88,080 177
1987 53,300 87,465 175
1988 54,000 84,115 169
1989 55,000 80,361 161
1990 57,000 78,496 157
1991 59,000 76,352 153
1992 64,000 78,577 158
1993 69,500 81,888 164
1994 74,000 83,887 168
1995 80,000 86,081 173
1996 84,500 87,509 175
1997 88,050 89,630 180
1998 91,300 91,300 183
Source: personal elaboration of ACRIB data
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TABLE XI
BRENTA FOOTWEAR FIRMS: PRODUCTION PER EMPLOYEE 
(in pairs of shoes/year)
YEARS PROD./EMPL. INDEX
NUMBER
1960 663,3 100
1961 648,8 98
1962 675,4 102
1963 675,1 102
1964 673,6 102
1965 649,4 98
1966 724.4 109
1967 819.9 124
1968 854.4 129
1969 914.2 138
1970 886.7 134
1971 833.3 126
1972 924 139
1973 978.5 148
1974 967.5 146
1975 963.4 146
1976 929.5 140
1977 916.8 138
1978 876.7 132
1979 882.4 133
1980 798.8 120
1981 842.8 127
1982 816.4 123
1983 792 120
1984 848.9 128
1985 860.2 130
1986 841.3 127
1987 819.9 124
1988 807.2 122
1989 820.9 124
1990 822.7 124
1991 860 130
1992 896.2 135
1993 934.6 141
1994 951.1 143
1995 964 145
1996 945.2 142
1997 942.4 142
1998 925.7 140
Source: personal elaboration of ACRIB data
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TABLE XH
BRENTA INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT: PERCENTAGES OF DOMESTIC SALES 
AND EXPORTS ON TOTAL SALES
YEARS % domestic sales on 
total sales
% export on 
total sales
1960 40.54 59.46
1961 40.00 60.00
1962 38.00 62.00
1963 37.01 62.99
1964 35.36 64.64
1965 44.01 55.99
1966 44.01 55.99
1967 40.01 59.99
968 41.52 58.48
1969 40.00 60.00
1970 44.01 55.99
1971 38.27 61.73
1972 37.81 62.19
1973 37.00 63.00
1974 36.00 64.00
1975 33.00 67.00
1976 29.95 70.05
1977 26.97 72.43
1978 27.37 72.63
1979 27.35 72.65
1980 29.00 71.00
1981 29.50 70.50
1982 29.80 70.20
1983 29.00 71.00
1984 28.90 71.10
1985 29.08 70.92
1986 30.01 69.99
1987 29.00 71.00
1988 28.00 72.00
1989 27.00 73.00
1990 26.00 74.00
1991 26.00 74.00
1992 24.50 75.50
1993 21.50 78.50
1994 20.20 79.80
1995 18.70 81.30
1996 17.30 82.70
1997 16.10 83.90
1998 14.70 83.30
Source: ACRIB
142
TABLE XIH
BRENTA INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT: DESIGN FIRMS AND EMPLOYEES
Year Design firms Employees
1979 34 140
1980 36 136
1981 34 119
1982 38 116
1983 41 123
1984 47 n.a.
1985 52 I l l
1986 55 111
1987 55 111
1988 60 113
1989 80 152
1990 83 159
1991 74 152
1992 79 162
1993 84 162
1994 81 171
1995 85 178
1996 73 159
1997 67 n.a.
1998 63 141
Source: ACRIB
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TABLE XIV 
SPACIAL DISTRIBUTION 
WITHIN THE BRENTA INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT: 
HARD CORE AND PERIPHERY
Year Employees He/ employees
%
1979 4.854 48
1980 4.842 47.4
1981 4,824 47.4
1982 4,826 47.6
1983 4,882 48.3
1984 n.a. n.a.
1985 4,702 46.7
1986 4,623 46.2
1987 4,513 45.3
1988 4,412 44.9
1989 4,348 44.6
1990 4,401 45.3
1991 4,298 45.6
1992 4,132 45.9
1993 4,156 45.7
1994 4,198 45.9
1995 4,283 46.9
1996 4,054 45.0
1997 4,044 45.4
1998 3,974 45.2
Employees: employees in Brenta hard core (Stra‘, Fiesso and Noventa) 
Hc/employees: percentage of employees in hard core on total Brenta employees
Source: personal elaboration of ACRIB data
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TABLE XV
WEEKLY WORKING HOURS AND WORKERS SALARIES AT VOLTAN
(JANUARY TO JULY 1935)
Week Working hours W orkers' salaries
7.1.35 1,854 1,855
14.1.35 713 1,006
21.1.35 1,638 1,508
28.1.35 549 667
4.2.35 2,705 2,452
11.2.35 1,491 1,295
18.2.35 2,789 2,861
25.2.35 3,072 3,056
4.3.35 3,121 2,881
11.3.35 3,272 3,636
18.3.35 3,625 3,535
25.3.35 3,192 3,986
1.4.35 3,396 4,135
8.4.35 3,190 4,724
15.4.35 3,204 3,542
22.4.35 3,006 3,655
29.4.35 2,430 3,190
6.5.35 2,759 3,861
13.5.35 2,386 3,300
20.5.35 2,618 3,545
27.5.35 2,619 3,412
3.6.35 2,479 3,332
10.6.35 2,137 3,382
17.6.35 1,178 2,061
24.6.35 1,748 2,704
1.7.35 2,088 2,424
8.7.35 1,043 1,387
15.7.35 70 153
22.7.35 0 2,698
The first day of each working week is indicated in the first column 
Source: Voltan archives - personal elaboration
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TABLE XVI
FORTNIGHT WORKING HOURS AND WORKERS' SALARIES AT VOLTAN
(JULY TO DECEMBER 1935)
Fortnight Working hours W orkers' salaries
29.7.35 4,821 5,975
12.8.35 6,074 7,867
26.8.35 5,835 7,597
9.9.35 n.a. 8,522
23.9.35 n.a. 8,888
7.10.35 5,917 9,200
21.10.35 5,863 9,314
4.11.35 5,996 9,243
18.11.35 6,326 9,156
2.11.35 5,305 7,486
16.12.35 4,004 7,256
31.12.35* 1,739 1,730
* one week only (31.12.35 to 5.1.36)
The first day of each working fortnight is indicated in the first column 
Source: Voltan archives - personal elaboration
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TABLE XVH
WEEKLY WORKING HOURS OF MALE AND FEMALE WORKERS AT YOLTAN
(JANUARY TO JULY 1935)
Week Working hours Males % Females %
7.1.35 1,854 1,276 68.8 578 31.2
14.1.35 713 549 77.0 164 23.0
21.1.35 1,638 945 57.7 693 42.3
28.1.35 549 387 70.5 162 29.5
4.2.35 2,705 1,614 59.7 1,091 40.3
11.2.35 1,491 539 36.2 952 63.8
18.2.35 2,789 1,640 58.8 1,149 41.2
25.2.35 3,072 1,800 58.6 1,272 41.4
4.3.35 3,121 1,740 55.8 1,381 44.2
11.3.35 3,272 1,798 55.0 1,474 35.0
18.3.35 3,625 2,015 55.6 1,610 44.4
25.3.35 3,192 1,736 54.4 1,456 45.6
1.4.35 3,396 1,804 53.1 1,592 46.9
8.4.35 3,190 1,840 57.7 1,350 42.3
15.4.35 3,204 1,720 53.7 1,484 46.3
22.4.35 3,006 1,576 52.4 1,430 47.6
29.4.35 2,430 1,310 53.9 1,120 46.1
6.5.35 2,759 1,570 56.9 1,189 43.1
13.5.35 2,386 1,520 63.7 866 36.3
20.5.35 2,618 1,368 52.3 1,250 47.7
27.5.35 2,619 1,512 57.7 1,107 42.3
3.6.35 2,479 1,438 58.0 1,041 42.0
10.6.35 2,137 1,489 69.7 648 30.3
17.6.35 1,178 908 77.1 270 22.9
24.6.35 1,748 1,155 66.1 593 33.9
1.7.35 2,088 1,072 51.3 1,016 48.7
8.7.35 1,043 619 59.3 424 40.7
15.7.35 70 70 100 0 0
22.7.35 0 0 0 0 0
Source: Voltan archives - personal elaboration
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TABLE XVm
FORTNIGHT WORKING HOURS OF MALE AND FEMALE WORKERS
AT VOLTAN 
(JULY TO DECEMBER 1935)
Week Working hours Males % Females %
29.7.35 4,821 2,452 50.9 2,369 49.1
12.8.35 6,074 3,272 53.9 2,802 46.1
26.8.35 5,835 3,114 53.4 2,721 46.6
9.9.35 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
23.9.35 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
7.10.35 5,917 3,447 58.3 2,470 41.7
21.10.35 5,863 3,433 58.6 2,430 41.4
4.11.35 5,996 3,600 60.0 2,396 40.0
18.11.35 6,326 3,720 58.8 2,606 41.2
2.11.35 5,305 3,371 63.5 1,934 36.5
16.12.35 4,004 3,155 78.8 849 21.2
31.12.35* 1,739 1,068 61.4 671 38.6
* one week only (31.12.35 to 5.1.36)
Source: Voltan archives - personal elaboration
148
CHAPTER DI 
Brenta’s collective actors and their interaction
A. Entrepreneurial self-help organisations as a constituent element of the 
Brenta district: “formal” versus “informal” co-operation
Brenta’s entrepreneurial self-help organisations are often mentioned as 
examples of comparatively efficient providers of common services.
At first sight, Brenta record in this regard is impressive, with formal 
institutions established in 1923, 1955, 1961, 1976, 1986, 1996, 2001. However, 
formal organisations like Brenta’s do not cover all the ground: informal co-operation 
operates alongside and provides the necessary pre-conditions for the proper 
functioning of formal structures. Even in Brenta “formal procedures were one thing;
219informal relationships quite another”, as Terry Gourvish notes on another case. 
The degree of efficiency of formal organisations therefore depends not only on their 
own internal structures, financial support or qualities of their managers, but also on 
the co-operation skills embedded in the underlying socio-cultural environment. 
Common organisations tend to function better where the “civic capital”, as Putnam 
defines it, is higher. Well functioning institutions in turn reinforce the civic capital 
and can attenuate, if not eliminate, the perennial contradiction between the 
attachment to one’s work and pride in one’s expertise on the one hand, and the need 
to co-operate on the other. This contradiction is particularly evident in industrial
2]Q
He comments on the relations between the Board of British Rail and the government: Terry 
Gourvish, British Rail 1947-97. From Integration to Privatisation, Oxford 2002.
220 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, Princeton 1993.
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districts, which are "... a strong expression of a highly specific entrepreneurial 
culture in which the individual ethos is very strong”.221
Inversely, institutions can even play a negative role and increase the rate of 
inertia of a given context. In particular, both “exogenous” institutions (expressions of 
the broader economy or society) and “endogenous” institutions (specific to a 
particular firm or industry) can reduce the rate of innovation and therefore reduce the
yyylocal competitive advantages.
Brenta is no exception: these conflicting aspects recur regularly throughout its
history, in a way which corresponds to a large extent to the quintessential image of 
Italian entrepreneurship. In particular, Brenta features a number of those negative 
Italian “national characteristics” described by Porter in the context of his “diamond” 
of conditions for a nation to become internationally successful. Dealing with firm 
strategy, structure and rivalry as one of the four main components of the “diamond”, 
Porter notes that the size of Italian firms and the type of Italian family ownership “... 
reflect, among other things, a high degree of individualism and a suspicion of 
authority unless coming from the family or extended family. Italy is a country in 
which family ties are strong, and even today people prefer to remain near their 
birthplace. Situations where family members all work in the same firm are very 
common, and rather than enlarging the existing firm beyond a certain level, new 
firms are created for sons and daughters”.223 This is a fairly accurate description of 
conditions prevailing in Brenta over several decades. At the same time, Brenta 
features also positive Italian characteristic equally mentioned by Porter, in particular 
a large number of ambitious individual entrepreneurs; sustained commitment over
221 Ivana Paniccia, Industrial Districts -  Evolution and Competition in Italian Firms, Cheltenham/UK 
and Northampton/USA, 2002, p. 197.
222 Richard N. Langlois and Paul L. Robertson, Firms, Markets and Economic Change, London and 
New York 1995, p. 103.
223 Ibid., p. 109.
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decades to a given specific product; and intense domestic competition, which in turn 
confirms Porter’s thesis of the association between vigorous domestic rivalry and 
the creation and persistence of competitive advantage in an industry”.224 In these 
positive aspects, Brenta family entrepreneurship confirms “... the importance of 
family firms as a stabilising factor of the economy in advanced economies... 
(which)... far from being the exception, seems to be among the basic characteristics 
of Southern parts of Europe”.225
These conflicting aspects are present in Brenta’s history. Brenta has been 
traditionally a fertile ground for associations, including self-help organisations 
established to provide some services to local firms. They feature a long history, 
going back at least to the establishment of the first Sunday school in 1923, and 
include now an umbrella entrepreneurs* association and a number of specialised 
institutions. Brenta formal organisations have also shown some flexibility in 
adjusting to a rapidly changing environment and taking up additional tasks. ACRIB 
in particular grew out rapidly of its original role as a mere entrepreneurs’ cartel for
224 Ibid., p. 117.
225 Margarita Dritsas and Terry Gourvish (eds.), European Enterprise: Strategies o f Adaptation and
Renewal in the Twentieth Century, Athens 1997, preface, p. 15. On small firms in Italy see also G.
Becattini and M. Bellandi, Mighty Pygmies and Feeble Watutsis. Considerations on Italian Industry,
Review o f the Economic Conditions in Italy, 2002, n. 3, 375-406; I. Cipolletta, Family-based
Capitalism and Small Firms in Italy, ibid., 2004, n. 2,239-64.
230 “ Schmitz and Musyck, in a careful investigation of the available literature on industrial districts in 
Europe, emphasises that knowledge of institutional intervention remains patchy and that there are few 
evaluations of the services supplied from the user's point of view“ : Roberta Rabellotti, Is there an 
Industrial District Model?..., quote., 36.
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wage bargaining. Formal organisations have been efficient in some areas, including 
in some specific issues like the survival of the Training Centre in the early 1970s, 
and in fostering a local collective identity.
However, they have performed less well in their classical function as 
providers of those services which are beyond the possibilities of individual small 
firms, including trade marks and marketing. These are precisely the higher value 
activities in which Brenta has always been weak, mainly due to the insufficient 
economies of scale of its enterprises.
Brenta’s common institutions are of particular interest since the specialised 
literature is far from reaching firm conclusions on formal co-operation in industrial 
districts, and only a relatively limited number of specific case studies is available.
A certain distortion is caused by the fact that the best studied cases, on which the 
Italianate model is built, show highly efficient formal institutions but are far from 
being common even in the Third Italy. As a consequence, the idealised Italianate 
industrial district draws from the experience of certain areas especially in Central 
Italy (in particular Emilia-Romagna, where the civic capital is highest in Italy) and 
conveys the picture of flourishing formal co-operation of single small-scale 
enterprises, including in the context of joint-sponsored (publicly and privately) local 
institutions providing services to all firms on an equal footing, from which the whole 
firm population democratically benefits. On this basis, “a broad array of supporting 
institutions”231 has come to be considered as an indispensable component of 
industrial districts, and in turn feeds the “myth of an efficient local government able 
to intervene for supporting the need of local industries, creating public or semi-public
231 Frank Pyke and Werner Sengenberger, Introduction to Francesco Cossentino, Frank Pyke, Werner 
Sengenberger (eds.), Local and Regional response to global pressure: the case o f Italy and its 
industrial districts, Geneva 1996, p. 3.
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centres for real services, for technological developments, for commercial promotion 
and so on”.232
Michael Best in particular notes that formal organisations perform a 
regulatory function without which the industrial districts simply could not exist”. 
He also notes that “the Third Italy is a goldmine for studying institutions by which 
individuals can achieve the benefits of joint action that are beyond the reach of 
individual action” 233
His core concept of “productive system” is based on the assumption that “the 
institutional features of a firm cannot be examined in isolation from institutions that 
interact with firms, for example inter-firm associations, workers organisations, 
financial institutions, and governmental agencies”.234 Pure inter-firm co-operation 
can be successful, but does not provide the collective capability needed to reshape in 
depth firm networks, when and if needed. Best compares two groups of furniture 
clusters, one co-ordinated purely by market prices (North London) and the other by a 
combination of market and formal institutions (Cantu’, Lombardy, Northern Italy). 
“Because British furniture firms were too small to develop international marketing 
capacities individually, they did not market internationally. Italian furniture firms, in 
contrast, reacted to the same problem by forming joint marketing associations”. 
According to Best, the case of Cantu’ underlines one specific competitive advantage 
of the Third Italy: the institutional capacity to continuously learn and improve on 
previous economic performance. But inter-firm institution building is also necessary, 
since spontaneous market co-ordination is hampered by the “tyranny of the small 
decisions” occurring when a collective decision-making process takes place. 
Historical analysis comes therefore to play a key role in explaining the geographical
232 Roberta Rabellotti, Is there an Industrial District Model?..., quote., 36.
233 Michael H. Best, The New Competition..., quote., p. 234-8.
234 Michael H. Best, The New Competition..., quote., p. 227.
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location of industry, with the relative abundance of factors of production can not 
describe accurately.
Best postulates a direct link between collective decisions and collective 
institutions. However, as mentioned above, collective decision-making can also take 
place outside formal institutions, and nevertheless evolve even into long-term stable 
relations. Formal organisations per se do not automatically ensure efficiency. These 
aspects are clearly highlighted by Roger Hyater.236 He notes that an adequate level of 
co-operation can be achieved also without the support o f formal institutions, since 
“... co-operative consultation and co-ordination ... occur in a wide variety o f ... ways, 
including firm-level co-operatives, bilateral exchanges of know-how and financing 
arrangements, subcontracting arrangements, and also the respect of the norms of 
competition shaped by local culture and enforced by the threats of loss of future 
business, loss of reputation and exclusion from exchanges of information and offers 
of help”. In some cases, the combined effect of self-help organisations and respect 
of such “norms of competition” proves to be very effective.
Hyater mentions in particular Silicon Valley, where the development of a co­
operative culture within the context of continuous innovation and relatively short 
product life cycles translates into “loyalty (grown out of) ... reciprocal decisions to 
honour unwritten obligations as well as contacts and not to take advantage of one 
another when market conditions changed”.238
235 Ibid., p. 233.
236 # #Roger Hyater, The dynamics of industrial location-The factory, the firm and the production system, 
Chichester-New York-Weinheim-Brisbane-Singapore-Toronto 1997.
237 Ibid., p. 331, with diagram.
238 Ibid., p. 346-7.
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Hyater* s model, while concentrating on informal rather than formal 
structures, highlights trust as a key element, which in turn is fostered by geographical 
proximity and frequent face-to-face contacts.239
In some cases, formal organisations can reduce social costs generated by 
insufficient level of trust. Determined and even ruthless action by the local 
entrepreneurs association was for instance successful even in the Jewellery Quarter 
of Birmingham, which conveyed “a picture of endemic dishonesty, of an industrial 
district rife with malfeasance and mistrust, rather different from the cosy relationship 
described by embeddedness theorists”.240 Francesca Camevali argues that this case 
“shows the failure of any invisible, social mechanism in eliminating dishonest 
behaviour, despite the existence of all those factors that should have encouraged 
embeddedness”, and indirectly highlights the possible role of formal institutions 
where informal co-ordination has failed.241
At the same time, growing levels of distrust, especially if combined with 
external challenges, can prove to be insurmountable obstacles. In the case of the 
Potteries, “declining trust exacerbated existing downward pressure on prices, 
intensifying local price competition and hindering collective response (emphasis 
added). The district as a whole represented a slaughter-house, in which buyers were 
there to dictate prices” and in which collective institutions failed to reach their 
objectives.242 In Brenta, levels of trust are considered to be sufficiently high, or at 
least compatible with its current reputation as a “purely Marshallian industrial
239 Ibid., p. 332-3.
240 Francesca Camevali, Malefactor and Honourable Men: the Making o f Commercial Honesty in 
Nineteenth-century industrial Birmingham, in John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp (eds.), Industrial 
Clusters and Regional Business Networks in England, 1750-1970, Aldershot/UK 2003, p. 205.
241 Ibid., p. 206.
242 Andrew Popp, Trust in an industrial district: the Potteries, c. 1850-1900, Journal o f Economic 
History, 3 (1) 2000,46.
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district”.243 In the long run, local levels of trust were sufficiently high to pave the 
way for the above mentioned comparatively thick network of formal institutions. 
This seems to derive partly from the specific Brenta history and its local civic capital, 
recalled in previous chapters, and would therefore confirm the systemic nature of the 
local levels of trust postulated by Casson.244 At the same time, is seems linked also to 
the specific nature of Brenta* s industry, where raw materials are not precious gold as 
in Birmingham and where large-scale development plans like in the Potteries were 
never really considered. However, even in Brenta trust was heavily eroded when 
external circumstances became challenging. It was so in particular in the critical 
early 1970s, when ACRIB proved to be incapable of checking the cut-throat 
competition between entrepreneurs to hire the increasingly few available skilled 
workers left in the area. A solution was eventually provided by exogenous 
developments (evolution of the local labour market) but not by collective actions 
steered by formal institutions. Insufficient levels of trust can also explain the failure 
of other more limited but in some respects more ambitious formal initiatives based 
on even closer inter-firm co-operation, which are recalled in the following 
paragraphs.
The multifaceted reality described above, with institutions failing or 
succeeding according to a variety of circumstances, suggests to consider a balance 
between the two extremes of a perfectly formalised system a la Best (a sort of 
idealised Emilia-Romagna) and a spontaneous interaction underpinned by mostly 
informal social mechanism a * la Hyater (a sort of ideal Silicon Valley).
243 Fiorenza Belussi, Industrial districts: networks without technologies? The diffusion o f Internet 
applications in three Northeast Industrial Districts o f Italy: results from a survey, paper presented at 
the DRUID Summer Conference on Industrial Dynamics of the New and Old Economy -  who is 
embracing whom?, Copenhagen/Elsinore, 6-8 June 2002, p. 3.
244 Andrew Popp, Trust..., quote., p. 47.
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Jonathan Zeitlin comments precisely on the great variety of conceivable 
forms of self-help organisations, each one depending on the given, specific 
developments in each district.245 The nature of services offered varies widely. Some 
services regard primarily marketing, others regard key inputs such as bank finance 
and credit, raw materials purchase and testing, or the training of skilled workers and 
technicians. Just as the range of services available varies widely from district to 
district, so does the institutional framework within which they are provided. 
Sometimes collective services are provided directly by local government; sometimes 
by artisan, trade or employers’ associations; sometimes by co-operative enterprises 
or consortia of individual firms; and sometimes by ad hoc teams of business people, 
public officials, trade unionists, bankers and educators. Institutional arrangements 
range from tenuous commitments to provide some financial assistance to a small 
Sunday school (as it happened in Brenta in the 1920s) to the nearly Orwellian task of 
“re-writing” history and fostering local “myths”, including myths of co-operation (as 
it occurred in Brenta in the late 1990s). Zeitlin’s insistence on variety and ad hoc 
institutions best fits Brenta’s history and its rather idiosyncratic coexistence of 
different types of formal structures.
The recent contributions mentioned in preceding chapters also discuss the 
role of formal entrepreneurial institutions. As mentioned, a number of writers 
underline the need for a reassessment of the Italianate model and the return to a more 
Marshallian vision, whith the key role reverting to entrepreneurs and a supporting 
role coming to “collective actors” (including self-help organisations).
245 Jonathan Zeitlin, Industrial Districts and local economic regeneration: overview and comment, in 
F.Pyke and W. Sengenberger (eds.), Industrial districts and local economic regeneration, Geneva 
1992, p. 279-294.
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In particular, it has been noted that effective local entrepreneurial networks 
are not necessarily embedded in pre-existing social contexts, and in particular in pre­
existing local social and cultural networks, as required by the “thick” version of 
industrial districts. Entrepreneurial networks can be established and function 
properly independently thereof, as suggested by the “thin” version of industrial 
districts, although the convergence of interests necessary to ensure collective action 
tends to be weaker.
A number of examples can be recalled to this end. Popp mentions the industrial 
district of Widnes, located in what had been empty uninhabited farmland and 
therefore by definition devoid of any social or cultural characteristic of its own.246 
But further examples can be traced even from clusters of firms located in those areas 
of North-eastern Italy from which the “thick” version originates. In the mid-1980s, 
Jacuzzi (the world leader in hydro massage) established its European headquarters in 
central Friuli, in a scarcely inhabited area with no specific cultural and social traits of 
its own, which however happened to be close to Valvasone, the village from which 
the seven Jacuzzi brothers emigrated to the USA in the early 20th century. The 
“myth”, carefully propagated by Jacuzzi, tells us that the decision to establish the 
new European headquarters there was taken as a tribute to the origins of the 
founders’ family.247 This may well be not too far from the truth, although other 
aspects (including ease of access to European markets, the relevance of Italian 
outlets, cheap land) were probably considered.
In any case, this external-driven development has prompted the emergence of 
a growing cluster of firms (often referred to as a proper industrial district), producing 
both components for Jacuzzi and hydro massage consumer products for the Italian
246 Andrew Popp, Networks and Industrial restructuring: the Widnes district and the formation o f the 
United Alakli Company, 1890, in John F. Wilson and Andrew Popp (eds.), Industrial Clusters and 
Regional Business Networks in England, 1750-1970, Aldershot/UK, 2003, p. 210-11.
158
market. As in many classical industrial districts, most of these spin-off entrepreneurs 
are former Jacuzzi employees and are connected to one another in a closely-knit 
network which prospers despite the lack of linkages with a specifically local culture 
and society. The emergence and growth of this network is instead linked to purely 
production-related facts. It is the case in particular of the need to achieve spatial 
proximity, since the components of hydro massage products tend to be fragile and 
bulky and therefore are difficult and costly to transport.248 Popp has analysed 
functioning and results of three key institutions which were active in the Potteries in 
the years 1853-1882. Very much like in Brenta, “though having distinct functions 
these institutions were closely related”.249 Again very much like in Brenta, they were 
led and shaped by a small group of leading businessmen who obviously acted in their 
own interest (although many of them, unlike in Brenta, were bom outside the district 
and had originally weak connections with the area). “Small-scale business may have 
dominated the district numerically, but large local pottery manufacturers, despite 
arguing to the contrary, were hugely influential in promoting various sections of the 
industry through these trade institutions”.250 Popp notes that the success of formal 
networks depended not only on a number of exogenous factors but also on certain 
pre-requisites, including a sufficient homogeneity of the firm population: if this 
insufficient, formal institutions can scarcely be efficient. In the Potteries, differences 
in size were so significant that firms often deployed different resources mix, 
developed different strategies and maintained different network relations. As a result, 
no collective body was able to reconcile these differences through either power or 
suasion and therefore to pursue their objectives of regulating, and even unifying, the 
local industry. In the same way as a sense of collective mission does not necessarily
247 Interview with Sergio Novello, Marketing Director of Jacuzzi Europe, on 24 April 2005.
248 E anche l’idromassaggio inizia a fare acqua, II Sole-24 Ore, 16 March 2005.
249 Andrew Popp, Business Structure..., quote., p. 235.
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stem from a single sectoral commitment, so the establishment of a common 
institution does not necessarily prevent cut-throat competition among members, 
when they perceive that their vital interests are at stake. As recalled above dealing 
with trust, Brenta was probably too small and too homogeneous to develop different 
network relations endangering the cohesion of the district, but showed internecine 
cut-throat competition as soon as local entrepreneurs felt that their survival was at 
stake.
At the same time, a number of case studies indicate that self-help 
organisations can also be effective in dealing with specific issues and in pursuing 
specific objectives. Francesca Camevali describes how the Birmingham Jewellery 
Association (BJA) was able to cope with the specific threat posed by rogue 
wholesalers in the late 19th century. A specific action (pressure to obtain the severe 
punishment of culprits) led in this case to specific, concrete results and helped restore 
mutual trust.252 The BJA again proved to be very effective in achieving specific 
common goals in the 1960s, assisting in directing production towards an 
unsuspected, large and untapped market with a sizeable income. As mentioned, 
ACRIB was quite effective in wage negotiations, in salvaging the Training Centre, in 
organising collective participation in logistically and geographically difficult 
locations.
In line with the above, the history of Brenta’s self-help organisations shows a 
number of failures and some successes, the most significant of which is probably the 
strengthening of a collective local identity which in turn reinforces common 
institutions and can therefore set in motion a self-supporting process.
250 Ibid., p. 244.
251 Ibid., p. 259.
252 Francesca Camevali, Malefactors and Honourable Men..., quote., p. 206.
253 young people aged 15 to 24: Francesca Camevali, Golden Opportunities..., quote., p. 287.
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Growth and consolidation of formal self-help organisations in the Riviera
The history of self-help institutions in the Brenta can be divided in distinct 
phases, which mirror quite closely the stage development model proposed by Brusco 
and Pezzini.254 As mentioned in previous chapters, horizontal co-ordination existed 
even at the early stage, and was either favoured by the dominant enterprise or 
imposed by the local Fascist organisations, and with the establishment of the Sunday 
School in 1923 as its best known result.255 In the post-Second World War Brenta, the 
lead was taken by the Organising Committee of the Stra’ Footwear Trade Fair, which 
operated from 1955 to 1963 upon the initiative and with the support of the commune 
of Stra’ and in particular of its Mayor, Giuseppe Vettorel. This co-operation was 
strictly limited to one specific objective and therefore did not correspond to the 
idealised continuous, close interaction between entrepreneurs and local authorities 
highlighted by the social embeddedness perspective. At the same time, it does also 
not correspond to the alternative, competing myth, often recalled by entrepreneurs, of 
private and public sectors acting in isolation from each other, on the basis of a tacit 
agreement: public authorities spending taxpayer’s money providing some basic 
infrastructures (roads, railways, schools, hospitals) and entrepreneurs doing the “real 
work” of ensuring economic growth.
A good embodiment of ths cliche* is the speech delivered by ACRIB’s 
President, Luigino Rossi, at a Seminar on Brenta footwear industry held at Dolo on
254 Sebastiano Brusco and Mario Pezzini, Small scale enterprise in the ideology o f the Italian left, in 
Frank Pyke, G,. Becattini and Werner Sengenberger (eds.), Industrial districts and inter-firm co­
operation... , quot., p. 142-59.
5 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, L'azienda incubatrice: Luigi Voltan e la nascita dell'industria 
calzaturiera italiana, in Dall'industrializzazione del'Artigianato all'esplosione distrettuale. Strategic e 
trasformazioni del calzaturiero brentano tra gli anni Cinquanta e gli anni Settanta, in Giovanni Luigi 
Fontana, Giorgio Franceschetti and Giorgio Roverato (eds.), Cento anni..., quote., p. 35.
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29 January 1974. Rossi criticised sharply the alleged lack of any public initiative to 
support the Riviera Training Centre.256
All this did not prevent individual entrepreneurs and the Association from 
cultivating personal relationships with both national and local politician, perfectly in 
line with the traditional networking as a key factor in entrepreneurial success or 
failure.257 Not surprisingly, the study on Brenta published under the auspices of 
ACRIB in 1998 includes a number of photographs of politicians visiting exhibitions
258or participating in events organised by local entrepreneurs.
Inversely, in an interview in the mid-1990s former Mayor Vettorel recalled 
the role of public authorities and town councils in the launching of the initiative and 
played down the role of entrepreneurs. Vettorel recalled in particular the role of the 
Christian Democrats and their attempts to gain some additional visibility using again 
the old but efficient method of inviting leading personalities 259
The first edition of the Fair was attended by 700 enterprises, with a 
cumulative daily production of 10,000 pairs of shoes. The list of participating firms 
sheds some light on the conditions of the industrial district of the time. Seven 
communes were represented.260 However, most of them (thirty-six) were located in 
Stra’ and Fiesso (the traditional “hard core” of the district). Most firms produced 
finished shoes, but also four component firms (heels) and three shoe designers
256 Source: ACRIB.
257 “Photographs of dedication ceremonies, of festival committees, or of entrepreneurs, local 
authorities in tow, giving tours around the factory to people like Prime Minister Andreotti, served to 
show ... who really counted in the region4: Thomas H. Baker, First Movers and the Growth of Small 
Industry in North-eastern Italy, Journal of the Society for Comparative Study o f Society and History, 
1994,636.
258 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Giorgio Franceschetti and Giorgio Roverato (eds.), Cento anni. .
quote.: among other, the photographs of Minister Ferrari Aggradi and the Undersecretary of State 
Cervone, pag. 226; Minister Colombo, pag. 238; Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Storchiu, 
p. 239: Minister Tolloj, p. 248; and even the Patriarch of Venice, later Pope John XXIII, p. 303.
9 interview by Michela Vettore, in her graduation thesis Formazione e Innovazione nel distretto 
calzaturiero del Brenta (1923-1997), academic year 1996-97, Venice University. The Catholic 
Patriarch of Venice visited the Stra’ Fair on 1st September 1957, one year before becoming Pope John
xxin.
260 Stra’, Fosso’, Vigonovo, Fiesso, Saonara, Noventa and Vigonza.
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participated. Only five firms were explicitly specialised in a given footwear sector 
(four in lady-, one in child-footwear). Quite expectedly, all the leading firms attended 
the Fair (amongst others obviously Voltan, and then Adua, Angi, Ballin, Borella) 
which were later to launch and steer ACRIB. No participating firm appears to have 
been incorporated at the time as a joint stock company (“societa’ per azioni”, s.p.a.); 
just one was a limited liability company; Voltan itself was an “accomandita” (limited 
partnership). Participation grew slowly but constantly, passing from 11,000 visitors 
in 1955 to 20,000 in 1963, from three to nine foreign delegations, from 66 to 140 
exporters. The fair was then moved to Padua and eventually discontinued.
Some evidence at a first attempt to establish an all-purpose entrepreneurial 
self-help organisation is found in a letter dated 10 November, 1946, sent to the firm 
Voltan by a “Costituenda Associazione fra Industriali ed Artigiani calzaturieri del 
mandamento di Dolo” (“Prospective association of footwear industrialists and 
artisans of the Dolo district”). It should have been located in Stra’ and cover three 
areas: protection and promotion of footwear production; legal and tax services to 
members; the running of a consortium to reduce costs of raw materials.261
When it indeed came about - fifteen years later, in December 1961 - the first 
umbrella organisation in the Riviera (ACRIB-Associazione Calzaturieri della Riviera 
del Brenta-Association of Footwear Producers of the Riviera del Brenta) was actually 
quite different from the 1946 project.
ACRIB remained firmly in the hands of a few local entrepreneurs, a sort of 
“local aristocracy”. Seven of the twelve founders were bom in the three communes 
of the traditional core of the district (Stra’, Fiesso and Noventa), five in the Paduan
261 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Dall'industrializzazione dell'Artigianato all'esplosione distrettuale. 
Strategic e trasformazioni del calzaturiero brentano tra gli anni Cinquanta e gli anni Settanta, in
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communes of the district and only two in neighbouring areas. From its establishment 
to date, ACRIB has always been chaired by members of this exclusive club or their 
families. In particular, it was run from 1962 to 1981 by Amleto Donadelli, whom I 
have mentioned already as the promoter of some technological progress in the early 
1960s and one of the initiators of Stra’ Trade Fair. 262
Far from playing any role in the shaping of the industrial district (as it could 
have been the case with the 1946 project), the association came into being once the 
industrial district had been fully established and had been operational in all its 
constitutive features (including horizontal inter-firm co-operation) for at least a 
whole decade, had shown a constant trend towards ever higher shares of exports and 
had largely contributed to the overall improvement of the standards of living in the 
Riviera. ACRIB is a product of the growth of the district, not a prerequisite for it. In 
the beginning, ACRIB was focussed in particular on providing a joint representation 
of entrepreneurs in work negotiations. However, the objectives of the new 
Associations went beyond that and included action in four additional areas: analyses 
and research on issue of common interest; relations with state and public authorities 
and other institutions, private or public; development of workers* training and 
education; co-operation with other footwear entrepreneurs’ institutions. In all these 
areas, some results were achieved in the following years. In particular, ACRIB 
began immediately data collection and analysis, providing indispensable assistance 
to research on the Brenta history (including this thesis).
ACRIB’s establishment had been brought about by exogenous modification 
on the local labour market, which made enhanced entrepreneurial collective action 
necessary. ACRIB in itself is therefore the result of Brenta’s evolution from an early
Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Giorgio Franceschetti and Giorgio Roverato (eds.), Cento anni di industria..., 
quote., p. 307-9.
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phase predominantly based on comparatively abundant and cheap labour, wage 
squeezing and family members co-operation (and self-exploitation) to a phase in 
which employment alternatives were available and in which family connections 
alone were no longer sufficient to ensure the proper functioning of the system.
ACRIB’s growth however became rapidly self-sustaining, independently of 
results achieved in labour negotiations. Some ten years after ACRIB’s birth, the gap 
between the average wages in Brenta and in the northern Italian footwear industry as 
a whole closed up with the signature of a local agreements on 1 September, 1974.263 
This took place in a context of increasingly complex labour regulations, more 
stringent public controls, improved pension and health schemes, which all concurred 
to make the development of some common services even more attractive for local 
footwear entrepreneurs.
In ist initial years, ACRIB’s stance on labour issues was quite 
uncompromising. Vittorio Pamagnin told me that, in the early 1960s, ACRIB was not 
different from all other entrepreneurs associations: “rigid and inflexible” (but, he 
added, “trade unions were not better”). Compromises were eventually reached 
through the personal mediation of a few “enlightened” representatives of both 
parties, and not as a result of converging views based on a common local culture or a 
common “mission”. This was partly due, so Pampagnin, to the fact that ACRIB was 
not yet a real collective actors, but rather a meeting point for a handful of 
entrepreneurs competing with each other also in holding in check labour unrest in 
their respective firms.264
ACRIB not only acquired a leading role as the sole representative of local 
“large” firms, but also established working relations with other entrepreneurs
262 Source: act nr. 46878 dated 22 January 1962 by A. Pavanello, Notary Public in Piove di Sacco- 
Padova, published in Francesco Jori, 1962 - 2002:100 Anni di ACRIB, Fiesso 2002, p. 94-101.
263 Giorgio Gottardi, II settore calzaturiero nell'area del Brenta* Bologna 1978, p. 14-16.
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associations. This was no foregone conclusion. ACRIB’s co-founder and former 
Chairman Luigino Rossi recalls the many initial problems ACRIB faced in dealing 
with the Industrialists’ Associations of Venice and Padua, of which both it is now a 
corporate member. In 1967, together with sister organisations in Vicenza, Valenza 
Po, Brescia, Alessandria, Florence and Pistoia, ACRIB joined the Italian footwear 
umbrella organisation (ANCI-Associazione nazionale calzaturieri italiani- Italian 
national footwear industrialist association) which represented at that time 
approximately 60% of the Italian production. Luigino Rossi served as ANCI’s 
Chairman between 1983 and 1987, focussing his action on the establishment of 
CMAC (a national provider of quality certificates) and Federpelle (a national 
consortium for the purchase of leathers and skins), and in promoting exports to the 
USA.266
Representatives of ACRIB seat since then in the board of Directors of ANCI 
(traditionally holding the Vice-presidency) and in the European footwear umbrella 
organisation Confederation Europeenne des Chaussures-CEC (European Footwear 
Confederation), as well as in the respective Boards of Directors of the Industrialists 
Associations of Padua and Venice, in their provincial Committees for foreign trade 
as well as in the provincial Commissions for home work.
As a consequence, membership grew considerably: member firms probably 
employed 60% of the total footwear workforce in the Riviera by the mid-1970s.268
Relations with public authorities have improved considerably from the early 
1990s. They include now relations with Italian institutions abroad, including 
Embassies and Missions of the Italian Institute for Foreign Trade.269
264 Interview with Vittorio Pampagnin, June 2003.
265 Materiali di Storia, nr. 18/December 2000, p. 13-15. See also interview with Luigino Rossi in 
Padova Eeconomica, 3/1995, p. 9-12.
266 www.anci-calzature.com/storia
267 Amleto Donadelli, founding member of ACRIB, was Vice-president until 1976.
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There were a few other short-lived attempts to launch enhanced formal inter­
firm co-operation. The consortium “Stracalzatura” was established in 1971 by four 
firms, with a permanent showroom in Stra*. The owners of the four firms rotated as 
Chairman-in-office of the consortium, which could boast 2,500 different shoe 
designs. Again, this initiative failed for lack of mutual trust, a sort of small 
local“tragedy of the commons”.270
ACRIB played a role in supporting Brenta firms’ joint participation in trade 
fairs, an area in which it could build upon the experience of the Organising 
Committee of Stra’ Fair. It promoted joint participation in trade fairs not easily 
accessible to individuals either politically (in Eastern Europe) or geographically (in 
the Far East or Australia). However, joint participation was scarce in Western Europe 
(including in Italy) and in North America, precisely in the largest Brenta’s markets. 
In a list of 23 exhibitions and fairs with official ACRIB participation from 1962 until 
1978, just six took place in member states of the European Community; out of a total 
of 138 firms taking part in these ACRIB initiatives, just 45 did participate in 
exhibition within member states of the European Community.271 Quite expectedly, 
the same small group of “large” firms always participated in these events.272 ACRIB 
organised a number of information and research missions abroad, with a total
268 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Dall'industrializzazione dell'Artigianato..., quote., p. 295.
269 A joint promotion of ACRIB and the Italian Embassy in Bonn was organised for instance in 
October 1998: interview with the Deputy Head of the Commercial and Economic Section of the 
Italian Embassy in Germany, February 2001, who assed both the results achieved and the co-operation 
as “positive".
270 Ibid., p. 228.
271 Bondi F-Mariacher, G., La calzatura della Riviera ...quote., p. 250.
272 Rossimoda, Ca’ d’Oro, Adua, Menin, Borella, Ballin, Myriam, Caovilla, San Marco, Baldan and 
Simonato, many of which had been usually present also at Stra’s exhibitions. The complete list 
follows (in brackets the number of Brenta firms participating): 1962: Adelaide (18 firms); 1963 
Leipzig (9); 1964 Luxembourg (4); 1965 Freiburg (7); 1966 (March-April): Utrecht (12); 1966 (April- 
may): Toulouse (9); 1966 (Sept.): Brussels (9); 1967 (June): Bucharest (5); 1967 (Sept.): Brussels (4);
1967 (October): Belgrade (10); 1968 (July): Moscow and Brno (9); 1968 (October): Belgrade (9);
1968 (October): Stavanger (Norway) (4); 1969 (Sept.): Moscow (6); 1970 (march): Zagreb (3); 1970 
(march): London (5); 1970 (June): Melbourne (3); 1971 (April): Kuwait (1); 1971 (May): Goteborg 
(6); 1971 (Sept.): Tokyo (1); 1978 (March-April) Jeddah (4).
Source: Bondi F-Mariacher, G., La calzatura della Riviera..., quote., p. 250.
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participation of 55 firms in the period 1963-1978273 as well as a number of seminars 
in Italy.274
However, ACRIB played a significant role in co-ordinating the Brenta 
participation in the trade fair of Dusseldorf, the largest of its kind. Initially, ACRIB 
held a concomitant but distinct collective exhibition, since Duesseldorf s Trade Fair 
was open only to individual firms. Brenta’s enterprises were eventually allowed to 
participate through an ad hoc formal organisation, a Consortium (Consorzio Maestri 
Calzaturieri del Brenta-Consortium of Brenta Shoe Masters) established in 1976 by 
64 members. In the same way as ACRIB had been initially established to negotiated 
collectively with trade unions, but soon took up additional tasks, so the new 
Consortium was established as a mere Trojan horse to participate in Duesseldorf fair 
but soon became involved in promoting exports and enhancing local inter-firm co­
operation. Since 1993, the Consortium has also provided a fashion consultancy 
service through a small group of experts who monitor and report regularly on 
national and international fashion trends. In 2004, ACRIB was considering the 
establishment of a new Fashion Centre, in part as a response to the acquisition of 
some firms by a leading French fashion group. This also translated in an increase in 
the number of ACRIB’s staff, which went from five in the mid-1990s276 to ten in 
2004.277
273 the number of participating firms is given in brackets:
1963: Germany (12); 1967: Prirmasens (5); 1967: Romania, Chekoslovakia, GDR (4);
1968: USA (14); 1969: Japan, Hong-Kong, Thailand (4); 1970: Angola, Nigeria, Rhodesia (1); 1972: 
GDR (10); 1976: Japan, Hong-Kong, Thailand (5).
Source: Ibid., p. 254.
274 1966, San Dona* di Piave (seminar organised by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade); 1968, Stra* 
(footwear industry in the Veneto Region); 1971, Stra' (sales techniques); 1972, Vigevano (problems 
and future of the footwear industry); 1974, Dolo (footwear industry in the Brenta area); 1975, Dolo 
(organisation of the Dolo district); 1976, Venice (meeting with Japanese entrepreneurs); 1978, Venice 
(meeting with Secretaries General of Foreign Chambers of Commerce in Italy); 1978, Bologna (the 
national footwear market).
Source: ibid., p. 255.
276 Source: oral information provided by ACRIB, June 1995.
277 Source: Mauro Tescaro, Director of the Footwear Polytechnic, interview in October 2004.
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A further consortium was established in 1986 as Centro Veneto Calzaturiero 
(Venetian Footwear Centre), to run the Training Centre and the three sections of a 
new Centro tecnologico (‘Technological Centre”).
An “Italian Consortium for Lasts” was established in 1996. An internal 
restructuring within ACRIB led to the establishment of a limited liability company 
(ACRIB Servizi s.r.l.) tasked with common services in particular in administration, 
while “political” tasks remain the preserve of ACRIB. A “Footwear Polytechnic” (of 
which ACRIB is the main shareholder but in which also public authorities, a bank 
and private companies participate) was established in 2001 and tasked with training 
and research.
Despite the increase in the number of institutions, Brenta* s real and perceived 
collective capabilities did not necessarily improve at the same pace. In general, after 
the shift towards a higher market segment had made wage negotiations less crucial, 
local entrepreneurs considered collective services as comparatively secondary, with 
the possible exception of joint participation in trade fairs in “difficult” countries. This 
attitude remained widespread until the late 1980s.278 Despite its increased 
membership, ACRIB and the Consortium continued to be considered as a “club” of 
the largest enterprises, providing little or no incentives for the small ones to take part 
and fully “play the game” of horizontal co-operation also through the associations 
themselves. Participation was reluctantly considered by many as a sort of necessary 
evil to avoid the ultimate punishment in an industrial district: isolation.
278 Interview with Giovanni Zuin, June 1996. He underlined that not only ACRIB, but also other 
entrepreneurial associations including the Chamber of Commerce played a role in information and 
promotion but were not able to deliver “practical assistance", in particular with regard to export.
79 "... industrial districts in Japan are strengthened by powerful incentives rewarding reliability and 
trustworthy behaviour”, including concerning active participation in formal self-help organisations: 
Roger Hayter, The dynamics o f Industrial Location-The factory, the firm and the production system, 
Chichester, New York, Weinheim, Brisbane, Singapore, Toronto, 1997, p. 333.
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The comparative success of Brenta’s formal institutions is ultimately also due 
to the personal commitment of some leading personalities of the area, in particular 
Luigino Rossi who invested in it considerable amounts of energy and time. In the 
mid-1980s, Centro Veneto Calzaturiero was established in an atmosphere of growing 
recognition of the added value provided by collective services, which was brought 
about also by the increasing success of the industrial district model among small 
entrepreneurs themselves.280
Conclusion
Brenta confirms the results of some other case studies: efficient formal 
horizontal inter-firm co-operation through self-help organisations, supported by 
public authorities and enjoying the confidence of entrepreneurs who actively 
contribute to is functioning, is often more an idealised model than an accurate 
description of reality, even in the “Third Italy”. The slow, sedimental and at times 
idiosyncratic development of Brenta’s formal institutions since 1923 confirms that 
industrial districts can indeed take off and develop independently of efficient formal 
organisations. Such organisations tend to appear in later stages of industrial districts’ 
development.
Brenta indicates on the one hand that most inter-firm co-operation (in itself 
one of the key features of industrial districts) can take place independently of formal 
organisations, and on the other hand that the maximum collective efficiency of 
formal institutions is reached in the pursuit of well-defined, specific and limited
280 Membership of ACRIB is at times perceived as status- and prestige-enhancing. Social recognition 
and a possible better place on the social ladder remain powerful incentives even among Brenta’s 
entrepreneurs. In the last years, efforts at improving the poor social recognition for the Brenta foowear 
industry have led to initiatives such as the Footwear Museum established by Luigino Rossi in his 18th 
century Palladian villa in Stra’, exhibiting a number of paintings and drawings made in the 1950s by 
Andy Warhol, who used to work as a shoe designer in New York. A co-operation with the Commune 
of Padua to promote the Museum was been launched in 2004. Source: Interview with Pietro Casetta, 
journalist and cultural advisor to the Commune of Padua, 15th July 2004.
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objectives. Nevertheless, successful formal institutions with limited objectives are 
easily encouraged to take up additional tasks. This sort of inverse correlation 
between ambitions and success of formal institutions has been observed in a number 
of other industrial districts. Francesca Camevali has analysed very efficient actions 
by the Birmingham Jewellery Association in a number of limited areas at different 
times, including reassessment of market strategies and the fight against rogue 
wholesalers. Andrew Popp has highlighted the failure of larger formal organisations 
in the Potteries, which pursued ambitious objectives including the unification of an 
entire industry and therefore ended up clashing against the interests of most single 
entrepreneurs. Again, this confirms that the essential role in any industrial districts is 
played by entrepreneurs, acting primarily through their firms. Formal associations 
are in principle as effective as entrepreneurs want and allow them to be. However, 
Brenta’s history demonstrates also that formal institutions can to some extent 
influence entrepreneurs’ attitudes and soften their resistance to further integration.
B. National and local governments in the Brenta area: 
a necessary evil or partners?
This section discusses the role played in Brenta by local and national 
governments as well as by political ideologies. This is done on the basis of electoral 
data for the period 1953-1979 which I traced at ISTAT (Istituto Italiano di Statistica 
- National Institute for Statistics).
My research at ISTAT archives shows that Brenta was permanently split 
between two almost equally powerful political cultures: Christian-Democratic and 
Socialist-Communist. This runs contrary to some central aspects of the established 
Italianate model of industrial district, in which “... the regions which are most typical
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of small-firm development ... are usually characterised by the existence of specific 
subcultures. In these areas, one often finds the predominance of a particular 
political tradition, whose origins usually go back to the beginning of the century, and 
a complex of institutions ... which derive from the same politico-ideological 
matrix”(emphasis added).281 Brenta’s lack of political homogeneity is in line with the 
reassessed model analysed in the previous chapters, where companies are the key 
actors and other economic agents play a subordinaterole. In this context, I recall 
my comments in the Introduction of this thesis on Putnam’s research on the “social 
embeddedness” perspective of a number of Italian economic success stories. 
Putnam’s findings do not postulate any simplistic cause-effect relationship between a 
given social and political environment and specific growth patterns. Rather he 
underlines the concept of “civic-ness”, which in turn can assume different forms as is 
precisely the case for the fragmented political landscape of Brenta.283
“White” and “red” political interventions
Analysts of the role of political cultures in Italian industrial districts have 
mainly focused their attention on the post-Second World War period. Carlo Trigilia 
in particular elaborated the concept of two political “subcultures” in the Third Italy, 
namely Catholic and socialist, which were established in“white” (Christian 
Democrat) areas and “red” (Communist) areas respectively.284 The existence of two 
such subcultures has become a topos of the literature on industrial districts of the 
“golden years” (in particular the 1980s).
281 Carlo Trigilia, Small-firms Development and Political Subculture in Italy, in Edward Goodman and 
Julia Bamford (eds.), Small Firms and Industrial Districts in Italy, London and New York, 1989, p. 
175.
282 Philip Raines (ed.), Cluster Development and Policy, Strathclyde, 2002, p. 15.
283 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work -  Civic Traditions in Modem Italy, Princeton, 1993, 
p. 97.
84 Carlo Trigilia, Grandi partiti e piccole imprese: comunisti e democristiani nelle regioni a 
economia diffusa, Bologna, 1986.
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The political turning point of the early 1990s included the collapse of the 
traditional mass-based political parties; the emergence of centre-right and centre-left 
loose coalitions with no stringent ideological identities; the strengthening of local 
authorities at the expense of national governments; the emergence of strong 
devolutionist, even secessionist movements. However, this did not seem to affect 
either the structures or the performance of Italian industrial districts. The world 
described by Trigilia seemed to disappear without any major consequence on the 
social and economic fabric which the mass-based parties had helped to create. In this 
context, Putnam’s research mentioned in previous chapters complements Trigilia*s 
account.285 According to Putnam, the efficiency of political and administrative 
institutions is determined also by the degree of what he terms “civic-ness” and by the 
“civic capital” accumulated over decades and centuries by a given local or regional 
community, and it is the result of a long process of learning how to co-operate 
“horizontally” in the pursuit of common goals. The underlying social preconditions 
so created shape in turn both the economic and the socio-political developments. 
Putnam’s model in particular sheds light on some differences between the regions of 
the Third Italy investigated by Trigilia. These differences can be connected to a 
higher degree of “civic-ness” in regions with a socialist ethos (like Emilia) than in 
regions with a predominantly Catholic background (like Veneto).286 I have already 
underlined in previous chapters that self-help organisations usually have been more 
common and more efficient in “red” than in “white” industrial districts of the Third 
Italy. Putnam also notes that “organised religion... in Catholic Italy is an alternative 
to the civic community, not a part of it”.287 As a consequence, involvement in civic 
life is quite likely to be less enthusiastic in Catholic areas. Incidentally, this could
285 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work..., quote., p. 107.
286 Ibid., p. 97.
287 Ibid., p. 107.
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also shed some light on the emergence of devolutionist movements in Catholic 
regions of the Third Italy in the late 1980s, but only to a much lesser extent in “red” 
regions.
Quite logically in this context, Putnam considers the “Communist” regions 
(Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna) as the most “civic” in Italy, significantly more 
“civic” than “Catholic” ones (including Veneto). This could explain why “red” local 
governments tend to be more interventionist, self-help institutions more effective, 
trade unions more incisive and the local “atmosphere” more vibrant in “red” 
industrial districts, which consequently tend to be closer to the stylised model of 
Italianate district. In this sense, Philip Raines can be correct in defining Emilia- 
Romagna as the “core region” of the Third Italy.288
In this respect, Brenta is a hybridwhere both subcultures, the Catholic and the 
socialist, co-existed side by side. Some communes were “historically” red, others 
“white”, and political control virtually never passed from one to the other mass-based 
parties for 45 years. Communes located within a radius of a few kilometres were 
ideologically divided for almost half a century, even within the minuscule historic 
core of the Brenta industrial district where Stra’ was “white” and Fiesso was “red”. 
Moreover, the ideological divide was perceivable within each commune, with 
substantial portions of the electorate (usually at least 40%) supporting the minority 
subculture. The presence of a strong socialist ethos in an otherwise almost 
completely Catholic region has probably helped the development of a comparatively 
high number of relatively efficient self-help organisations. At the same time, the 
rather ambivalent attitude of entrepreneurs, but also of the local civil society at large, 
vis-a-vis public authorities and politics, is rather reminiscent of the abovementioned 
Catholic mistrust of state and public institutions.
288 Philip Raines, Cluster Development..., quote., p. 19.
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In this context, the history of the interaction between politics and the 
economy in the Brenta can be divided into three phases.
Initially, relations were direct between state and local authorities on the one 
side, and the leading enterprise Voltan and a few other local industrialists on the 
other. Direct public orders (for example for the army) were common, and so were 
also political involvement by entrepreneurs both in public functions (Giovanni Luigi 
Voltan was a town counsellor in Dolo) and in party functions (his son was a leading 
member of the local branch of the Fascist party). Some inter-firm formal co­
operation took place within the Fascist organisations, including the entrepreneurs’ 
trade union (membership of which was compulsory).
In a second, longer phase (from 1945 to the late 1980s), relations tended to 
become indirect, with entrepreneurs focusing exclusively on running their firms and 
with local politicians intervening rarely (and if so in a private, rather than official 
capacity) in local economic issues. At the same time, formal organisations, in 
particular the entrepreneurs* association established in 1961, played an increasingly 
important role as interlocutor for political and administrative institutions on specific 
issues (for instance the severe crisis at the training centre in the mid-1970s). The role 
of the Communist party in particular was significant (in line with the tradition of 
“red” regions).
A third phase followed from the late 1980s, with relations between the 
economy and politics again becoming more direct but this time channelled through 
formal Brenta associations. The national law of 1991, providing some legal and 
financial incentives to industrial districts as such, and subsequent regional legislation 
strengthened the role of the formal organisations and favoured direct contact with 
policymakers at the local and national level. This development concluded a long
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process started in the early 1950s, when the nascent Brenta district proved to be a 
less suitable interlocutor for public authorities than Voltan had been in pre-war years 
and to some extent until the 1940s.
Apart from the usual scarcity in available data, there are some additional 
difficulties in assessing the role of politics and public administration in Brenta’s 
history. The role of leading members of the Voltan family in the Fascist regime is 
mentioned only cursorily by writers, with the exception of Vittorio Pampagnin.
Entrepreneurs also tend to deny any role for politics in economic 
development, which (not surprisingly) they tend to consider as the result of “pure” 
entrepreneurship. In the Veneto region (more than in other regions of the Third Italy 
with a socialist ethos, particularly Emilia-Romagna), this attitude is shared by a 
significant portion of the public, suspicious of any public intervention. A number of 
writers on Brenta tend to share this approach. This could partly be justified by the 
often less than adequate performance by national governments and the national 
public administration. On this point, Porter remarks acidly that “... the Italian case 
suggests quite clearly that government policy is not a sine qua non of national 
competitive advantage. The Italian government, at the national level, has created far 
more disadvantages than advantages”.289 Public administration, on its part, has at 
best been the generator of “... a curious sort of advantage. Italian firms are intensely 
pragmatic, undeterred by obstacles, and adept at competition and improvisation. 
They manage constraints rather than succumb to them. Many observers cite Italian 
success ... as a product of years of coping with the Italian bureaucracy”.290
289 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage..., quote., p. 447.
290 Ibid., p. 439.
292 Gian Antonio Stella, Schei, Milano, 2000, p. 180-8.
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And yet, such sweeping statements do not capture at least some areas of the 
“Third Italy” where Putnam-ian “civic capital” has paved the way for highly 
developed local political environments and performing public institutions. Research 
in this area is confronted with the apparently conflicting topoi of very inefficient 
Italian national governments and quite efficient Third Italy local governments, the 
former hampering economic development, the latter fostering it.
These issues are analysed in depth by Trigilia’s seminal work. Building upon 
previous contributions (Bagnasco wrote on the subject already in the early 1970s), he 
succeeded in making the distinction between “red” and “white” areas a topos of the 
literature on Italian industrial districts.
The overall picture in contemporary Third Italy is now very different because 
inter alia of the collapse of its mass-based parties and their replacement by loose 
coalitions. The current electoral competition in Italy between a centre-right and a 
centre-left coalition of parties and movements is not simply the continuation of the 
previous competition between the Christian Democrats and the Communists, but 
rather a wholly new phase in which the traditional allegiances to mass parties as 
mediating forces between conflicting interests are being replaced by political choices 
based on the capabilities of candidates to provide solutions and answers to specific, 
concrete problems.
Italian industrial districts have been able not only to survive the collapse of 
the political system which had been so closely associated with them, but even to 
experience an unprecedented growth precisely in the years of decline for both the 
Christian Democrats and Communists. This confirms both the resilience of Italian 
industrial districts and the limited role played by politics in their development. In 
some cases, the mediating role played in the past by mass-based parties was carried 
on by new political coalitions. This was the case in particular in Emilia-Romagna
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and Tuscany where the traditional “socialist ethos” survived. It was less so in 
Veneto, where traditional Catholic values and the direct influence of the Catholic 
Church on politics have been substantially eroded.292
Peaceful coexistence of incompatible ideologies
As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the Second World War created a 
fundamental divide in the history of the footwear industry in the Riviera. The pre­
war situation was to a large extent clear-cut: one leading entrepreneur, Knight of the 
Crown of Italy, well connected with the Fascist authorities and a minor role in local 
politics; a small but growing group of spin-off small firms, controlled by the Fascist 
entrepreneurs’ associations; and a number of individual artisans. All of this was 
replaced by free and tough competition between “red” and “white” political parties in 
a rapid developing economic context. The results of national elections in the Riviera 
del Brenta communes for the three key decades of its birth, take-off and restructuring 
are listed in the tables at the end of this chapter.
Table XIX, at the end of this chapter, reports the election results for each of 
the two chambers of Parliament (Chamber of Deputies and Senate) for the whole 
industrial district. The table reports in each column the number of valid votes, total 
votes for the mass parties (Christian Democratic, Communist and the latter’s close 
ally, the Socialist Party), votes for the Christian Democrats, the sum of votes for the 
Communist and the Socialist Parties, votes for the Communists alone, votes for the 
Socialists alone.
Table XX indicates the political majorities (either Christian Democrats- 
“white”, or Socialist-Communist-“red”) in each of the 12 communes of the industrial 
district. Tables XXI-XXXIV provide data on the electoral results in each commune 
for both Chambers of Parliament.
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The constantly increasing amount of valid votes from just over 44,000 in 
1953 to just over 64,000 in 1979 (both data refer to the Chamber of Deputies) in an 
area in which voter participation has been traditionally very high (over 90%) reflects 
the natural growth of the population. The high percentage of votes for the mass- 
based parties remains very high, on average around 90%, well above the national 
average (around 70%).
Election results have remained remarkably stable over the years, in line with 
the local innovative conservatism which I have identified as the specific 
characteristic of Brenta. Seven communes have always been governed by Christian- 
Democrats, four by Communists and Socialists, and just one has experienced 
political changes. Moreover, the gap in terms of votes in the whole district between 
the “white” majority and the “red” minority remained tiny and was even reduced 
over the years. The overall red minority/white majority ratio grew from 0.81 in 1953 
to 0.93 in 1979 (both data referring to the election for the Chamber of Deputies). The 
left even achieved a transient, tiny majority in 1976 (only in the election for the 
Chamber of Deputies). The gap between the “white” majority and the “red” minority 
was constantly larger in the election for the Senate than for the Chamber of Deputies. 
This reflects the different ages of voters (over 25 years for the Senate, and over 21, 
later 18, for the Chamber of Deputies): the preference among younger voters in the 
Brenta for the leftist parties in the decades between 1950 and 1970 is in line with the 
rest of the country.
There is no evident relationship between communes’ political affiliation and 
the specific economic policies they persued. The two core communes of the district, 
Stra’ and Fiesso, featuring the largest concentration of firms and workers and which 
were economically and socially intertwined, were “white” and “red” respectively.
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Local events, no matter how significant, are not directly reflected in the 
preferences of voters. The short-lived novelty of a tiny majority for the left in the 
elections for the Chamber of Deputies only mirrored national trends. Traditional 
allegiances and ideologically motivated choices therefore appear to have been even 
more significant than in Trigilia’s model, in which there is a direct connection 
between political competition and economic development and in which a high degree 
of consensus for a given political force depends on its capability to mediate divergent 
interests at the local level. This capability draws upon a closely-knit institutional 
network (parties, churches, groups of interests, social services, cultural and sport 
associations) which are all co-ordinated by the dominant political force. This force 
also controls the local government and is in charge of relations with the national 
government. Through this network, two goals are achieved: the structure strengthens 
and preserves itself, and a composition of local divergent interests is achieved. The 
political subcultures are to be seen as forms of institutionalisation of social 
movements (socialist and Catholic) originally meant to change society radically and 
which, falling short of that, took root in those areas where preconditions were 
favourable. In other words, Trigilia describes the story of a sort of compromise 
between idealism and reality, with mutual benefits for all actors involved: radical 
reforms at the national level are postponed indefinitely, but the movements acquire a 
leading role at the local level.293
Trigilia also underlines, however, the significant differences between the two 
models. Social conflicts are more frequent in “red” than in “white” areas. Union 
organisations and union struggles are more frequent, as are co-operative 
organisations and social self-help organisations. A pivotal role is played in the white 
areas by self-help organisations, co-operatives and credit institutions. In general, the
293 Ibid., p. 148.
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“red” communes are more inclined to intervene than “white” communes, and they 
tend to emphasise the role of politics in the mediation of social conflicts. In the 
“white” communes, the effort is opposite: a self-confinement of political action and 
the leading role in social mediation played by social institutions inspired or led by 
the Catholic Church. The class structure of the two types of areas is one more key 
element of differentiation. In the “red” communes, the leading agrarian and industrial 
classes are excluded; the “white” communes tend to encompass all classes and 
therefore have a more pronounced “territorial dimension”. 294
However, both political subcultures pursue the same fundamental objective: 
defending the local society from the aggressions of market forces and from 
consequent destabilising effects. Differences in tactics (politicisation and union 
activism for the red areas; self-help organisations, banks and the mediation of the 
Catholic Church for the white areas), according to Trigilia, should merely be seen as 
different means for achieving the same results.295 Trigilia attempts an evolutionary, 
rather than static, description. He also stresses “signs of erosion” of his model at the 
time he is writing. In the 1980s, political support for one or the other mass party had 
already ceased to be an automatic consequence of a global cultural affiliation passed 
down from generation to generation. Political support became progressively more 
selective and determined by the capability of the local political forces to provide 
adequate responses to specific needs. In the early 1990s, ten years after Trigilia’s 
work, the mass-based party system came to an end. However, other elements of his 
analysis, less dependent on his dichotomy, deserve further commentary.
a) Triglia stressed that large areas of central-north-eastern Italy, even prior 
to their industrial take-off in the first decade of the 20th century, may have been 
economically backward, but always relied upon a safety net of social structures
294 Ibid., p. 129.
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preventing the disintegration of the local society. These areas coincide both with the 
areas of development for the industrial districts of the Third Italy and with the areas 
in which sharecropping was most common. They are all areas characterised by a 
specific balance between “backward” and “advanced” elements, which together give 
those areas a comparatively strong capability of absorbing the impact of rapid 
developments and make the social network of relations more resilient. This specific 
set of characteristics cannot be found in southern Italy (where social aggregation is 
deficient) or in north-western Italy (where growing urbanisation and industrialisation 
translate into class frictions and undermine the “territorial” dimension of social 
relationships).296 Brenta in particular has shown consistently good levels of social 
integration in comparison with those of the surrounding areas. Evidence of this can 
be found in the data concerning subsidies paid by the ECA (Ente Comunale di 
Assistenza - Communal Social Support Agency) to destitute families until the mid- 
1970s.297 Although per capita income in the Riviera was probably lower than that in 
other Venetian areas (and in same cases still was until the early 1990s)298, the 
number of subsidies paid to families with income levels under a given threshold has 
continuously been smaller than in most Venetian communes of surrounding areas.299 
The data which I found at ECA archives confirm this coupling of a less-than-average 
income and a less-than-average number of destitute families and seem to point to the 
existence of several informal social networks assuring a certain degree of re­
distribution before the intervention of the public hand.
295 Ibid., p. 128.
296 Ibid., p. 51.
297 Source: Ente Comunale di Assistenza-ECA reports, archives of ISTAT (National Institute for 
Statistics), Rome.
298 Source: Guidazzurra-Dizionario dei Comuni, edited by ANCI-Associazione Nazionale Comuni 
d’ltalia, Rome, 1992.
299 This is true not only for the relativly better-off communes of northern Riviera (Stra‘, Fiesso, Dolo) 
but also for those south of the river Brenta (Camponogara, Fosso‘, Campagna Lupia).
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b) Trigilia stresses that the Catholic political culture tended to support a 
moderate growth in industry, moderate enough to preserve the traditional rural social 
equilibrium and to use it for its purposes. This fits well into Brenta’s “innovative 
conservatism”.
c) A high level of self-employment is considered by Trigilia a prerequisite 
for the taking hold of territorial subcultures. Self-employed workers tend to be more 
focused on preserving the local social order than on class allegiance, and are 
therefore more open to co-operation.300
d) Trigilia underlines the role of smaller urban centres with a small and 
medium bourgeoisie, some providers of common services and a handicraft and 
commercial tradition. These centres may depend on larger cities for more specific 
services but are equipped to meet most requirements of the rural economic life and of 
nascent industrial districts.301 Dolo played exactly this role following its take-off in 
the early 18th century as a logistical centre, a commercial meeting point and a 
crossroads in the centre of the Rivera, halfway between Padua and Venice.
Some initiatives undertaken by Fiesso and Stra’ epitomise the nature of “red” 
and “white” interventions respectively.
Fiesso had 245 employees and 30 firms in 1951 and has consistently had the 
highest number of employees in the footwear sector in the area since the mid-1960s 
despite its small size (six square kilometres).302 Even in Fiesso, however, financial 
support appears to have been the only efficient instrument really available to the 
local government.303 Until 1961 in particular the Commune of Fiesso acted only by 
means of tax relief for new footwear enterprises (for instance, seven were granted in
300 Ibid., p. 64.
301 Ibid., p. 65.
302 Source: ISTAT - National Census 1951.
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1958). Fiesso, like other footwear communes of the area, also became engaged in 
financial support for the annual Footwear Trade Fair in Stra* and even increased its 
contribution from 50,000 to 200,000 lire in 1962. The local government played a role 
as a direct and impartial mediator, a la Trigilia, in 1969, when it invited workers and 
entrepreneurs to participate in a round of consultations. However, on 12 November 
1969 it also approved a document condemning the “inflexible attitude” of the local 
entrepreneurs, instead supporting the requests of workers as well as the general 
strike. The motion also requested that the mayor seek tax and rental relief for 
workers during the period of labour conflicts. Far from playing the idealised role of 
mediator between conflicting interests, the Commune indeed seems to have 
sharpened social tensions by taking sides with one party. In addition to a few specific 
interventions (e.g. one million lire for workers’ families), Fiesso local authorities 
showed an inclination for ideological debates rather than for concrete actions.304 
However, confronted with an ongoing labour crisis, their tried their hand at a 
mediation exercise between workers and entrepreneurs which included other 
communes and a number of members of Parliament.
The most successful campaign undertaken by a “white” commune in the 
footwear sector was the support given to the trade fair held in Stra’, in particular by 
its Christian Democratic Mayor Giuseppe Vettorel. This initiative, instead of playing 
one actor against the other, aimed at encouraging co-operation in the pursuit of a
303 Massimo Tegon, II distretto e gli enti locali. Gli interventi del Comune di Fiesso d ’Artico nel 
ventennio 1950-1970, in Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Giorgio Franceschetti and Giorgio Roverato (eds.), 
lOOanni..., quote., p. 310-311.
304 Translation of some relevant passages from the communal motion approved on 12 November 
1969: ‘The Communal Council of Fiesso d’Artico supports the workers who in Italy and particularly 
in our province struggle to achieve better living conditions in workplaces and in society. The Council 
condemns the unjustifiable inflexibility of entrepreneurs. The current struggles originate from the 
working class... and are components of a wider process in which working masses, through their 
struggles, make clear their objectives of social and economic reform. These reforms represent 
objective needs arising from the current situation”: Ibid., p. 311.
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common objective and led to the first local semi-formal self-help entrepreneurial 
organisation.
The main feature of Brenta* s political landscape over the longest period of its 
post-war history was a potentially fragile balance between two political cultures. 
This balance, however, proved to be exceedingly stable over the decades and 
translated into a blend of laissez-faire and some elements of a social policy, 
supportive of industrialisation but not intrusive.
A brief comparison with another footwear area, well investigated from this 
specific angle, shows how much Brenta’s case is idiosyncratic. Michael Blim 
describes the political events in a footwear area in the Marches, centred on the little 
town of San Lorenzo Marche, which experienced something unknown to the 
conservative Riviera: a change of local government, from the Christian-Democrats to 
the Communists.305 The ascendance of the Communist Party in San Lorenzo Marche 
was “slow, steady and incremental”306, but culminated in the electoral victory of 
1980. The history of San Lorenzo therefore is more a story of a well-functioning 
local democracy in which two groups struggle (democratically) for power and obtain 
the support of the citizens on the basis of their performance or the general economic 
climate, rather than a semi-permanent allegiance to a political subculture. Class 
differences indeed appear to have played a significant role in shaping the political 
landscape of San Lorenzo. According to Blim, the rise of the Communist Party 
passed through the “conquest” of the area’s artisans, in particular those who had 
emerged from the ranks of former shoe workers and peasants. The Christian- 
Democratic incumbents relied instead on a wider scattering of social strata.307
305 Michael L. Blim, Made in Italy..., quote., New York, 1990.
306 Ibid., p. 218.
307 Ibid., p. 242.
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However, they experienced power struggles between their right and left wings, the 
former favouring a policy of laissez-faire, and the latter trying to implement a 
cautious social policy.308 Blim’s description of the early history of the industrial 
district, far from reporting co-operation among all the local actors and mutual trust 
based on a respect for a set of common values, “seems something of a Marxian 
delight”, with two “new untested and antagonistic groups -  the new workers (from 
the countryside) and the new entrepreneurs -  in a battle over wages and working 
conditions in an industry that was enjoying unparalleled expansion and success” but 
which was still based on “just good old-fashioned exploitation”.309
Conclusion
Since Trigilia’s seminal work of the 1970s, the interaction between small 
firms and politics in the Third Italy has attracted attention not only for analyses of 
existing clusters but also for the formulation of cluster policies, of which there has 
been “a global proliferation” over the last decade or so.310
The preceding paragraphs, in combination with various elements highlighted 
in the chapters on entrepreneurial organisations and trade unions, have tried to shed 
some light on the progressive development of cluster policies in the Riviera. Brenta 
confirms the view that policy intervention has little to do with the emergence of 
clusters, and its function in their growth seems at best indirect.311 However, it also 
indicates that relations with public authorities can indeed enter a new phase once a 
district has reached a comparatively advanced stage in its development.
Relations between single firms and political and administrative authorities of 
course are common, and have also been common in Brenta. Significant interaction
308 Ibid., p. 224.
309 Ibid., p. 225.
310 Philip Raines (ed.), Cluster Development..., quote., p. 21.
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between the firm Voltan and politics in particular, mentioned on a number of 
occasions in the preceding chapters, continued as long as Voltan maintained some 
relevance at a national or regional level. Specific attention to clusters o f firms, 
however, is a relatively recent phenomenon (in the case of Brenta, it goes back only 
to the late 1980s or early 1990s) and therefore should often be considered (in 
particular in Brenta) a consequence rather than a precondition of their emergence.
There are several reasons for this. State authorities were more interested in 
promoting heavy industry. Local authorities (communes and provinces) had only 
limited economic powers in post-Second World War Italy. Their additional role as 
providers of a sort of “social wage” in terms of transport, public housing, schools and 
child care centres, was also rather limited.312 Consequently, the classical distinction 
between the interventionism of the Communist communes and the laissez-faire 
policy of the Christian-Democratic communes tended to blur in Brenta. An 
innovation was introduced in the early 1970s with the establishment of regional 
governments and assemblies. Some performed well (usually in northern Italy, 
including the Veneto region), some less well (usually in southern Italy), as Putnam 
writes, but all were remote enough from the still largely “invisible” industrial 
districts of the time to attempt to play a specific role in their development. They did 
so only when industrial districts were robust enough to be credible (or unavoidable) 
interlocutors. Still in 1986, more than a decade after the establishment of regional 
governments, Trigilia wrote that “... the regional level could provide favourable 
opportunities for attacking problems of scale of the small-firm economy, which 
seems to require an intermediate level of government between the centre and the
311 Ibid., p. 23.
312 Carlo Trigilia, Small-firms Development and Political Subculture..., quote., p. 190.
187
individual communes. These opportunities, however, have not yet been effectively 
exploited”.313
The weakness of local authorities in itself is not necessarily mirrored in a 
corresponding weakness of local political cultures. On the contrary, the latter can 
play a significant role informally, outside the official decision-taking process, 
ensuring what Trigilia terms “... localist mediation of interests... achieved by means 
of political resources which, directly or indirectly, have facilitated the integration of, 
and agreement between, the various actors involved in the development of small 
firms”.314 However, this chapter also underlines three specific factors which weaken 
significantly the linkage between Brenta’s local firm system and a specific local 
political subculture: 1) the exogenous influence of the large, integrated firms of 
Marghera, particularly on Brenta unionism; 2) the significant number of commuters 
from the Riviera to Marghera and at the same time to the Riviera from backwards 
areas in the southern parts of the provinces of Padua and Venice -  this meant that the 
workforce employed in Brenta did not correspond with the voters enrolled in local 
electoral lists who in the end decided upon the composition of local administrations; 
3) a significant number of domestic workers who were residents either of those parts 
of the eastern Rivera outside the industrial district (Mira) or of comparatively 
backwards neighboring areas, who did play a relevant part in the production process 
but were not integrated into the local social and political environment.
In this context, Brenta’s lack of political homogeneity as underlined by my 
research on local political trends reflects a complex composition of the local social 
and cultural environment. Far from being a “geographically circumscribed area fixed 
by nature and historical heritage”315, Brenta appears to be an open system, permeable
313 Ibid., p. 193.
314 Ibid., p. 191.
315 Andrea Colli, Networking the market..., quote., 77.
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to influences from outside its borders, whose development, even at critical junctures, 
was determined by exogenous factors.
As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the decline of the mass-based 
political parties coincided chronologically with Brenta’s growing self-awareness as 
an industrial district and with itsincreased capability to enter into a collective 
dialogue with local (and subsequently even national) authorities. The new national 
and regional laws on industrial districts on the one hand, and the agreements signed 
with the entrepreneurs’ association on the other now cover “... the three points at 
which policy seeks to affect clusters: 1) through the interaction within the cluster 
itself; 2) through commonly-accessed factors influencing the competitiveness of the 
cluster as a whole; 3) in terms of the cluster’s self-awareness”. In the case of 
Brenta, politics seems to have assumed the role of an interlocutor once the industrial 
district has reached some degree of development (and in particular has achieved 
some capability for collective intentional action), abandoning the benign neglect 
exhibited in previous phases.
C. The role of trade unions: employer-employee relations in Brenta
In many regards, employer-employee relations in Brenta fits least in the 
idealised industrial district model. Not surprisingly, most writers have devoted little, 
if any, attention to local trade unions. I have integrated their contributions with some 
primary sources including interviews with trade union officials or retired officials 
and collection/analysis of data provided by entrepreneurs and trade unions alike. My 
primary sources regard in particular the issues of “undeclared” work (lavoro nero),
316 Philip Raines (ed.), Cluster Development..., quote., Strathclyde, 2002, p. 27.
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the development of relations between entrepreneurs and trade unions, and the social 
costs of the industrial take-off in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
As mentioned in previous chapters, a crucial role in local employer-employee 
relations in Brenta was always played by the availability of labour as well as by the 
average size of enterprises. As usual, Brenta unionisation took root more easily in 
large than in small firms. It grew comparatively quickly in the 1950s, at the same 
pace as the establishment of a core of comparatively “large” firms. Further 
unionisation progress was then hampered by the subsequent waves of firm 
downsizing, subcontracting and outsourcing of the early 1970s. As discussed above, 
it is still debated whether such modifications in the structure of the local firm 
population was essentially a reaction of entrepreneurs to circumvent the effects of 
more advanced labour legislation favoured by trade unions, or rather an innovative 
form of enhanced intra-firm co-operation with positive results for all actors of the 
industrial districts. In any case, Brenta* s trade unions had a direct influence on a 
number of crucial developments, including the establishment of an effective 
entrepreneurs association and the shift of production towards a higher market 
segment. Unlike in the Italianate idealised model, however, the relations between 
entrepreneurs and trade unions were mostly based on confrontation. Co-operation 
ensued at a quite late stage, when the industrial district had already taken off and 
even entered the stage of maturity.
In this context, each stage of development in the economic history of the 
Brenta corresponds to a specific phase in labour relations. The patronage initiatives 
by Giovanni Luigi Voltan were probably partly intended to help workers, partly to 
better control them. In the 1920s and 1930s, several artisan workshops were 
established, several of them actively helped by Voltan. Relationships between
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employers and labour were close: each “paron” (master shoemaker) led a small 
group three to four “garzoni” (apprentices). A code of conduct, although informal, 
was strictly observed, for instance with reference to some off-duty Mondays (the 
“lunedi’ dei scarpari”, literally “shoemakers’ Monday”). The relative decline of 
family workshops and the evolution of the relatively autonomous small groups of 
“paroni” and “garzoni” into hired workforce resulted in new working conditions. In 
post-second World War Brenta, fragmented and repetitive work was introduced even 
in a number of small firms, in particular through the assembly line; workers were 
obliged to perform repetitive tasks and discipline was very strict, much stricter than 
in the pre-war time when each apprentice had to learn how to produce a complete 
pair of shoes. The application of some Fordist-Taylorist principles to a still very 
labour-intensive industry resulted in working conditions which were very different 
from the niche survival of craft production a la Piore and Sabel. The social costs of 
this sudden introduction of an embryonic Fordism into a rural environment were 
high, and included a significant number of work accidents as shown in following 
paragraphs. The history of trade unions in the Brenta begins with this fragmentation 
of work: the “Lega dei Calzaturieri” (Shoemakers’ League), the first real trade union 
in the area, was established in the 1950s. Labour conflicts tended to be quite harsh, 
although limited to the handful of “large” enterprises. The initial tough and 
uncompromising attitude of entrepreneurs and trade unions alike, which continued 
until the mid-1970s, was modified and to some extent softened by the growing habit 
of negotiating together and by some awareness of a common interest in the survival 
of the footwear industry. However, the key factors in this respect were exogenous 
modifications of the economic environment and especially of the local labour 
market. A sort of “rational partnership” emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. This led 
eventually to the establishment of a number of joint bodies, where trade unions and
191
entrepreneurs participate formally on an equal footing. This evolution is also 
reflected in a growing interest of local trade unions in issues other than salaries and 
working conditions (for instance environment and training).
Two opposite M yths’’ and a multi-faceted reality
Labour conditions and workers-employers relations represent to some extent 
the acid test of developments in industrial districts. As recalled above, the 
specialised literature oscillates between an optimistic vision of excellent employers- 
employee relations, turning industrial districts not only into efficient economic 
systems but also into better working (and living) environments, and a pessimistic 
vision which considers industrial districts as an adjustment to changing conditions to 
continue the good old labour exploitation. Brenta indicates that such relations evolve 
over time, and that they are not predetermined by a genius loci or local 
“atmosphere”.
In addition to being limited to “large” enterprises, early Brenta unionisation 
was also hampered by the weak local presence of the Catholic Church and of its 
associations. ACLI (a Catholic workers’ network) was virtually unknown in the 
footwear industry world. Workers preferred to join the Communist trade union CGIL 
rather than the Catholic trade union CISL. Some Catholic priests helped workers’ 
organisations; but they acted on their own and did not represent a coherent Catholic 
strategy as in other areas of the Veneto region.
It is therefore hardly surprising that the initial Brenta unionisation resembled 
that of “red areas” of the Third Italy, including a comparatively frequent recourse to 
strikes rather than the search for compromise and mediation on the one hand, and 
early attempts to enlarge the scope of negotiations to areas such as firm organisation, 
training and employment.
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However, Brenta labour conflicts were more related to specific local 
situations. In classical “red areas”, labour conflicts were often the direct consequence 
of national trade union strategies pursuing also national political objectives, as was 
the case in particular in the so-called “hot autumn” of 1969. This however was 
comparatively mild in Brenta, where labour relations had been shaped to a large 
extent by fluctuations in the local labour market in previous years. Labour unrest had 
already peaked in the mid-1960s, leaving a comparatively rich experience in labour 
negotiations on both sides.
“Lavoro nero”: the dark side of Italian industrial districts
“Informal” or illegal work (“lavoro nero”, literally “black work”) should be 
mentioned in this context.317 The size of the Italian informal economy is traditionally 
considered significant. Although precise quantitative data are by definition only 
tentative, some estimates put the share of the Italian informal sector at around 27% of 
the national GDP, one of the highest among OECD countries and well above the 
estimated OECD average (16.7%).318 Obviously, the Italian percentage represents an 
average among widely different regional values. The informal economy is considered 
to be larger in Southern than in Northern Italy, and it tends to be lower in larger 
enterprises. In the footwear sector in the Third Italy, informal work played a role in 
reducing costs in particular during the early phases of outsourcing in the early 1970s. 
It has probably declined afterwards, both because of technological progress which
356 The literature on the “black“, “informal“or “underground** Italian economy is vast. See for instance 
G.M. Rey, The controversy over the underground economy, Review o f the Economic Conditions in Italy, 
2003, n. 1, 9-52; I. Cipolletta, The illusions of the underground economy, ibid., 2003, n. 1,75-88.
318 Estimates are provided for example by Friedrich Schneider, in Schwarzarbeit und die Folgen fuer die 
deutschen Sozialsysteme un den Arbeitsmarkt, Inter Nationes, Basis-Info, 25-2001, p. 6. According to 
these estimates (estimates, not data), the Italian informal economy as a percentage of GDP went from 
22.8 in 1989/90 to 26 in 1994/95 to the above mentioned 27.1 in 1999/2000. In the same periods, 
Germany went from 11.8 to 13.5 to 16, France from 9 to 14.5 to 15.2, Britain from 9.6 to 12.5 to 12.7, 
Sweden from 15.8 to 19.5 to 19.2, the USA from 6.7 to 8.8 to 8.7, the OECD average from 13.2 to 15.7 to 
16.7.
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made labour costs less crucial and because of more stringent tax and labour controls 
which have also reduced de facto incentives to use undeclared employment.319
Informal employment however does not necessarily always mean labour 
exploitation. Exploitation in the Brenta did occur in particular in the early phases of 
the nascent post-war district, during the above mentioned transition from family 
workshops to the impersonal larger “modem” factories. Not surprisingly, irregular 
labour and its consequences (non-payment of social security, lower salaries than 
those established officially, unjustified firing) was high on the agenda of the new 
Lega dei Calzaturieri. However, from the second half of the 1960s, the informal 
economy took on new forms as the shift towards higher market segments reduced the 
proportion of labour in total production costs and encouraged larger firms to 
subcontract the most labour-intensive production phases. From the late 1970s, the 
combat against irregular employment ceased to be one of the key issues negotiated 
by entrepreneurs and trade unions. Attention progressively shifted towards other 
issues, in particular the defence of existing employment levels together with broader 
industrial policies including training and environment.
The effective impact of the “informal” economy on the historical 
development of Brenta is an open question. Certainly, informality decreased costs 
and therefore contributed to cost-based competitiveness. However, it also implied 
disadvantages, including diminished efficiency of public support, erosion of trust, 
mediocre employer-employee relations and reduced economies of scale 
(“informality” tends to become more and more difficult as organisations become 
more complex). As production moved towards higher market segments, reduction of
319 Marcello de Cecco, L ’economia italiana negli ultimi trent’anni, in Sabino Cassese (ed.), Ritratto 
dell'Italia, Bari 2001, p. 86-87.
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labour costs became less decisive and therefore the interest in having recourse to 
“informal” economy also diminished.
Specific assessments on Brenta however vary considerably. According to 
comments I have obtained from local representatives of the Catholic trade union 
CISL, in the mid-1990s up to 20% of the workforce in the Riviera would have been 
employed irregularly.320
According to some entrepreneurs, illegal employment instead would have 
been comparatively rare and would have served mainly the mutual interest of 
entrepreneurs and workers alike to avoid taxation. Some estimates of the size of 
informal activities of small and medium-sized enterprises in the Veneto region are 
proposed by Gian Antonio Stella, who also suggest a percentage of around 20%.
The former footwear worker, trade union official and local politician Vittorio 
Pampagnin gave me a vivid account of standard practices in Brenta, which were 
quite similar to those traditionally observed elsewhere in Italy and bore no or little 
trace of a specific solidarity between employers and employees based on an alleged 
common mission or culture. In this respect, there were no significant differences 
between working conditions in an industrial district or in firms operating outside a 
district environment.
According to Pampagnin, “modem informality” began with the “new” 
factories established after the Second World War and in particular from the early 
1950s, with San Marco and Bretas as possible leading enterprises. Previously, wages 
were usually paid as lump-sums for the execution of specific tasks (or even for the 
production of complete pairs of shoes) on the basis of agreements usually negotiated
320 Interview with Giovanni Finco, CISL area manager for Dolo and Brenta, July 1995. According to 
Finco, given the current level of technology and mechanisation in Brenta firms, the current level of 
total output can only be reasonably achieved in a number of working hours higher than the official one 
by at least 20%.
3 1 Gian Antonio Stella, Schei, quote., p. 221.
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not by the single workers but by the “paroni” or leaders of small teams of some 
persons including apprentices. This system coexisted for some time even with the 
“new” factories, which in some cases simply controlled the quality of supplies and 
delivery times (not always respected, even in today Brenta, again contrary to the 
traditional image of well interlocking production phases performed by different firms 
in a highly co-ordinated manner). “Informality” then consisted in tax evasion by 
entrepreneurs and workers alike, but was not in itself a direct exploitation of the 
workforce. Innovations were brought about by modification of work, in particular 
through the fragmented, repetitive tasks imposed by assembly lines. The traditional 
mediation of “paroni” was therefore eroded, while wages were related to work and 
not to products. “Informality” then often meant selective application of labour laws 
and agreements. The habit of fictitiously hiring, firing and, a few months later, hiring 
again workers who in reality continued to work all year, was quite widespread and 
helped to reduce social security and other costs. The system was quite difficult to 
combat, since it was plausibly presented as a measure to enhance flexibility to face 
the peaks and troughs of footwear markets. According to Pampagnin*s evaluations, 
30 to 40% of the total Brenta labour (labour, not necessarily workers) was “informal” 
at the beginning of the 1960s. Informality was probably even higher among domestic 
(female) workers, where control was virtually impossible.
Some thirty years later, “informal” labour has probably been halved.322 
According to Tania Toffanin (area manager of the CGIL office in Dolo), “informal” 
labour has decreased significantly since the mid-1990s and is mainly limited to some 
categories of workers, in particular retired people who continue working for a few
322 For instance, a note by CGIL of november 1997 reported on a survey among its members: 19% of 
workers declared to have been paid less than the legal minimum salary “in the past”, and 7% to be 
still paid less than the minimum legal salary at the time of the survey. According to Fiorenza Belussi, 
the loss of relevance of “irregular” work is a characteristic shared by all Venetian districts in the last 
twenty years. However, it is more evident in the oldest, more mature districts, where the relationship
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hours a day. He mentioned a few concrete examples. A labour inspection conducted 
in 2001 in a factory in Fiesso discovered five officially retired persons still at work 
out of a total of 70 employees. Four irregular workers were found in another firm 
with 40 workers.323
Labour flexibility tends now to translate into individual negotiation of 
working hours and working conditions, providing some adjustment to both 
entrepreneurs and workers needs. In a way, this is a return to individual working 
conditions negotiated case by case by “paroni” on behalf of their small teams still in 
the early 1950s. A number of formulae has been devised and included in the national 
footwear workers contracts. Brenta workers however, according to Belussi, still tend 
to prefer the traditional higher wages for extra hours (in the region of 10% in smaller 
enterprises). Working hours flexibility in the mid-1990s involved over 60% of 
workers: a percentage similar to other districts and inferior only to the mechanical 
engineering sector.
The above mentioned aspects are crucial in the history of Brenta unionisation, 
as outlined in the following paragraphs.
Labour conflicts in the nascent district
Precise information on labour conditions in the early phases of the Brenta 
district are scarce. Fontana comments on an episode which took place at Voltan* s in 
1906. The Paduan anticlerical newspaper “La Liberta’” published an article on 
alleged exploitation of workers. Giovanni Luigi Voltan “ invited” his about 120 
employees to respond by a letter to the same newspaper. Not surprisingly, Voltan’s 
workers graciously obliged and praised the “good working conditions”, in particular
between the economic system and the local social environment is more intense and at the same time 
skilled workers have become rare: Tacchi a spillo, quote., p. 173.
323 Interview on 30 May 2002.
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working hours: officially eleven a day, “but in practice not even ten”.324 A separate 
letter was also written by female Voltan employees. Precise data on working hours 
and labour “flexibility” in the mid-1930s, based on unpublished documents whch I 
traced in Voltan’s archives, are reported in Chapter II of this thesis.
The post-Second World War economic growth entailed significant social 
costs in terms of work accidents and, in some respects, of worsening working 
conditions.
A considerable increase in work accidents was recorded at the Dolo hospital 
(which served the whole Brenta area with the only exception of the communes closer 
to Padua: Vigonza and Noventa) and was described at its peak by Antonio Novello
• 325and Franco Fante, two medical doctors who served in the surgery department. 
Work accidents increased at the end of the 1950s, peaked in the mid-1960s, and 
decreased rapidly thereafter. In the most critical period, up to 30 percent of patients 
in the accident surgery department were victims of labour accidents. A quarter of the 
approximately 1,000 annual surgical operations were on the about two hundred 
victims of work incidents in footwear factories treated in that hospital. About 10% of 
casualties suffered complete amputations of fingers (not of hands).. Novello and 
Fante indicate three main reasons. First, many victims were unskilled commuters, 
most coming from the poorer communes located south of the district, lacking 
adequate training and fatigued by the daily long journeys to the working place. 
Second, many machine tools were dangerous and often carried no safety devices. 
Third, work breaks were not foreseen: most incidents took place just before lunch,
324 Giovanni Luigi Fontana, L'azienda incubatrice: Luigi Voltan e la nascita dell’industria 
calzaturiera italiana, in Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Giorgio Franceschetti and Giorgio Roverato (eds.), 
Cento anni..., quote., p. 76-79.
Fontana publishes also a document confirming the paternalistic attitude of the initiator of the Brenta 
district: the speech by the oldest Voltan worker at a social event marking the 25th anniversary of the 
esbtalishment of his firm (1923), in which, quite predictably, Voltan himself is depicted as a “ model*‘ 
and a promoter of initiatives in the interest of his workers: ibid., p. 85.
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when exhaustion was highest. The debate following the findings of Novello and 
Fante, in particular at the 1964 National Congress of the Italian Association of 
Orthopaedic Surgery, contributed to some modifications in working conditions, 
which proved to be quite effective. In particular, the introduction of a short 
interruption of ten minutes during the critical late morning was sufficient to halve 
their number.326
Machine tools used until the late 1960s had also other drawbacks. In 
particular the so-called “ribattitrici meccaniche ad anelli”, a sort of electrically 
heated automatic hammers, were very noisy and produced strong vibrations. Laws on
327workers protection existed; implementation however was at best selective. 
Additional problems derived from a technological improvement of the late 1950s: the 
replacement of nails with glues to connect soles and uppers. Volatile glues (which 
dried up more quickly and so reduced production times) were usually preferred. 
However, they contained dangerous substances such as benzoate, easily inhaled by 
workers and were therefore prohibited by the Italian law nr. 245 of 5 March 1963.
In 1972, Fiesso (a “red” commune) established a monitoring centre on 
working conditions in footwear firms, which included two medical doctors 
specialised in labour medicine. The Communes of Mira, Dolo, Camponogara and 
Campagna Lupia also joined the initiative. In 1973, Fiesso launched an enquiry into 
labour conditions of domestic workers. The results of this enquiry were discussed in 
the preparation of the new Italian law on domestic work, approved in December 
1973.
325 A. Novello and F. Fante, Le lesioni nella mano nell’industria calzaturiera, Rivista di Chirurgia 
della Mano, vol. 2,1964, 100-7.
326 Interview with Professor Antonio Novello, former Director of the Orthopaedic Surgery 
Department, Dolo Hospital, on 20 December, 2004.
327 see in particular the law nr. 547 of 27 April 1955 enabling Labour Inspectors to carry out controls 
in factories. A national contract on home work had been signed as early as 1948.
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Wages continued to be comparatively low, and the gap with other sectors 
persisted. Wages in the Italian manufacture sector grew by 28.1%, between 1955 and 
1959, but those of the footwear sector only by 19%. Even in this context, Brenta was 
comparatively backward. Three years after the establishment of the Brenta footwear 
trade union, the Italian National Footwear Association placed Brenta in the second 
group, together with areas in Southern and central Italy (including Naples, Bari, 
Ascoli and Macerata), well behind other areas in Northern Italy which were placed in 
the first group (Varese, Bologna, Firenze and Arezzo).
Growing but unbalanced unionisation
By 1961, two years after the establishment of the Lega dei Calzaturieri, only 
one workers’ council at firm level had been established (San Marco, in Fiesso: again, 
in a “red” commune). However, in may 1961 the newly established Lega had already 
798 members, as many as the trade union in Milan and twice as many as in 
Alessandria.
Despite the significant social capital mentioned in previous chapters, Brenta 
workers associations were scarce. By the mid-1950s, just two small structures were 
recorded. A small office of the Communist-led trade union CGIL was established in 
Mira and dealt especially with work procedures of local peasants seeking 
employment in the “large” enterprises of Mira, Mestre and Marghera. One “Circolo 
ACLI“ (a club of the Catholic Association of Italian Workers) operated in Stra’, 
seeking employment for its members in the local footwear factories, rather than in 
asserting workers’ rights and interests.328 The nascent Brenta footwear unionisation 
was already in line with the split between “red” and “white” areas on the one hand,
328 ACLI were established in Rome as a self-help, educational and recreational organisation rather 
than as a full-fledged trade union, precisely with the aim of contrasting the influence of the 
Communist parties and is related trade unions.
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and between the small and medium-sized firm network of western Brenta and the 
heavy industry cluster of eastern Brenta on the other.
The first documented strike of some relevance took place in 1957 at the San 
Marco firm. It was a sort of Luddite action, triggered by the purchase of an automatic 
stitching machine (“Blake”).
Some co-ordinated action towards the establishment of a real trade union was 
undertaken in 1958 by Paolo Pannocchia (a native Tuscan), Secretary of the 
Chamber of Labour (Camera del Lavoro) of Padua and a member of the Communist 
party. Local offices were open in Stra’ and Fiesso. A sort of plenipotentiary of the 
Chamber of Labour of Padua, Armando Cecchinato, visited the area regularly. This 
unionisation campaign was therefore started not in the half rural, half urban Brenta 
environment, but in Padua, by men coming from outside the region, with little or no 
previous direct knowledge of local realities, and directly linked with the Communist 
party. But the campaign was rather successful: by the end of 1959, thirteen workers 
representing six firms (three based in Stra’, one in Fiesso, Vigonovo and Camin 
respectively) officially established in Stra’ the Lega dei Calzaturieri della Riviera del 
Brenta (League of Brenta Shoemakers) as a specialised section of the Communist-led 
trade union CGIL, encompassing firms in both the Provinces of Padua and Venice.
Not surprisingly, the new league’s first initiatives were confined to just a 
handful of the largest local firms, in particular San Marco. For a few years, this firm 
came to be considered a sort of acid test for the development of unionism in the 
Brenta. Luigino Rossi recalls that by the mid-1950s San Marco was the leading firm 
both for workers and entrepreneurs, with about 200 workers “most of whom” were 
members of the Communist-led CGIL trade union.329 According to Pampagnin’s 
recollection (who at the time was one of its employees), San Marco was in many
329 Source: Materiali di Storia, 18, december 2000, p. 18.
201
respects different from other Brenta firms, both for its comparatively advanced 
technology and for its hybrid work organisation. Unlike many other enterprises, 
which continued to hire domestic workers, San Marco entrepreneurs (the Poletto 
brothers) still negotiated individual wages with each experienced shoemaker, who 
then worked with his apprentices in the factory. Domestic work, while not being 
really technically improved, was “relocated” into the firm. This led to better quality 
control and probably also translated into some cost reductions through higher work 
productivity.
Some specific names should be mentioned here, to underline the close 
personal and professional connections between a handful of key social players in 
what was still a small, half-rural world. A significant role in unionisation was played 
by the Poletto brothers themselves. Both were convinced communists and registered 
their employees, virtually automatically as Pampagnin recalls it, as members both of 
the Communist Party and of the Communist-led CGIL. The personnel and 
administration manager of San Marco, Antonio Ulivoni, himself a member of the 
Communist party, was subsequently Communist mayor of Fiesso in the early 1970s.
By the end of the 1950s, this hybrid system could not keep pace with new 
developments. The local leadership passed to another firm, established by the three 
Baldan brothers, literally located at a stone throw from San Marco but technically 
more advanced. It was smaller (about sixty workers) but had a proportionally higher 
productivity (up to 700 daily pairs of shoes). The Baldans pushed even further the 
centralisation policy pursued by San Marco. Only sewing and stitching were still 
performed by female domestic workers. New factory premises were built by the local 
architect Antonio Zandarin (the promoter of the footwear trade fair of Stra’); shoes 
were sold directly to local shops and not by agents. Some technical innovations were
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adopted and spread rapidly to other local firms, including San Marco which was 
directed by Amleto Donadelli (who later became ACRIB’s Chairman). The 
introduction of a sort of assembly line put an end to the traditional “caregoto” 
(artisan stool) which had come to represent a sort of local symbol. Technicians from 
outside the district helped in the fine tuning of the new system, which was perceived 
as a worsening of working conditions.330
Collective labour bargaining
The Eighth Congress of the Italian Communist Party (1956) acknowledged 
the “strategic relevance” of the alliance between peasants on the one side, small and 
medium-sized entrepreneurs on the other. A specific role in this new strategy was 
played precisely by those entrepreneurs who had been workers themselves or in any 
way, for their origin and culture, were considered close to the working class (“ceto 
medio produttivo” or productive medium class, as it was termed in the political 
jargon of the day). The Poletto brothers, owners of San Marco but former workers, 
members and even contributors to the Communist party, were in several respects a 
perfect embodiment of this. Some role was also played by Lega delle Cooperative, a 
sort of umbrella organisation grouping the enterprises close to the Communist party, 
which served from the 1950s until the late 1980s as a sort of sole semi-official 
intermediary in economic transactions between Italy and eastern European countries. 
Pampagnin refers in particular to some orders obtained by San Marco through Lega 
delle Cooperative, which in turn enabled the firm to grant some wage increase and 
improvements in working conditions (in particular an increase of 200 lire per 
working hour, approximately equivalent to two Euro in 2004 value). This agreement
330 Dario Fo, actor and later awarded the Nobel literature price, referred to the negative consequences 
of this innovation in his performance of his theatre piece “Morte accidentale di un anarchico” 
(Accidental death of an anarchist) in Fiesso in the early 1960s.
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was signed on behalf of workers by Giuseppe Golinelli, the new Secretary of the 
Chamber of Labour of Venice and a high-ranking representative of the local 
Communist Party: once again, somebody from outside the district, pursuing a 
strategy dictated by national, not local objectives. In this early stage, the Lega dei 
Calzaturieri enjoyed little or no autonomy from the established trade unions of Padua 
and Venice. The latter in particular seemed quite interested in Brenta* s developments 
and sent regularly “inspection teams” which usually included Umberto Conte and the 
above mentioned Giuseppe Golinelli. Both were members of the Communist party, 
had no official role in the Lega dei Calzaturieri and were to play some role in future 
local developments.
The nascent Brenta unionisation faced serious problems paradoxically 
ushered in by the signature in Milan of the comparatively advanced national 
footwear work contract (25th April 1959). The contract had been endorsed not only 
by the three main Italian trade unions but also by the Italian parliament, which had 
made it formally equal to a national law and therefore declared it binding for 
entrepreneurs and workers alike. Its articles 30 and 31 established workers* councils, 
workers’ representatives and codes of conduct at firm level. Most Riviera enterprises 
however simply refused to acknowledge these provisions, which in their opinion 
could not be implemented during the local difficult transition from the traditional 
flexible, semi-artisan system to a “new” industrial organisation.
As a consequence, the gap between law and reality in Brenta was widened. 
From this moment on, trade unions pursued a double strategy in the Brenta: on the 
one hand, they strove to improve wages and working conditions; but they devoted 
equal or even higher attention to the implementation of existing agreements, in 
exchange for “moderation” and “realism” in the conduct of negotiations. Trade 
unions bargaining positions continued to be weakened by difficult co-ordination
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among workers, dispersed in several small and very small artisan enterprises and 
scattered over a comparatively large area with poor communication facilities (except 
in the Padova-Stra’-Fiesso-Dolo section).
Controversies following the non-implementation of the national contract in 
the Rivera led to the appointment of a full-time trade union staff in charge of Brenta 
issues: Piero Meneghetti. Like his part-time predecessors, he had virtually no 
previous knowledge of the footwear industry. He came from Cittadella, in the 
northern area of the province of Padua, where the Catholic Church and the Christian 
Democratic party were omnipresent and pervasive. Meneghetti commenced his 
working life as an employee in a cement factory near Padua, and later became a full­
time trade union staff in the Communist-led CGIL. His first public speech in his new 
capacity was held in may 1960 during a strike at the Minerva footwear enterprise. He 
was later to serve as Secretary of the Lega dei Calzaturieri until 1980, and was 
involved in negotiations also a the national level. He died in 1996.
The issues left unresolved by the refusal of Brenta’s entrepreneurs to 
implement the national work contract of 1959 were tackled by the newly-established 
ACRIB, which finally reached an agreement not with trade unions as such but with a 
“neutral” body (the Chamber of Labour of Venice, also on behalf of the Chamber
i
Labour of Padua). Some provisions of the national contract were replaced by 
others less favourable to workers, including the freezing of both the 10% national 
wage increase and the new national job description. Provisions favourable to workers 
included goodwill clauses concerning a “renewed” effort in the combat against 
“informal” work and against the non-payment of social security contributions; and 
ACRIB’s support to the implementation of the agreement by all Brenta firms 
including those which were not ACRIB members. This last point seems to confirm a
331 Luigino Rossi, speech reported in Materiali di Storia, quoted, p. 11.
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converging interest in mutual recognition as the sole representatives of the respective 
parties. The specific local situation was therefore acknowledged by both contracting 
parties: Brenta still lagged behind the most advanced footwear areas of Piedmont, 
Lombardy and Tuscany, to which the national contract had been tailored, and where 
wages were 10 to 15% higher, informal work was less frequent and firms were larger 
and less labour-intensive.
This first local agreement was obviously considered by ACRIB as a success, 
although it was criticised by the Italian footwear entrepreneurs umbrella 
organisation, ANCI. Strictly speaking, the agreement was null and void, since it 
modified legally binding provisions endorsed by the Italian parliament. Not 
surprisingly, its terms were not reported in a formal, written reference document, bur 
remained rather vague, as diverging witness reports confirm four decades later: some 
mention a written text, other refer to a verbal consent.
The agreement generated further support for ACRIB. It led to a labour cost 
reduction in the region of 15%: not a bad result for an area still mainly competing on 
prices rather than on quality.332 National trade unions obviously criticised the 
agreement, in particular CGIL-FELA, which had played the leading role in 
negotiating the national contract. A trade union representative, Carlo Polliotti, was 
sent to the Riviera and participated in a hearing at the Chamber of Labour in Venice 
on 6 march 1962. Golinelli, the negotiator of the agreement on behalf of workers, 
defended himself against sharp critics. He expressed the view that the agreement was 
“realistic” and that it would help reduce “informal” work in the interest not only of 
workers but also of the local industry as a whole.
332 Ibid., p. 11 and 34.
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The difference of wages between the provinces of Padua and Venice had also 
some impact in the shaping of Brenta’s industrial district. Until the labour reforms of 
the late 1960s, which introduced nation-wide unified rates, Italian wages in the 
manufacturing sector were classified in six areas, the largest Northern cities 
belonging to area I and the most backwards Southern regions belonging to area VI. 
Venice and its province were listed in area I, Padua and its province in area n. 
Wages were 278.05 lire per hour in the former, 226.15 in the latter. As a 
consequence, a number of firms were established in Paduan communes, although as 
close as possible to the border with the province of Venice and therefore at times 
literally at a stone throw from Stra’. In this way, firms reaped the benefits of reduced 
labour costs but remained within the same environment.
The 1964 national footwear contract was signed in a rapidly changing 
environment. The Socialists had joined the national government. The Italian 
footwear industry had developed further. Production had increased on an annual 
basis by 8.1% in 1963 and by 9.4% in 1963. However, working conditions remained 
hard: six working days a week, 48 working hours weekly, wages inferior by some 
32% to average manufacture salaries. 34 out of the 157 Italian footwear enterprises 
with more than 100 workers had established workers’ councils. Just one of the 
Brenta 16 firms had done so (San Marco).
Negotiations for a new national work contract took place in Milan. ACRIB 
was represented by its Vice-Chairman, Amleto Donadelli, representing some 74 
Brenta firms. Brenta workers were represented by the Secretary of the Lega, Pietro 
Meneghetti, as a member of the Communist trade union delegation. An attempt to 
de-couple once again Brenta and national negotiations failed. During negotiations, 
Brenta workers participated for the first time in a two-day national (not local) strike.
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By that time, Brenta had moved further towards “new” enterprise 
organisation based on some incremental technological progress, the widespread use 
of the assembly line, decreasing recourse to domestic workers, the end of the 
traditional workers team under the leadership of “paroni”, the fragmentation of 
several production phases in repetitive tasks. Several sources, including workers’ 
and entrepreneurs’ statements, agree on the significant impact of the skilled 
workforce drain which took place in the early 1960s. Workers were certainly 
attracted to Marghera by higher wages (30 to 50%) and job security, but also by the 
refusal of fragmented and repetitive work. Several among those who left were trained 
artisans, still capable of producing a complete pair of shoes on their own but whose 
skills were becoming increasingly irrelevant (it is questionable of course to which 
extent such skills were of any use in Marghera). Luigino Rossi acknowledged that 
Riviera entrepreneurs were not able to keep their best workers: emigration to 
Marghera was also a consequence of “errors”, in particular of the tough stance in 
labour negotiations and the ensuing increasing “misunderstandings”. While recalling 
the need to compress costs, Rossi acknowledges that efforts imposed upon workers 
were “excessive”. Rossi’s firm Rossimoda itself lost some thirty workers, in line 
with losses experienced by other Brenta firms.334 Brenta was able to cope with this 
crisis because the drain was spread over six to seven years, giving time to find 
alternative workforce in the southern parts of the provinces of Padua and Venice 
(Cona, Cavarzere). Some workers had already individually sought employment in the 
Brenta in the late 1950s. Now, Brenta entrepreneurs began to look for them. Luigino 
Rossi recalls his journeys to Arzergrande, some twenty kilometres south of the 
Brenta, together with the son of the Mayor of Stra’, to meet some 500 prospective 
young workers gathered by the local Catholic priest. Other meeting of this kind took
333 Conversation with Vittorio Pampagnin on 23 May 2002.
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place. Some transport firms (Marzola, SVA) launched a regular service, with up to 
eight buses departing daily and stopping in Stra’, Fiesso and Fosso’. In the late 
1950s, some new council houses were specifically built for these commuter workers 
in Stra* (Edil-Lum district).
Commuting however continued unabated for some years (and continues 
today, on a smaller scale). COSES provides some data on commuting in those years, 
showing a significant share of Brenta residents commuting to Marghera and a 
parallel commuting from the southern parts of the Padua and Venice provinces to the 
Riviera.335
The number of trade union members in the Rivera grew over the years, but 
members remained always a minority. According to Pampagnin, members registered 
in 1964 were 453.336 In the year 2000, trade union registered members were over 
2,000, out of whom 1,200 were in CGIL, 750 CISL and a few UIL (which was the 
last to open an office in Dolo in the late 1990s).337
The comparative scarcity of workers set the tone for renewed negotiations 
which led to the local agreement signed on 28 September 1974 in Stra’ by ACRIB on 
the one side, CGIL and CISL on the other.338 This agreement marked a shift from a 
narrow approach focussed exclusively on wage- and work-related issues to a wider 
approach encompassing also the future development of the local footwear industry.
The following agreement was signed in Mestre on 23 March 1978, with 
Brenta entrepreneurs represented not just by ACRIB but also by the Industrialists 
associations of Venice and Padua. Defense of current employment levels as well as
334 Luigino Rossi, speech reported in Materali di Storia, quote., 17.
333 Donatella Calabi, Localizzazione industriale, distribuzione della residenza, movimenti pendolari 
nella provincia di Venezia, Rinnovamento Veneto, 1976-1, 91-101; Giuliano Zanon, Movimenti 
Migratori nella provincia di Venezia dal 1968 al 1970,1971, manuscript available at COSES, Venice.
336 Conversation with Vittorio Pampagnin, quote., with reference to a letter by Armando Cecchinato 
to the trade union Filtea, in Rome.
337 Fiorenza Belussi, Tacchi a spillo, quote., p. 34.
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information sharing on investments and subcontracting were included. Entrepreneurs 
accepted limited outsourcing in periods of “temporary” underemployment of their 
respective workforces.
From confrontation to co-operation
The 1981 local agreement included consultations over investments, support of 
current employment levels, control and registration of home workers, use of public 
subsidies for temporary unemployment (“cassa integrazione”), gender equality, 
safety of working places, regulation of labour incentives provided by the Veneto 
region. New forms of employer-employee bargaining were tested, focussing on 
specific questions of local interest and leaving comprehensive, long and difficult 
negotiations on general issues to negotiations at the national level.
A Joint Commission on domestic work was established in 1981. It was 
composed of three members for each side and was tasked with wages, the monitoring 
of domestic work and arbitration on labour controversies. A “Gruppo di 
Miglioramento” (“Working group for the improvement of home work”) proposed 
new types of home work incentives in 1995. New Joint Commissions were 
established in 1998 on working hours, work organisation, domestic work, 
international competition. Three additional “Gruppi di miglioramento” were 
subsequently established on working conditions, training and gender equality 
respectively, and were tasked to build upon the results of the 1995 group. A six- 
member “Footwear Council” (“Consulta Calzaturieri”) was established in 2001 with 
six members, one President and one Vice-president rotating periodically between 
representatives of entrepreneurs and workers.
338 The texts of this and the other agreements mentioned in this chapter are deposited in ACRIB’s 
archives, in Stra’; and at the CGIL office in Dolo.
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This Council is responsible for the co-ordination of the above mentioned 
groups; the relations with the Veneto region and other public authorities; data 
collection on, and monitoring of the Brenta district; the assessment of economic 
trends.
On paper at least, Brenta had moved from a typical confrontational 
entrepreneurs-workers approach, based on regular negotiation rounds conducted by 
ACRIB on one side, some trade unions on the other side, to an on-going co-operation 
process. This process takes place through permanent joint and specialised bodies 
working on pragmatic solutions on specific issues including not only “classical” 
work-related areas (wages, working hours, production bonuses, social services) but 
also the economic policies affecting the district as a whole (in particular investments 
and international competition).
A number of proposals submitted by such joint bodies have been approved 
and enforced (for instance on production bonuses). Additional indirect benefits 
probably come from the development of co-operation skills through the habit of 
working together. A common district identity has also been strengthened. Not 
surprisingly, the concept of the Riviera as an industrial district, within clear 
boundaries and encompassing eleven communes, was mentioned for the first time in 
an agreement of 1995 and has become thereafter commonplace also in most 
officially agreed documents.
The ambivalent role of (female) domestic workers
Despite increased attention by ACRIB, trade unions and public authorities 
alike, domestic workers (virtually all female workers performing the difficult tasks of 
sewing and stitching: “mistre”) continue to be in several respects the most 
disadvantaged working group in the Brenta.
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Official figures are not very reliable, not necessarily because of “informality” 
but because domestic workers are obliged to register but not to cancel their 
registration. According to ACRIB, up to one quarter of all Brenta employees (3,700) 
were domestic workers in the year 2000. Attempts by Belussi to quantify the number 
of Brenta firms which employ domestic workers fluctuate between 29 and 58%, 
probably because of double entries in the registers of both the Padua and the Venice
339provmces.
Domestic work does not seem to have changed significantly over the years. 
Fifteen interviews co-ordinated by Belussi confirm a static image, with at most 
modest changes related to the supply of raw materials (now usually delivered by 
firms to home workers) and the failure of attempts to outsource abroad sewing and 
stitching.
Still today, female domestic workers play a double role. One the one hand, 
they contribute to Brenta’s positioning in the higher market segment, through their 
artisan skills which are sometimes still passed on from mother to daughter. On the 
other hand, they also ensure that necessary additional flexibility which national 
contracts and labour regulations make less easy to obtain from factory workers.
Along with draw-backs (isolation, weak bargaining position vis-a-vis 
employers, weak trade union protection), Brenta domestic workers seem to enjoy 
some advantages. According to Belussi, their level of professional satisfaction is the 
highest among Brenta workers. Their work is less repetitive and offers the symbolic 
(but effective) incentive of usually closer relationships with entrepreneurs than those 
experienced by factory workers.
339 Ibid., p. 200-201.
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There is no lack of goodwill clauses on domestic work in agreements between 
trade unions and entrepreneurs.340 In the year 2000, about one hundred home workers 
were registered trade union members. However, none served as a member of firm 
workers’ councils. The “wage anarchy” mentioned by Belussi persists, and the 
provisions of the national law of 1973 seem to be still applied selectively.
Conclusion
The developments described in the preceding paragraphs confirm the 
inaccuracy of the common perception that “... areas of small-firms development are 
characterised by weakness of trade unions and by poorly institutionalised industrial 
relations”.341 On the contrary, Brenta has a long, vibrant history of unionism and of 
entrepreneurs-workers relations, although with peaks and troughs and often limited 
to the largest enterprises.
Trade unions and entrepreneurs are now able to share some assessments on 
past labour conflicts and on the events of the last decades, and even to elaborate a 
common historical perception which in turn strengthens the collective district 
identity. A meeting held in 2002 in an 18th century villa in Dolo played a symbolic 
role, with the participation in particular of the founder and honorary Chairman of the 
entrepreneurs’ association and the surviving founders of the first local workers* 
association of the late 1950s. Workers’ representatives paid tribute to 
entrepreneurship and Rossi recognised the “error” of too rigid positions in labour
340 Article 5 of the agreement of 28 September 1978 states the “common intention” of ACRIB and 
trade unions to work together in the implementation of the 1973 law on domestic work. The 
agreement of 23 March 1978 recalls again the “common commitment” to this implementation, 
foresees information provided by entrepreneurs to trade unions on their home workers, established an 
obligation of entrepreneurs NOT to have recourse to domestic workers during periods of temporary 
underemployment of their factory workforce, and confirms the “common intention” of all parties to 
continue the combat against “informal” work “especially outside factories”. The agreement of 12 
November 1981 introduced a new method to calculate wage increases, including for the fist time a 
specific production bonus (“integrativo salariale”). Source: ACRIB.
Carlo Trigilia, Small firm development..,, quote., p. 181.
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conflicts in the 1960s, which “contributed to the loss of thousands of workers who 
preferred to emigrate to Marghera”.342
The Brenta test case therefore is multi-faceted. It puts into perspective the 
traditional image of harmonious relationships between workers and entrepreneurs. 
Labour conflicts were indeed part of the local landscape. Pampagnin commented 
lapidarily to me: “you went (from Brenta) to Marghera to show solidarity; to learn 
how to be a militant; to learn how to organise a strike (in Brenta)”.
At the same time, Brenta* s case puts into perspective also the opposite image, 
of the birth of a cluster of industries based on the remorseless exploitation of a 
docile and abundant workforce and with ample recourse to informal work, so dear to 
some post-Fordists who see in industrial districts and flexible specialisation simply a 
slightly different way to continue the exploitation of the weakest categories of 
workers.343
The overall picture is complex, and includes in particular the fracture between 
“large” factories, with a certain presence of workers’ associations since the early 
1950s, and small firms and artisan workshops, in which exploitation and self­
exploitation were checked not by unions as such but mainly by family links and by 
informal social rules. In general, Brenta’s workers were comparatively educated and 
skilled: in the inter-war period, the training of an apprentice last for three years. 
Trade unions therefore found a comparatively favourable social environment and 
could tap a developed association network which could partially offset the dispersion 
of workers over a comparatively large territory and the small size of most factories.
This, and the reluctance of the Catholic Church to be directly or indirectly 
involved in the Brenta industrial district, explains why trade union action in the
342 Luigino Rossi, speech held in Dolo on 10 June 2000, text reported in Materiali di Storia, quot., p. 
16.
343 See review in Krishan Kumar, Le nuove teorie...,, quote., p. 81-2.
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Brenta resembles those most frequent in “red areas” of the Third Italy, in particular 
in their comparatively more frequent strikes and scarce availability to compromise on 
the one hand, and in early attempts to enlarge the scope of negotiations to areas such 
as firm organisation, training and employment on the other.
Rising unionism in Brenta was the catalyst of a phase of intense inter- 
institutional competition. As discussed above, this was prompted by the almost 
simultaneous establishment of the Lega dei Calzaturieri (the first local footwear 
workers trade union, under the aegis of the Communist-led national trade union 
CGIL) in 1958, and the launching of the entrepreneurs’ association ACRIB 
(originally little more than an entrepreneurs’ cartel to negotiate work contracts 
collectively) in 1961. Memberships of both organisations were originally limited: 
only workers of comparatively large firms joined the Lega while Acrib’s 
membership, in the beginning, included just twelve of the six hundred or so local 
entrepreneurs.
In the following years, the growth of both organisations depended on their perceived 
effectiveness, which in turn depended on the resilience shown in negotiations. In this 
respect, the development of local institutions representing employers and employees 
was originally based on tough competition, rather than on the co-operation so dear to 
the stylised model of industrial districts. Co-operation ensued only at a later stage, 
when the perceived respective interests converged to a significant extent. Even this 
new phase was therefore ushered in by contingent developments and was not directly 
determined by the common participation of entrepreneurs and workers in a 
“community of individuals and a population of individual enterprises” a la 
Becattini.344 In this respect, Brenta is far from the picture conveyed by Trigilia on the 
basis of his analysis of Bassano and Prato of the mid-1980s: an “atmosphere where
344 Andrea Colli, Networking the market..., quote., 77.
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there is little conflict” and in which "... seventy per cent of the entrepreneurs declare 
themselves to be satisfied with industrial relations, while the opinion of 
entrepreneurs on this subject on national level is clearly negative”.345
A key aspect of these developments was rather the shift towards higher 
market segments, which reduced the relevance of wages in total production costs. 
With the ensuing fewer incentives to use undeclared work, the combat against 
irregular employment ceased to be one of the key issues negotiated by entrepreneurs 
and trade unions. Attention progressively shifted towards other issues, in particular 
the defence of existing employment levels together with broader industrial policies 
including training and environment.
At first glance, this transition from a competitive to a co-operative model of 
industrial relations has now brought Brenta more in line with the Italianate model of 
industrial district. Nevertheless, a number of unresolved issues remain. Domestic 
workers in particular are still often disadvantaged even if their number decreases and 
their replacement is more and more difficult.
In this context, the current trade unions-entrepreneurs co-operation in Brenta 
district (which does not necessarily cover all issues and all firms) “... is likely to have 
a basis in sectoral coalitions of interest rather than in any more pervasive system of 
values”.346 It remains to be seen whether the current balance would enable Brenta to 
escape instability in case of major external challenges.
345 Carlo Trigilia, Small-firms development..., quote., p. 185.
346 Andrew Popp, Business Structure..., quote., p. 20-21.
TABLE XIX
Election results in the Brenta district as a whole
Years Votes MbP DC Left PCI PSI
1953 c 44062 39883 22041 17842 10296 7546
1953 s 38704 35929 20315 15614 9846 5768
1958 c 45578 42447 23990 18457 10631 7826
1958s 40674 37982 21590 16392 9264 7128
1963 c 47038 43616 23906 19710 12911 6799
1963s 42376 39074 21640 17434 11509 5925
1968 c 50454 44698 24968 19730 14679 5051
1968 s 44951 42855 22877 19978 14953 5025
1972 c 54642 47504 26705 20799 16274 4525
1972 s 48959 44802 24636 20166 15579 4587
1976 c 62146 57491 28580 28911 23107 5804
1976 s 53036 49453 25128 24325 19283 5042
1979 c 64024 57399 29766 27633 22016 5617
1979 s 54482 50651 26036 24615 19700 4915
Key
C = Elections of the Chamber of Deputies
S = Elections of the Senate
Votes = total amount of valid votes in each election
MbP = total amount of votes for massed-based political parties (Christian-Democrats, 
Communists and Socialists)
DC = votes for Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
Left = votes for left-wing parties (Communists and Socialists)
PCI = votes for Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = votes for Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di Statistica, Rome
TABLE XX
Political majorities at parliamentary elections in each Brenta Commune
Comm. 53 c 53 s 58 c 58 s 63 c 63 s 68 c 68s 72c 72s 76c 76s 79c 79s
C.lupia R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
C.longo W W W W W W W W W W W/R W W/R W/R
C.nogar R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
Dolo R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
Fiesso R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
Foss6 W W W W W W W W R W W W W W
Pianiga W W W W W W W W W W W W W W
Stra’ w W w w W w w w W w w w W w
Vigonov w W w w W w w w w w w w W w
Noventa W/R W/R W/R w W/R w W/R RAV w w w w w w
Saonara W W W w W w W w w w w w w w
Vigonza W W W w W w W w w w w w w w
Total ID w W W w W w W w w w R w w w
Key
C: elections of the Chamber of Deputies
S: elections of the Senate
R: “red”, Communist and Socialist majority
W: “white”, Christian-Democratic majority
B/R: balanced electoral results with small „white“ majority
R/B: balanced electoral results with small „red“ majority
bold: change of majority
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXI
Elections of the Chamber of Deputies, 1953
Comm. Votes Dc Pci Psi Psdi Pli Pri Msi
C.lupia 2648 870 1245 435 29 19 4 28
C.longo 4361 2455 1069 641 52 35 8 44
C.nogar 4158 1590 1629 742 53 45 11 42
Dolo 6400 2695 1836 1266 208 68 33 147
Fiesso 2234 688 719 684 32 12 4 42
Foss6 3116 1360 338 442 40 46 5 45
Pianiga 3490 2125 255 687 81 38 10 67
Stra‘ 2804 1482 545 520 75 23 10 55
Vigon. 3157 1875 508 542 59 75 8 44
Noven. 2332 1096 769 291 38 30 7 33
Saon. 3054 2060 422 354 79 40 5 32
Vigon. 6308 3745 961 942 159 45 15 125
Total ID 44062 22041 10296 7546 905 476 120 704
Mira 14691 5357 4536 3606 426 109 52 355
Venice 195350 76005 37736 39256 11104 5707 1732 11430
Prov. 415545 176743 81742 86329 20938 9236 2628 18085
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberale Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole 
Prov.= results in the Venice Province
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXII
Elections of the Senate, 1953
Comm. Votes Dc pci psi mon. Msi Psdi pli Pri
C. Lupia 2339 789 1159 296 4 26 27 15 17
C.Longo 3920 2261 1034 487 28 43 46 9
C.Nog. 3747 1475 1589 520 38 44 57 13
Dolo 5799 2550 1783 1001 73 128 176 33
Fiesso 2012 651 692 550 19 43 33 7
Fossb 2069 1273 321 349 13 41 46 13
Pianiga 3133 1995 239 536 176 66 80 15
Stra 2525 1383 549 403 53 43 65 11
Vigonovo 2817 1731 541 393 30 40 51 11
Noventa 2090 1008 676 246 30 30 59 22 5
Saonara 2684 1850 377 258 25 30 79 25 26
Vigonza 5569 3349 886 729 148 111 242 31 10
Total ID 38704 20315 9846 5768 637 645 961 93 170
Mira 13027 4945 4310 2760 125 301 356 92 92
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberale Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXin
Elections of the Chamber of Deputies, 1958
Comm. Votes Dc pci psi msi Psdi Pli pri/pr
Cam. Lupia 2687 1009 1262 280 46 51 24 4
camp.long 4391 2596 1145 498 54 51 24 4
Cam.nog. 4292 1788 1736 606 29 61 26 23
Dolo 6936 3009 2038 1203 136 296 142 39
Fiesso 2430 816 792 670 33 61 26 14
Foss6 2416 1406 357 510 42 61 23 11
Pianiga 3722 2394 317 658 76 116 50 16
Stra 2917 1552 561 534 63 100 47 25
Vigonovo 3370 2080 534 566 31 70 53 12
Noventa 2568 1211 673 513 32 52 41 17
Saonara 3192 2223 391 387 19 81 68 4
Vigonza 6657 3906 825 1401 95 197 67 13
Total ID 45578 23990 10631 7826 656 1197 591 182
Venezia 210890 80450 41332 46556 10541 14494 7740 3843
prov. 440224 190024 86904 95025 15887 26204 12003 4857
Mira 15913 5565 5608 3680 267 460 124 63
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberate Italiano (conservative)
PRI/PR= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing) allied with the 
Radical Party
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole 
Prov.= results in the Venice Province
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXIV
Elections of the Senate, 1958
Comm. Votes Dc Pci psi Psdi pli Pri msi-mon.
cam. Lupia 2391 898 1112 261 43 23 4 41
Camp.long 3913 2334 972 465 44 26 7 51
cam.nog. 3833 1586 1547 572 47 23 14 31
Dolo 6277 2787 1815 1086 257 117 42 132
Fiesso 2163 752 695 582 56 24 9 33
Foss6 2172 1266 308 469 55 25 8 38
Pianiga 3297 2162 255 599 102 45 17 83
Stra 2593 1389 477 498 93 48 24 53
Vigonovo 2997 1888 452 501 61 44 11 32
Noventa 2322 1120 576 485 57 40 8 36
Saonara 2805 1934 345 319 75 80 14 28
Vigonza 5911 3474 710 1291 201 73 113
Total ID 40674 21590 9264 7128 1091 568 158 671
Mira 14149 5013 4974 3255 380 120 58 254
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberate Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI-mon. = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right) alied with 
monarchists
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano Statistica,
Rome
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TABLE XXV
Elections of the Chamber of Deputies, 1963
Comm. Votes Dc Pci Psi pli Psdi msi pri
cam. Lupia 2672 958 1282 236 46 68 61 1
Camp.long 4363 2455 1271 428 60 61 56 1
cam.nog. 4332 1730 1960 457 30 75 34 17
Dolo 7484 3123 2481 1059 269 351 108 37
Fiesso 2659 901 1009 552 52 70 35 9
Foss6 2468 1372 512 421 37 77 27 6
Pianiga 3902 2293 564 658 63 191 51 12
Stra 2973 1489 716 460 93 126 55 5
Vigonovo 3471 1983 738 516 73 89 30 7
Noventa 2487 1322 827 431 99 94 41 9
Saonara 3347 2178 526 425 70 88 28 9
Vigonza 6880 4102 1025 1156 190 260 75 18
Total ID 47038 23906 12911 6799 1082 1550 601 131
Mira 17195 5771 6725 3438 254 589 283 37
Venezia 226736 75509 52887 47191 17724 17178 10462 1853
Prov. 461376 182118 107619 92228 23993 30857 15859 2469
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberale Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole 
Prov.= results in the Venice Province
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXVI
Elections of the Senate, 1963
Comm. Votes Dc Pci psi pH Psdi Msi Pri
cam. Lupia 2409 864 1166 214 34 67 57 7
Camp.long 3899 2221 1125 384 54 62 50 3
cam.nog. 3920 1574 1784 395 33 66 32 36
Dolo 6757 2875 2248 950 217 313 113 41
Fiesso 2353 812 892 492 52 63 35 7
Foss6 2193 1237 432 383 41 68 27 5
Pianiga 3461 2075 481 603 73 161 55 13
Stra 2641 1349 634 408 83 112 52 3
Vigonovo 3084 1798 649 452 74 74 32 5
Noventa 2579 1195 732 364 83 157 48
Saonara 2933 1915 471 335 68 103 34 7
Vigonza 6147 3725 895 945 157 328 97
Total ID 42376 21640 11509 5925 969 1574 632 84625
mira 15232 5202 5977 2983 227 534 269 40
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberale Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXVII
Elections of the Chamber of Deputies, 1968
Comm. Votes dc Pci Psu pli Psiup Msi pri sociald.
C. Lupia 2696 938 1364 130 35 129 56 3 15
C.longo 4480 2508 1413 168 37 260 37 1 17
cam.nog. 4475 1709 2151 243 41 235 28 13 20
Dolo 7731 3111 2631 879 232 549 113 38 39
Fiesso 2943 947 1193 434 70 205 29 5 16
Foss6 2632 1449 632 230 27 207 36 2 12
Pianiga 4167 2452 726 470 87 239 54 7 50
Stra 3170 1567 798 414 64 185 55 10 23
Vigonovo 3735 2034 923 375 77 179 32 4 23
Noventa 3323 1546 963 403 164 165 51 18
Saonara 3577 2281 606 325 60 230 37 30
Vigonza 7525 4426 1279 980 186 487 97 30
Total ID 50454 24968 14679 5051 1080 3070 625 161 215
Mira 18818 6136 8056 2499 263 1209 248 79 122
Venezia 237199 81553 61877 42313 17056 14788 8780 3526 2577
Province 487599 193497 123793 81222 23748 29746 14159 4513 4954
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic Party) 
PLI= Partito Liberale Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole 
Prov.= results in the Venice Province
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXVIII
Elections of the Senate, 1968
Comm. Votes Dc pci-psiup psi-psdi pli Msi-mon. pri
C. Lupia 2396 849 1297 141 45 59 5
C. longo 3964 2260 1410 194 54 43 3
Cam.nog. 4033 1591 2107 246 46 29 14
Dolo 6897 2934 2702 847 259 116 39
Fiesso 2617 892 1172 435 71 35 12
Foss6 2322 1311 675 250 40 36 10
Pianiga 3763 2309 800 479 99 62 14
Stra 2797 1476 788 391 73 57 12
Vigonovo 3341 1925 925 361 91 33 6
Noventa 2957 1356 974 402 147 61 17
Saonara 3141 1973 676 325 80 52 35
Vigonza 6723 4001 1427 954 185 116 40
Total ID 44951 22877 14953 5025 1190 699 207
Mira 16736 5697 7822 2584 306 239 88
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberate Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole 
Prov.= results in the Venice Province
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXIX
Elections of the Chamber of Deputies, 1972
Comm. Votes dc Pci Psi msi Psdi pli pri psiup
C. Lupia 2912 952 1438 143 99 62 24 12 92
C.longo 4771 2557 1559 176 67 62 28 18 208
cam.nog. 4737 1747 2314 226 44 72 19 20 199
Dolo 8239 3456 2820 764 216 237 191 134 305
Fiesso 3220 1050 1371 430 61 76 66 29 98
Foss6 2692 1101 636 577 57 66 52 9 158
Pianiga 4580 2707 856 389 96 142 87 58 191
Stra 3372 1706 885 350 93 105 77 52 73
Vigonovo 4148 2295 1036 388 82 120 52 26 107
Noventa 4069 1977 1091 301 140 164 172 90 107
Saonara 3767 2329 704 224 44 158 72 57 154
Vigonza 8135 4828 1564 557 174 433 157 67 245
total ID 54642 26705 16274 4525 1173 1697 997 572 1937
Mira 19857 6475 8689 2150 409 596 265 252 741
Venezia 240510 83254 66161 28506 15631 14983 12196 9533 6647
Prov. 509510 202079 138573 61748 24914 27760 18042 12604 15249
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunnista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic Party) 
PSIUP= Partito Socialista Italiano di Unita* Proletaria (left-wing)
PLI= Partito Liberale Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole 
Prov.= results in the Venice Province
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXX
Elections of the Senate, 1972
Comm. Votes Dc Pci psi msi psdi Pli pri
C. Lupia 2563 861 1371 151 87 60 23 10
C. Longo 4148 2283 1506 195 61 56 31 16
C.nogara 4257 1617 2209 267 46 67 29 22
Dolo 7480 3178 2756 817 211 216 196 106
Fiesso 2895 953 1270 468 50 70 64 20
Foss6 2374 1316 675 213 47 77 34 12
Pianiga 4125 2476 828 449 87 140 96 49
Stra 3062 1579 795 377 86 103 78 44
Vigonovo 3695 2055 951 430 69 107 58 25
Noventa 3660 1800 1011 341 123 148 160 77
Saonara 3365 2112 680 262 43 148 61 59
Vigonza 7335 4406 1527 617 162 397 168 58
Total ID 48959 24636 15579 4587 1072 1589 998 498
Mira 17851 5980 8238 2198 386 560 275 214
Key:
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberale Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXXI
Elections of the Chamber of Deputies, 1976
Comm. Votes Dc pci psi msi Psdi Pri Pli
C. Lupia 3290 1046 1854 223 55 54 21 9
C. Longo 5245 2542 2203 317 49 53 23 12
C. Nog. 5498 1874 3016 392 48 72 23 17
Dolo 9078 3573 3711 927 179 217 216 81
Fiesso 3761 1147 1871 485 54 62 61 18
Foss6 3099 1574 997 318 35 67 28 12
Pianiga 5229 2769 1479 538 89 139 72 53
Stra 3732 1773 1264 405 61 84 55 26
Vigonovo 4791 2456 1585 442 86 93 42 18
Noventa 4976 2309 1589 517 113 158 149 40
Saonara 4203 2445 1061 386 51 124 53 15
Vigonza 9244 5072 2477 854 164 322 120 63
Total i.d. 62146 28580 23107 5804 984 1445 863 364
Mira 22909 6641 11817 2840 317 406 316 106
Venezia 254247 85109 90294 32876 10319 9599 11724 3380
Prov. 561991 215076 195934 71835 18292 20437 16926 5493
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberate Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole 
Prov.= results in the Venice Province
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXXII
Elections of the Senate, 1976
Comm. Votes Dc pci Psi msi psdi Pri pli
C. Lupia 2760 924 1520 183 91 42 16 12
C. longo 4400 2196 1804 254 52 37 21 13
C.Nog. 4629 1640 2499 328 88 58 24 16
Dolo 7907 3201 3167 848 176 207 172 86
Fiesso 3285 1047 1593 436 89 78 50 22
Foss6 2606 1354 838 266 33 57 22 14
Pianiga 4477 2468 1211 461 86 126 44 25
Stra 3220 1589 1064 350 89 83 47 22
Vigonovo 4083 2130 1341 390 70 80 37 17
Noventa 4294 2069 1341 444 96 146 139 40
Saonara 3559 2123 878 348 38 95 43 24
Vigonza 7816 4387 2027 734 143 324 105 48
Total ID 53036 25128 19283 5042 1051 1333 720 339
Mira 19639 6001 10005 2478 277 389 261 109
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberate Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXXm
Elections of the Chamber of Deputies, 1979
Comm. Votes dc pci psi Msi Psdi Pri Pli
C. Lupia 3440 1106 1857 237 64 51 17 15
C.Longo 5516 2646 2251 289 52 60 24 22
C.Nog. 5751 1928 3078 382 52 76 27 15
Dolo 9272 3827 3520 883 170 185 186 77
Fiesso 3806 1195 1713 513 47 69 51 29
Fossb 3239 1671 966 275 45 73 20 25
Pianiga 5322 2867 1313 521 81 122 64 67
Stra 3938 1921 1227 382 59 86 48 30
Vigonovo 4899 2601 1415 440 80 96 45 24
Noventa 5094 2340 1447 520 133 186 129 63
Saonara 4292 2470 955 430 45 98 53 37
Vigonza 9455 5194 2274 745 179 349 137 114
Total ID 64024 29766 22016 5617 1007 1451 801 518
Mira 23576 6816 11439 2777 320 454 335 156
Venezia 249391 81243 79347 29727 8652 9724 10188 5785
Prov. 565557 215094 179083 66587 16564 20775 15138 9321
Key
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberate Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole 
Prov.= results in the Venice Province
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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TABLE XXXIV
Elections of the Senate, 1979
Comm. Votes Dc pci Psi msi Psdi Pri pli
C. Lupia 2897 986 1550 193 57 51 18 17
C.Longo 4579 2297 1870 254 40 49 20 15
C.Nog. 4831 1707 2609 322 42 75 25 14
Dolo 8081 3384 3144 810 145 204 182 80
Fiesso 3331 1070 1559 468 39 62 46 35
Foss6 2710 1430 855 241 30 68 18 19
Pianiga 4523 2527 1555 452 77 120 60 52
Stra 3355 1673 1089 335 39 80 47 38
Vigonovo 4160 2234 1270 398 62 88 38 23
Noventa 4391 2075 1313 450 107 172 110 66
Saonara 3630 2138 860 361 39 93 47 37
Vigonza 7994 4515 2026 631 149 335 140 95
Total ID 54482 26036 19700 4915 826 1397 751 491
Mira 20232 6159 10007 2493 270 472 286 156
Key:
Votes = total amount of valid votes
DC = Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)
PCI = Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI = Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSDI= Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italian Socialist Democratic 
Party)
PLI= Partito Liberale Italiano (conservative)
PRI= Partito Repubblicano Italiano (moderate left-wing)
MSI = Movimento Sociale Italiano (extreme Right)
Comm. = Communes
Total ID = results in the Brenta industrial district as a whole
Source: personal elaboration of data traced in the archives of ISTAT-Istituto Italiano di
Statistica, Rome
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CHAPTER IV
Transmission of knowledge and institutional co-operation: the Brenta
Training Centre
Introduction
In the preceding chapters, I have already mentioned the Brenta Training 
Centre (the “School”) on a number of occasions. Although established in 1923 and 
often considered as the best local example of institutionalised co-operation, the 
nature and intensity of its linkages with the local footwear system have changed 
frequently over the years. Originally a modest all-purpose Sunday school, the Centre 
devoted increasing attention to the footwear industry, was then completely absorbed 
into the system of institutionalised self-help structures of the Brenta district, and has 
finally acquired a degree of autonomy which enables it to reach out from Brenta 
proper. During my last visit to the Centre (October 2004), Director Mauro Tescaro 
underlined to me the increasing number of students coming from outside Brenta, 
including from competing footwear districts, and the transfer of the management of 
the Centre from a consortium of local firms to a newly established “Footwear 
Polytechnic”. On the same day, I visited a group a students attending a first year 
class, and saw for myself that that ten out of eighteen came from outside Brenta.
The following analysis is different from the previous chapter, in which I have 
discussed the “double triangle” of the main Brenta actors (entrepreneurs, workers 
and public authorities) and their main formal organisations (entrepreneurs’ self-help 
institution, trade unions and mass-based political parties). This chapter discusses 
training and technical education in Brenta as possible areas of individual or joint 
action by all the above mentioned actors. In this context, formal institutions like the 
Brenta Training Centre, rather than playing an active role in the shaping of local 
policies, tend to be used by them in the pursuit of some of their respective interests.
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Consequently, while the preceding chapter has analysed action by single 
collective actors on a wide range of issues of their direct and immediate interest, this 
chapter discusses their inter-action on a specific, medium-term issue which they tend 
to see at least as partly someone else‘s responsibility.
Although the history of the School goes back to 1923, secondary sources are 
scarce. Giorgio Gottardi recalls the “over fifty-year-long existence of the footwear 
School O.T. Fava” and its role in fostering local know-how in design. He also recalls 
that already in the late 1970s some students came from other areas of Veneto .347 
Marco Bonzio recalls some financial contributions by ACRIB.348 ACRIB’s study is 
quite detailed above all for the inter-war period.349 Vittorio Pampagnin provides an 
account of the early years of the School and an assessment of apprenticeship and on- 
the-job-training.350 The most comprehensive account is provided by Michela Vettore 
in her graduation thesis.351
Brenta* s Training Centre played a multi-faceted role, at times concrete, at 
times symbolic, as one possible way to transfer and duplicate knowledge, and 
therefore maintain and improve local factor conditions; as a tool to strengthen the 
local identity; as a marketing strategy to promote Brenta’s reputation; and also as a 
pawn in the complex interaction and bargain among the main actors in the district.
The School has now been in existence for over eighty years (under various 
denominations), which makes it the oldest local formal footwear-related self-help 
institution. No wonder that this comparatively long history has taken up some
347 Giorgio Gottardi, II settore calzaturiero nell'area del Brenta, Bologna 1984, p. 57; 36.
348 Marco Bonzio, Quale politica industriale per il calzaturiero del Brenta?, I distretti industriali in 
provincia di Venezia: problematiche a confronto, Documento 18 del Consorzio per lo sviluppo 
economico e sociale della Provincia di Venezia-COSES, dicembre 1995, p. 5-18.
349 Giovanni Luis Fontana, La spirale cognitiva: la Scuola "Ottorino Tombolan Fava" e le origini 
nella specializzazione calzaturiera, in Giovanni Luigi Fontana, Giorgio Franceschetti and Giorgio 
Roverato (eds.), 100 anni..., quote., p. 177-86; Giovanni Luigi Fontana and Michela Vettore, Da 
allievi a maestri: esperienze e mestieri nella Scuola Modellisti di Stra \  ibid., p. 399-411.
350 Vittorio Pampagnin, La Riviera...,, quote..
351 Michela Vettore, Formazione e innovazione..., quote...
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symbolic value, to the point that the School is often mentioned, in some celebratory 
literature, as one of the oldest (if not the oldest) of its type in Italy (if not in Europe). 
Nevertheless, the local actors’ attitude vis-k-vis the School has been ambivalent, with 
little or no support in particular from individual entrepreneurs (with some 
exceptions) but decisive intervention by the entrepreneurs association in its most 
serious crisis; lack of interest by the Catholic Church but also some financial and 
political support by communal governments; sporadic tensions with the regional 
authorities, but also increased attention by trade unions, at least since the late 1970s. 
Brenta actors’ ambivalent attitude confirms both their reluctance to be involved in 
an area of which “ someone else” should take care, and their awareness of the role 
played by transfer and promotion of knowledge.
Knowledge transmission and local competitive advantages
Contradictions such as those experienced by Brenta are often mentioned in 
the specialised literature. The relevance of education and training is in itself seldom 
questioned.
As Porter notes, “general statements on the importance of training and 
education in economic development are quite common, as are statements about the 
impact of transmissions of skills in the specific socio-economic environment of 
districts”. Difficulties arise, however, with the implementation of this principle. 
On the one hand, most firms are aware that training and technical education require a 
long-term perspective and that the required investment usually bear fruit at best after 
some years.
352 education and training are decisive in national competitive advantage. ...In every nations, those 
industries that were the most competitive were often those where specialised investment in education 
and training had been unusually great. Education and training constitute perhaps the single greatest 
long-term leverage point available to all levels of government in upgrading industry. At the same time 
the general education system is insufficient to ensure national advantage. As important is setting
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Education and training are in fact almost by definition medium- and long­
term investments and need continuous perception of their usefulness by the 
entrepreneurs (and other actors) who support them. Consequently, it is an important 
task of associations to convince members that participation in such initiatives is 
worthwhile for their enterprises.353 But again, considering that returns on investments 
in education are usually apparent only in the long run, support for educational and 
vocational training is to be found only in relatively sophisticated economic 
environments.354
Technical education and vocational training, very much as education in 
general, is almost by definition a joint enterprise, in which co-operation by a number
355of actors is often indispensable, in particular between private and public sectors. 
Langlois and Robertson note that “... most nations ... have systems of schooling that 
turn out potential workers with an assortment of skills of various grades. Employers 
must then provide further training and education to meet firm specific needs”. This 
in turn can take place in a number of ways.
policies that link the educational system to industry and encourages industry's own efforts at training”: 
Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage..., quote., London 2000, p. 628.
353 R. Hayter, The Dynamics o f Industrial Location, Chichester and New York 1997, p. 332.
354 The importance of training becomes evident “... with the growing complexity of production. As a 
result, the transitional “on-the-job” method ... is less and less efficient. This is because part of this 
know-how has to be regularly overhauled if not re-invented. Reskilling is increasingly necessary as 
regards workforce, at least for technicians and key personnel”: Pierre-Andre’ Julien, The role o f local 
institutions in the development o f industrial districts: the Canadian experience, in F. Pyke- 
W.Sengenberger (eds.), Industrial Districts and local economic regeneration, ILO-Geneva, 1992, p. 
197-213.
355 Chandler highlights education as one component of large-scale industrialisation in the USA, the 
United Kingdom and Germany, and underlines the close links between educational structures and 
further development. However, he has little interest in vocational or professional training and 
mentions it in passing only when dealing with the “superior” academic education: Alfred D. Chandler, 
Jr., Scale and Scope-The dynamics o f Industrial Capitalism, Cambridge-Massachusetts and London, 
1990, p. 82-83; 292-293; 425-426.
356 Richard N. Langlois and Paul L. Robertson, Firms, markets..., quote., p. 103.
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Within their limited possibilities, some Brenta actors explored some of these 
possible lines of action, including contacts with public education institutes (for 
instance in Padua).357
But the above mentioned “free-rider” problem remains: returns on 
investments in training and research can not be kept wholly proprietary, since 
employees leave and technology is copied (especially in a labour-intensive industrial 
district like Brenta, where turn-over is high and technology was not a significant 
barrier to entry).358
The definition of the respective role of firms and employers on the one hand, 
of governments and public authorities on the other however has been quite often 
solved pragmatically and with success in Italy. “The real uniqueness of Italy... is the 
out-of-school learning process in particular industries ... highly specialised 
knowledge and skills are passed within families and from generation to generation... 
Geographical concentration (also) speeds the accumulation and diffusion of 
knowledge. In some fields, such as jewellery, there are long formal apprenticeship 
programmes”.359
This means however also that formal training is less developed than in other 
countries. Italy performs well where informal on-the-job training is suitable, and less 
so where advanced formal training is necessary. However, footwear training is 
now provided by a number of Italian footwear districts, which offer part-time
357 The only university institution in Brenta however specialises in tourism. CISET (Centro 
Intemazionale di Studi e ricerche sulTEconomia Turistica), located in Mira, was established in 1991 
by Venice University, the Italian Touring Club and the Venetian regional government. It conducts 
research on tourism and holds a post-graduate course in Tourism management. The Chancellor of 
Venice University serves as its Chairman.
358 M.E.Porter, The competitive..., quote., p. 593.
359 Ibid., p. 437.
360 Nevetheless, Porter notes that the role of Italian entrepreneurs associations in promoting training 
centres as being much broader than in most countries. He makes ample references to the strengths and
237
teaching in particular for students already active in the footwear sector. Most of these 
training centres were established at a comparatively late stage, from the 1980s, often 
in co-operation with local authorities, offer part-time teaching and charge annual fees 
in the region of 5,000 to 7,000 Euro.361
The most fertile environment for training is provided by geographically 
clustered firms, since “... co-operation involving joint learning, technology transfer 
and the development of new business requires face-to-face contacts and levels of 
trust that are facilitated by geographical proximity” (emphasis added).362 In this 
context, the development and transmission of skills from one generation to the next 
is at the very heart of districts’ competitive advantages.
The spontaneous, sometimes even unconscious absorption of skills from the 
environment is a key component of the industrial district model. However, it depends 
also on the degree of transmissibility of specific skills, some of which are less easy to 
communicate than others.363 In particular, “the idiosyncratically synergistic 
resources that bind organisations together are, in fact, most frequently forms of 
knowledge that are difficult both to acquire and to communicate to others. This 
knowledge is often expressed in the form of the individual and collective behaviour
weaknesses of the Italian educational system, but no specific references to the vocational and 
professional training system: ibid., p. 437-9.
61 Some examples follow. A “Marangoni Institute” in Lombardy was established in 1935 and offers 
design courses for some ten people. A “Scuola Regionale per Calzaturieri” in Lombardy was 
established in 1977. A “Corso di formazione professionale per modellista tecnico calzaturiero” is 
organised since 1984 near Lucca, and offers a general vocational course (450 hours) and specialisation 
courses for shoe disegners (60 hours), CAM-CAD (40 hours) and skin and hide experts (80 hours) for 
some ten students respectively. The Centro di Formazione professionale Santa Croce sull’Amo (CFP), 
near Pisa, was established by the Province of Pisa in the mid-1980s to support the ailing local leather 
and shoe industral distirct. From 2001, about twenty courses are offered. Another school in Tuscany, 
SARTECO, was established in Empoli in 1963. A “Scuola Regionale di formazione professionale per 
calazaturieri” was established in the Marches in the early 1970s. See 
www.leatherfashionandmore.com/training/ceseca.it and www. leatherfashionandmore.
com/training/cfpit.asp. A university First Degree in logistical and managerial engineering, with 
emphasis on footwear, has been launched by the Castellanza University (Libero Istituto Universitario 
Cattaneo-LIUC), in Lombardy. A similar course has been envisaged by Ancona University. A co­
operation between the Brenta Footwear Polytechnic and the faculty of Enginering of Padua University 
is underway since the late 1990s: Michela Vettore, Formazione e Innovazione..., quote., p. 70-1.
362 R. Hayter, The Dynamics..., quote., p. 333.
363 Richard Langlois and Paul L. Robertson, Firms, markets..., quote., p. 14.
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of members of the organisation”.364 Habits and routines acquired through the years 
produce a repertoire that is “superadditive, in that (it) can accomplish more than the 
sum of the skills of the individuals in the organisation.” Even when articulation or 
transfer of the repertoire to others is plausible, it still requires a relatively high 
investment on the part of those willing and able to acquire them.
The literature provides a number of case studies which are directly relevant to 
this thesis. Thomas Baker comments the case of some textile weavers who attended a 
design school in Schio (in the Veneto region) and were able to draw from that 
experience in order to start a small firm in their own town in Friuli, which was later 
to become the incubator for a local system of enterprises. He concludes that even 
small training facilities can have on a semi-rural area.
Investments in education in already established labour-intensive sectors can 
also be productive, provided that firms inertia is overcome. Higher-than-expected 
returns were shown for instance in the successful revitalisation of some industrial 
districts in Pennsylvania started in the late 1970s and described by Charles Sabel. It 
took place through a government-sponsored process of growing co-operation in the 
provision of services to industries, including vocational training and education. 
Sabel identifies three phases in the process in which educators interacted with 
bankers, businessmen, trade unionists, local government officials, all leading to the 
conclusion that in general the enterprises taking part in the initiative had 
overestimated the costs and underestimates the benefits of co-operation.367
364 Ibid., p. 13. They build upon Nelson and Winter’s concept of routines at the basis of their 
evolutionary theory of industrial structure and economic growth: R.R. Nelson and S.G. Winter, An 
evolutionary Theory o f Economic Change, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.
365 R.Langlois-P.L.Robertson, Firms markets..., quote., p. 16.
366 Thomas Baker, First movers..., quote., 621-75.
367 Charles F. Sabel, Studied trust: Building new forms o f co-operation in a volatile economy, in 
Industrial districts and local economic regeneration..., quote., p. 239.
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Joint initiatives particularly in the field of education tend to be more common 
in regions where the “civic capital” is high. Emilia-Romagna (the most “civic” of the 
Italian regions considered by Putnam) shows for instance a wealth of initiatives 
launched already in the 19th century, which helped the creation of a local workforce 
versed in the sectors covered by its 20th century industrial districts (in particular 
mechanical engineering). This helps to explain why Emilia-Romagna districts tend to 
be technologically more advanced and innovative than Venetian ones, even in 
apparently mature and labour-intensive sectors like ceramic tiles.
A similar story in told by Hubert Schmitz with regard to the German Land of 
Baden-Wiirttenberg. The local close co-operation with industry is said to be perhaps 
closer than in the rest of Germany, building upon some initiatives in the field of 
technical advice and information going back to the middle of the 20th century. The 
regional organisation for manufacturing and trade established in 1848 under the 
leadership of Ferdinand Steinbeis in particular deserves a mention.
At times, a decisive role in the fortunes of local training centres is played by 
wider specific social and economic developments. In turn, training initiatives can 
produce results reaching out their original environment (as occurred precisely in 
Brenta). A relevant example is provided by two industrial districts in West Jutland 
analysed by Kristensen.370 Both developed out of small railway towns of fewer than 
5,000 people: knitting and garment in Heming-Ikast and fomiture in Saling.371 Both 
districts owe much of their development to the existence of a national organisation of 
craft educational institutions linking the small railway towns into a horizontally very
368 Vittorio Capecchi, A history o f flexible specialisation and industrial districts in Emilia-Romagna, 
in F.Pyke, G. Becattini, W.Sengenberger (eds.), Industrial districts and inter-firm co-operation in 
Italy..., quote., p. 20-36, describes a number of initiatives undertaken in Emilia at the end of the 19th 
the begining of the 20th century.
369 Hubert Schmitz, Industrial Districts: Model and reality in Baden-Wurttenberg, Germany, ibid., p. 
101.
370 Peer Hull Kristensen, Industrial Districts in West Jutland, Denmark, ibid., p. 123-173.
371 Ibid., p. 127.
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mobile labour market for skilled workers and potential entrepreneurs. A significant 
role was played by the Danish co-operative movement established in the 1880’s and
372by a later movement promoted by craftsmen between 1870 and 1900. In turn, the 
local concentrations of skills and variety of craftsmen and their apprentices promoted 
by such movements provides a basis for a strong, flexible and heterogeneous
373industrial structure.
Kristensen’s analysis also points to a paradox typical of some industrial 
districts, where higher standards of education brought about by economic success, far 
from stimulating further economic growth result in young searching for other, more 
socially and economically rewarding, types of employment.374 This is typical of the 
Riviera and translates today into some real problems in finding adequately capable 
workforce. This is less the case in other areas, for instance in Baden-Wiirttemberg 
where the social recognition which goes with employment in the district remains 
high.375 Another example is the Birmingham School of Jewellers and Silversmiths, 
established in 1890 as a component of the local entrepreneurs’ promotion of a system 
of governance that could assure the industry’s reputation and shed its “Brummagen” 
label.376 The School, with the “best specimen of art metal work that could be got
372 ibid., p. 136-139.
373 In West Jutland, “small railway towns, which formerly functioned as service centres for the 
neighbouring agricultural areas, have served as seedbeds for industrial entrepreneurial activity during 
periods of agricultural crisis during the century. This spatial organisation, together with the existence 
o f national institutions like Denmark's apprenticeship and technical schools, partly explain why, and 
how, a peripheral region like West Jutland has been able, endogenously, to create industrial 
development” (emphasis added): ibid., p. 126.
374 “Improved welfare and better education, due to the expansion of the footwear sectors (in the areas), 
result in an increasing tendency for young people, better educated than their parents, to abandon the 
sector if they can find alternative, mainly non-manual jobs. The resulting interruption of the 
accumulation and transmission of skills from parents to children, from one generation to the next, 
could in the future undermine the collective learning affect which has been so important in 
determining the competitiveness of the district”: ibid., p. 345.
375 Probably because “... in its industry the separation of “head” and “hand” has rarely gone as far as in 
typically Ford mass production. This is clearest in the skill-intensive machine tool industry”: Hubert 
Schmitz, Industrial Districts: Model and reality in Baden-Wiirttenberg..., quote., p. 112. Related 
training is shaped on this principle: ibid., p. 110.
376 “ The School had no equivalent in the country, and its promotion of technical and artistic standards 
ensured the steady supply of skilled workers needed by the trade”: Francesca Carnevali, Golden 
Opportunities..., quote., 276.
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together”, was one of the results of the biggest ever meeting held in connection with 
Birmingham jewellery trade, held on 3rd August 1887.377
The above mentioned cases confirm the relevance of training and technical 
education in several phases in industrial districts development, certainly including 
the “traditional” transmission, duplication and enhancement of knowledge (Emilia), 
but in specific cases also influencing their birth and location (Udine, Saling). Precise 
assessment of district-based, formal and collective action in this field remains 
however difficult. In this context, both accumulation of past experiences (Baden- 
Wuerttemberg) and innovative action by interested actors (Pennsylvania, Heming- 
Ikast) seem to be viable options. The history of Brenta’s Training Centre, discussed 
in the following paragraphs, confirms this multi-faceted picture.
The Brenta Training Centre: a multi-faceted role
Resilience and flexibility are specific characteristics of the School. Changes in 
syllabi, the duration of courses and the teaching methods reflected the evolutions of 
the local environment. The following analysis will focus on both historical continuity 
and relations with the local industry. Throughout its existence, the School was more 
an effect of the local industrialisation than one pre-condition of economic growth. 
Nevertheless, it had a positive impact on a number of issues, including indirect 
benefits in terms of a reduction of transaction costs through enhanced cultural levels 
of workers, the fostering of local co-operation and the enhancement of Brenta’s 
reputation. The School was usually cost-effective for ist sponsors, since most costs 
were met by students themselves and its equipment and facilites remained basic over 
several decades. The School’s history can be divided into three main periods:
377 Francesca Camevali, Malefactors and Honourable Men..., quote., p. 197-8.
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• From its foundation in 1923 until the end of the Second World War, it 
experienced a relatively rapid development and an even higher growth of footwear- 
related activities;
• From 1945 to 1975, it completed its specialisation in footwear, but also 
underwent a severe crisis which threatened its very survival;
• Since 1975, it has further specialised, in particular in shoe design, but has 
also endeavoured to provide some education in related subjects such as marketing 
and sociology. The increasing number of students from outside the district has been 
mirrored by a growing independence of the School of its purely local environment.
The history of the School should also be seen in conjunction with 
apprenticeship and on-the-job-leaming, which had a long tradition in the Riviera and 
was centred on the distinction, already recalled in previous chapters, between 
“paron” (master) and “garzoni” (apprentices).378 Each master had usually not more 
than two apprentices: more would have been disruptive of the existing division of 
labour, most of which was performed manually and therefore was often repetitive 
and unqualified. Some masters could exceptionally have more than two apprentices, 
but only if some of the later were “quasi finiti” (almost accomplished), i.e. able to 
perform virtually all the tasks usually carried out by the master himself.
Apprentices used to begin working immediately after completing the primary 
school, i.e. aged between ten and eleven years, but quite often even before. A sort of 
code of conduct regulated the division of labour of the approximately one hundred 
distinct phases involved in the production of a single pair of shoes. Obviously,
378 Ibid., p. 98.
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apprentices took care of the easiest, most painful and also most boring activities, 
while masters were responsible of the most complex phases.379
The unequal relationship between masters and apprentices took place on 
another equally central element of shoe-making: the desk, the so-called “bancheto” 
(literally “small desk”), with short legs so to enable workers to pick up quickly their 
working instruments from the ground. Theoretically up to four workers could find 
place on a “bancheto”, in practice not more than two. The number of hours spent on 
a desk depended on the demand for footwear and therefore varied widely. Especially 
at the end of summer and at the end of winter, work pressure diminished; it is 
estimated that every year each master had three to four months of slack, with work 
being reduced to a minimum. This had to be made up for during times of increased 
demand, were working hours could be exceedingly long.
The Centre between 1923 and 1945: first steps of a modest Sunday school
The centre was established in Stra’ in 1923 as a modest, all-purpose arts and 
crafts Sunday school, not specialised in footwear-related teaching. The initiative was 
taken by the local newly-established Veterans’ Association, and particularly by its 
President, Antonio Calzavara, who earned decorations for the campaigns against 
Turkey (1911-1912) and in the First World War. The School was dedicated to the 
memory of Captain Ottorino Tombolan Fava, who died in action in 1918. 
Appropriately, its primary objective was to create a design training centre 
specifically for children and orphans of veterans. Fortunato Voltan, son of Giovanni 
Luigi, is credited with some part in launching the initiative, and so too are the 
Commune of Stra’ and other neighbouring communes.380 However, the School
379 For a list of operations performed by masters and apprentices respectively see ibid., p. 92-96.
38° y  pampagnin^ i#  Riviera..., quote., p. 129.
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remained initially a child of the Veteran Association, and was chaired by its 
President.
Courses began on the first Sunday of January 1923. 32 students registered in 
the first year and 40 in the second. The teaching schedule covered twenty-five 
Sundays. A relatively broad range of options were offered, such as cabinet-making, 
carving, decorating, building, cement-laying, tailoring, carpeting, but also shoe- 
making. Improvement in the overall performance of the school was achieved quite 
early, with registrations increasing to 56 students. Gustavo Triffi, the first part-time 
Director, started some regular co-operation with the Professional School “Pietro 
Selvatico” of Padua (of which he was a teacher) and obtained some limited financial 
support from both local and national authorities.381
In 1928 the School moved to Villa Pisani in Stra’, a 18th century, patrician 
palace decorated by Giambattista Tiepolo, which is by far the largest and most 
impressive country residence of the area. The School could also afford to be 
selective, with a relatively high percentage of attendees not passing the final 
examinations. For instance, there were 34 successes and 26 failures recorded in 
1928-29. Some public recognition was achieved through the linkage of the syllabi 
taught in the School with the new national plan for professional education. On this 
basis, Gustavo Griffi suggested to replace Sunday classes with evening classes 
during working days, but to no avail.
381 The Italian government offered 1,000 lire, approximately 600 € at 2004 value (but twice as much 
three years later). 650 lire were offered by the communes of Vigonovo and Noventa respectively, 200 
by Dolo, 200 by the Chamber of Commerce of Venice and 100 by “Cassa di Risparmio” of Venice: in 
total 3,150 Lire (approximately 1,800 € at 2004 value).
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In 1931 Gustavo Triffl was replaced by Enrico Giulio Trois, who later was to 
become the living symbol of the small training centre and remained in this position 
until his death after the Second World War. Trois focussed strictly on work-related 
subjects. His annual reports are an important source of information on this early 
stage of the School’s history. Far from being detached, aseptic descriptions, they 
reflect the enthusiasm and personal commitment of a man who devoted his energy 
and time to a beloved project.
The economic crisis of the early 1930s reduced the number of enrolments 
significantly. Quite a few of Trois’ initiatives had to be postponed, in particular 
additional programmes for 1933. Other plans, including a design course for women, 
could not be implemented. Inversely, the period of economic recovery following the 
depression of the early 1930s translated into a sharp increase in the number of 
enrolments.
A further attempt to launch evening classes ensued, but again to no avail. 
However, syllabi were modified following the adoption of the Boroni system and the 
ensuing additional attention to the study of geometrical forms. The share of 
footwear-related syllabi in the teaching programs increased steadily. In 1936/7, 30 
out of 90 students chose footwear-related courses. In 1938/39, “tagliatori” (leather 
cutters), “montatori” (assemblers) and shoe-making courses were offered as 
additional evening classes.
In the initial war years there was even an increase in the overall number of 
students, who peaked at 150 in 1941. However, while most teachers were called to 
arms, the teaching material painfully acquired throughout the years, including some 
machine tools, was directed to meet other needs. The School eventually discontinued 
its courses in the last period of the war.
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The Centre and the Brenta take-off: peaks and troughs
The School’s history in the first years after 1945 is above all a history of 
reconstruction, in the context of the continuity between the pre-war and the post-war 
Brenta footwear industry recalled in previous chapters. On 22 December 1946, the 
Mayor of Stra’ confirmed that the Veterans’ Association intended to re-open what 
was still an all-purpose Sunday school. This happened in the early months of 1947. 
154 students registered. A refresher course was established to aid those who already 
attended the School before or during the war. The School began as a purely private 
initiative, but as early as 1947, it acquired official recognition through compulsory 
registration with the list of “recognised professional schools” held by Italian public 
authorities. In 1948, the School returned to Villa Pisani in Stra’. Two years later 
Giulio Trois, who had been at its helm for nearly two decades before the war, was 
once again appointed Director. Thus, only five years after the end of the war, the 
School recovered the position enjoyed in the interwar years, although furniture and 
teaching materials remained substandard for years to come.
Further development began shortly afterwards, with the appointment as 
consultant of an architect, Antonio Zandarin, whom we have already mentioned in 
his capacity of organiser and promoter of the first footwear Trade Fairs in the area. 
He simplified the organisation of the School and placed more and more emphasis on 
footwear-related teaching. Only two departments survived, one specialising in 
footwear and the other regrouping all the remaining professional courses. In 1958 all 
other courses were discontinued and enrolments peaked at 312 students.
Both the success of the School and Brenta take-off encouraged additional 
directly footwear-related initiatives in the field of vocational training. A new, well- 
equipped training centre was opened by INAPLI of Venice (a public institution) at
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the beginning of the 1960s. Conceived literally as a small factory and funded by the 
public purse, its facilities were by far superior to those of the School. However, 
contrary to most expectations, the new centre failed to assert itself as an outlet for 
young prospective employees in the footwear sector: it never really came to be seen 
as a real alternative and had to be discontinued a few years later. In those years, the 
new “Scuola media inferiore” (“unified middle school”, a three-year compulsory 
school for all boys and girls aged eleven to fourteen) was opened also in Stra’. The 
School ceased to be the only local institution offering education after primary level.
In 1966, enrolments dwindled to a few dozens. The School could only be 
salvaged by the intervention of the newly-established entrepreneurs’ association 
(ACRIB), which obtained financial and logistical support from the Istituto Veneto 
per il Lavoro (Venetian Institute for Labour). As a quid pro quo, however, the 
Institute imposed stringent conditions to bring it into line with its own teaching 
syllabi. The increase in the number of weekly hours to eight as well as the decision to 
hold regular lessons on Saturdays, eventually freed the School from its previous 
Sunday routine but made attendance more difficult for students (who were all already 
employed).
ACRIB was instrumental in finding temporary solutions. However, it could 
not provide a definitive solution on its own. In 1973, a mere 29 students registered: 
they were fewer than in the year of its foundation.
Furthermore, there is some anecdotal evidence of petty rivalries between 
social actors who were expected to co-operate. In particular, a long dispute between 
the School and the Archaeological Office of Venice concerning the use of Villa 
Pisani for the School’s activities was perceived as caused by a bureaucratic if not
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overtly hostile attitude of distant public authorities, unwilling and incapable to 
provide any assistance in the local economic development.
Another example was the above mentioned new training centre opened by 
INAPLI of Venice in the early Sixties, where a small factory was funded by the 
Ministry of Labour. However, courses offered by the new institution were 
discontinued only after a few years due to insufficient attendance. This outcome was 
not just the result of the new institution’s incapability of competing successfully with 
the old School (which in the same period also experienced a severe decreasein the 
number of students). Instead, it was due to a real clash of “models”. The newly 
established school appeared to be detached from the “real life” of the area and did 
not provide those close contacts and flow of information to and from the firms, 
which were the most appealing feature for those who enrolled. A negative prejudice 
against the newly-established training centre can probably be traced down to the 
existing poor record of relations with both central and local public authorities, which 
in turn deteriorated even further because of the failure of this initiative at the eve of 
the economic crises of the early 1970s.
The Centre between further specialisation and new challenges
The revitalisation of the School started in the early 1970s. Syllabi were 
improved. The first official textbooks were adopted in 1975. Project-design was 
introduced in 1985.
In the years between 1973 and 1981, enrolments were 34, 84, 79, 114, 142, 
135,140 and 147 respectively.383
382 The dispute on the School’s premises was long. The Venice Archaeological Office vented repeated 
concerns about the Villa’s security and provided a limited numbers of rooms, half of which were 
considered inadequate for teaching. The school had to move temporarily to other premises in 1953 but 
returned to Villa Pisani on the basis of an “informal agreement” which lasted until 1984.
383 Michela Vettore, Formazione e innovazione..., quote., p. 121.
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Discussions on its future however continued within ACRIB. A possible role 
of the School was mentioned in an internal report of the entrepreneurs’ association of 
September 1977. The report focussed on competition from low-wages countries and 
the growing impossibility to respond by simply reducing costs. Training was seen as 
an integral part of a three-pronged strategy.384
A turning point was the agreement signed on 23 March 1978 by 
entrepreneurs and trade unions on the enhancement of "... the existing vocational an 
professional training facilities by means of jointly-agreed schemes, in co-operation 
with the Venetian regional government and with the regional schemes of professional 
training”.
The role of collective action in the field of footwear-related education and 
training had by then been widely recognised in Brenta. A public speech delivered by 
the Provincial Labour Counsellor of the Province of Venice, Flavio Boscolo, sheds 
some light on the attitude of public authorities.385 He defined education as one of the 
keys to prosperity in the area and as one of the priorities to be pursued by local 
authorities and entrepreneurs alike.386 He stressed the need for better professional 
training for prospective employees and for specialisation courses for employees, also 
through a “revitalisation” of apprenticeship. In this context, also the division of 
labour would have been reconsidered, in order to limit repetitive, easy tasks 
inevitably leading to the loss of professional skills and to personal dissatisfaction and 
frustration. He criticised the exclusion of footwear-related training from the 
programmes financed by the Christian-Democratic regional government. He
384 the other elements being action by the newly-established Consorzio Maestri Calzaturieri and 
Consortium and the promotion of the image of Brenta as a whole.
385 The speech was delivered at a seminar on “The Footwear Industry in the Brenta area in the 1980s”, 
held at Dolo on 23 February 1980. The manuscript is available at ACRIB’s archives. Flavio Boscolo, 
a Communist, co-operated closely with ACRIB and enjoyed great respect among Brenta’s 
entrepreneurs.
386 together with consortia to be established for the purchase of row materials, R&D and easier access 
to credit.
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commended the growing network of Brenta self-help organisations and promised 
some financial support to further co-operation among independent firms.
In 1980, the Conference Europeenne de la Chaussure (CEC) established a 
Committee, led by ACRIB*S Chairman Luigino Rossi, to explore a possible common 
European training model. The Committee visited a number of training centres in 
France (Paris and Nantes), the United Kingdom the Netherlands and Western 
Germany, and also Stra*. As far as the latter was concerned, the final assessment of 
the Committee highlighted precisely the interaction among local actors including 
local firms and also entrepreneurs’ organisations, trade unions and public authorities.
This growing attention to training issues led to the implementation of the 
rather vague goodwill clauses of the 1978 agreement and to the upgrading of the 
School to a “Centre for Professional Training”. On 30th April 1980, entrepreneurs, 
trade unions and local authorities discussed joint financial support for the future 
Centre and even the possibility that trainees be directly hired by firms without any 
additional apprenticeship.387
The agreement of 19th January 1981 recalls in particular the need for a “... 
strict co-ordination between theoretical teaching and practical training”.388
The final agreement in this field was signed on 12th November 1981.389 Once 
again, “... the contracting parts agreed on the relevance of the professional training 
scheme agreed upon on 23 April 1980 and undertook to implement it by means of a 
co-operation with the local governments of the area (even if an increase in the 
number of employees is not for the time being foreseeable) and, in this context, the 
further development of the Scuola Tombolan Fava, the role of which is
387 Source: ACRIB’s archives.
388 Source: ACRIB’s archives.
389 Source: ACRIB’s archives. ACRIB signed on behalf of entrepreneurs.
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acknowledged”. The role of the School as a reputation booster was also explicitly 
recognised.390
The increased attention to training issues by Brenta and Veneto collective 
actors, while paving the way for the above mentioned agreements, did not lead 
immediately to significant improvements. In the early 1980s, enrolments stagnated 
just under the threshold of 150 students, but fell to under 120 in 1984/85. The School 
was even forced to leave Villa Pisani for good in 1984. It moved to Villa Loredan, 
another 18th century building in Stra’ located in front of Villa Pisani, but on the other 
bank of the river.
A collective response however was undertook timely. One year after this 
worrying signal, the management of the School was transferred to the new Centro 
Veneto Calzaturiero (Venetian Footwear Centre), established in 1986 and discussed 
in the previous chapter. The School was therefore in a position to profit of some 
synergies with the small R&D department of the Centre. At the same time, a special 
course was launched with the support of the European Social Fund and of a special 
rotating fund of the Italian Ministry of Labour. Public contributions were possible 
because Stra* had been listed among the EC “economically declining areas”. The 
course was supported by ACRIB, the communes and the trade unions, was offered to 
eighty unemployed young people aged between 15 and 22 years, and included 400 
hours of theoretical teaching and 2000 hour of practical apprenticeship. Students 
received a fellowship and were guaranteed employment in local firms at the end of 
the two-year course. The initiative was discontinued when Stra’ was cancelled from
390 Source: ACRIB’s archives. An Italian translation of other relevant passages follows:“All initiative 
undertaken in the above mentioned context should be co-ordinated in the context of the general 
objective to promote Brenta’s quality and reputation... It is also agreed that ... should enterprises 
experience severe difficulties to maintain the current levels of employment, the contracting parties 
shall explore solutions that, if compatible with the competitiveness end the economicity of the local 
production, will preserve both the local employment and the traditional skills of the local workforce, 
including through specific training courses to be undertaken in the context of the abovementioned 
scheme”.
252
the EC list of decling areas.391 As a consequence, the level of enrolments increased 
again and peaked at 182 students in 1990/91.392 The percentage of students coming 
from outside the district grew constantly over the same period, thus confirming some 
improvement in the quality of teaching. In 1982/83, 84 and 35 students came from 
the Venice and Padua provinces respectively, and can therefore be assumed to have 
had strong links with Brenta. This correspond to a percentage of 74.3% of the total 
number of students enrolled in that year (152). Fifteen years later, the proportion was 
reversed: Venice and Padua were represented by 44 and 32 students respectively, a 
percentage of 41.5% of the 183 enrolled students. Treviso (which includes the 
Montebelluna footwear district) had replaced Venice as the single largest provider of 
student already in 1992. The number of foreign students had also increased, from 
none in 1982 to 12 in 1996, although some of them came from former Yugoslavia in 
the context of some assistance initiatives sponsored by the Veneto region. Also the 
percentage of male and female students had significantly changed, with females 
being 15% in 1982 and just under 31% in 1997.
According to Mauro Tescaro, Director of the Polytechnic, the local 
availability of a reputable Training Centre, open to the outside world and capable of 
attracting students from other Italian regions and even from abroad, has a multi­
faceted positive influence on the local system, which offsets the risks of fostering the 
competitiveness of other Italian footwear districts.393 A confirmation of the relevance 
of the local shoe design is given by a Shoe Designers Association established in 
Brenta in the mid-1990s, which by the year 2000 included some thirty members (two 
of which were limited liability companies). Half of them resided in Brenta hard core,
391 Michela Vettore, Formazione e Innovazione..., quote., p. 109-10.
392 Ibid., p. 122.
393 Interview on 22th October 2004.
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others were based in the other Venetian footwear districts of Verona and 
Montebelluna.
Finally, on 13 April 1996, the School moved again to Capriccio di Vigonza, 
to the premises of a dismissed shoe factory which were maybe less prestigious but by 
far more suited to a training centre than an old patrician countryside residence. 
Again, the Centre was moved by a few hundred meters: due to the irrational 
administrative boundaries discussed in previous chapters, Capriccio di Vigonza is 
located within the Province of Padua, but in fact it is now completely integrated in 
Stra* and is within walking distance from Voltan’s.
The Footwear Polytechnic
In 2001, also the management of the School was again transferred, this time 
to the new “Footwear Polytechnic” established by ACRIB, Veneto Innovazione (a 
limited liability company controlled by the Veneto region), the consortium Venetian 
Footwear Centre, the Italian Footwear Association ANCI and a Venetian bank 
(Cassa di Risparmio di Venezia). An additional shareholder joined later (Veneta 
Servizi per l’lndustria, a private company). Besides providing some services (quality 
control, some research in footwear technology and computer-assisted production, at 
times in co-operation with the Department of Mechanical and Managerial 
Engineering of Padua University), the Polytechnic runs the Training Centre (now 
officially known as “Scuola per stilisti e tecnici calzaturieri”-School for Footwear 
designers and Technicians). The Polytechnic has established some co-operation with 
similar centre in Florence (POLEMODA) and in the Marches (SCAM in Civitanova), 
in an attempt to launch a “Network of excellence” in its field under the aegis of the 
National Footwear Association-ANCI. At the regional level, it has also launched a
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co-operation with similar institutions of the two other Venetian footwear districts, 
Montebelluna (Foundation “Museo dello Scarpone”) and Verona (FO.CA.VER.).
Even before the establishment of the Polytechnic, the Training Centre had 
participated in a number of EC initiatives. In particular, in 1997 it took part in the 
project “An open learning scheme for continuing training in enterprises submitted to 
individual changes” (id.n. 216171997) in the context of the Leonardo da Vinci 
European Union programme. The project aim at promoting a scheme of continuous 
education for small- and medium-sized enterprises through open distance learning 
and flexible self-development.
In 2004, the Polytechnic was run by a Managing Director, a Director, two 
support staff, four courses co-ordinators, with a core team of 37 part-time teachers 
(entrepreneurs and shoe designers).394
According to Elisabetta Berami, former seamstress and now part-time teacher 
in the Polytechnic, the Centre is successful in developing design capabilities and in 
promotion the use of computer assisted technologies, but has not been able yet to 
offer viable solutions to the problem of transmission of the specific knowledge of the 
traditional, highly specialised, manual phases of production. Alternative solutions are 
being studied in co-ordination by ACRIB and the Polytechnic, and include 
outsourcing to Southern Italy but also new attempts to train workers in some Eastern 
European countries.395
The Polytechnic also focuses on improvements in inter-firm co-ordination. In 
particular, it has launched a study in a possible new co-ordinated production process 
involving a number of component producers.396
394 Interview with Mauro Tescaro, Polytechnic Director, on 24th October 2004.
395 Interview with Elisabetta Berami, 24th October 2004.
306 . _ . j  • • •The components of high-quality (not middle- or low quality) shoes (in particular soles, heels and 
uppers) are traditionally produced in a pre-determined order, allowing final adjustments of each
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The reaching out of the Polytechnic and its interest in a growing number of 
issues has led also to a joint research promoted by the Polytechnic itself published in 
March 2004 and offering a comparative analysis of new professions needed in the
397three Venetian footwear districts.
Today, the Training Centre offers a two-year standard course (340 hours per 
year) including footwear projects, drawing, use of models, CAD techniques, 
informatics and English. An additional third year is also offered, with six 
specialisation paths including project management, two-dimensional CAD and 
three-dimensional CAD. A further year of specialisation especially focussed on 
design leads to the title of “style co-ordinator”. Teaching schedules are compatible 
with the working times of students (a “full immersion” of eight hours on Saturdays 
and three additional hours on another week day). School fees are in the region of 
€750 per year per student, with some contributions by public authorities and ACRIB 
itself. Some courses are tailored to some specific needs: a courses for disabled has 
been completed in December 2000 with 11 of the 12 participants having found 
employment in local enterprises.398
The continuity of the Centre is embodied in its staff. Mauro Tescaro, 
Director, has been with the School for over ten years; some teachers for even longer. 
It is the case in particular of one of the best known Brenta shoe designers, Vinicio 
Borgato, who attended the School at age of 15, was then assistant to some teachers 
and now has taught there for 39 years. In a conversation at the School in October
component to the other. The new production process studied by Brenta Polytechnic aims at 
simultaneous production of all components, with a reduction of production time in the order of 60%.
397 Nuove figure professionali, nuovi formatori e modelli formativi nel settore calzaturiero veneto, 
report available at the Polytechnic and established by the Brenta Polytechnic, ACRIB, Fondazione 
CUOA (a research and education centre of the Industrialists’ association), Fondazione Museo dello 
Scarpone (a provider of common services of Monebelluna industrial district), FO.CA.VER. (Verona 
footwear industrial district), the Venetian Industrialists’ association, the Industrialists’ Association of 
Treviso Province, the Industrialists’ Association of Verona province, the Veneto region, with the 
financial support of the European Social Fund (objective 3 Cl system actions), the Veneto region and 
the Italian Ministry of Labour.
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2004, he gave me a sort of first-hand overall recapitulation of the School teaching 
philosopy in the last decades. Until the mid-1970s, knowledge transmission was 
rather empirical, and it depended essentially on the personality of theachers and on 
their ability to transmit personal experiences to students. In the mid-1980s, syllabi 
became more formal and the overall objectives of the School clearer. In the last ten 
years or so, the incresingly narrow focus of teaching has been reverted and syllabi 
now include subjects as marketing and “semiotics” (i.e. interpretation of fashion 
trends). Borgato underlined to me that design training at the School should encourage 
the development of individual creativity and originality but above all take into 
account the real requests and trends of an increasingly competitive and hard 
international market.399
Local technological innovation
The Polytechnic also plays a role in local technological innovation. Recently, 
attention has been devoted in particular in the diffusion of the new three-dimensional 
computer-assisted technology. CAM-CAD two-dimensional computer technology is 
now widespread among interested Brenta enterprises. It is not yet so with the next 
generation of computer-assisted footwear technology, the production of 3-D plastic 
models (“prototopizzazione rapida”) of three-dimensional shoe components (such as 
soles and heels). These models are literally assembled, layer after layer, by machine 
tools steered by a computer which “translates” an image into a real plastic object. 
The model can be easily tested, modified, refined, until the result is considered 
satisfactory and used for “real” production. This process can lead to significant cost
398 Source: Footwer Polytechnic.
399 See also an interview with Michela Vettore, in Formazione e Innovazione..., quote, p. 134-38.
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reductions and quality improvements in particular through savings for the costly steel 
moulds.400
In general however Brenta remains cautious even vis-a-vis “soft”, 
comparatively low-cost new technologies, despite recent encouraging signals. 
Fiorenza Belussi has investigated the diffusion of Internet in three industrial districts 
in the North-eastern Italy, including Brenta. Asked for the reasons in the delay in 
adopting new technologies, entrepreneurs of her sample “... generally did not 
mention as obstacles the item of financial resource or the lack of competent 
personnel, but the scarce utility of the technology per se and the scarce 
appropriateness of these tools for the typical small-sized firm”. However, inter-firm 
co-operation plays a role even in this regard: over 21% of the Benta sample 
considered by Belussi has a collective web-site, so that the percentage of Web-lined 
Brenta firms reaches almost 80%. In general, Brenta firms score better in the use of 
electronic mail (over 92%), ISDN lines (64%), CAM-CAD (almost 58%). However, 
Enterprise Resources Planning and Electronic Data Interchange are virtually ignored. 
The first adoption of information technology by firms of the sample goes back to 
1975, but was followed by a stagnation of almost 17 years. A new wave of adoption 
of ICT technologies started in 1992, a real take-off began in 1995. “In those years, all 
types of entrepreneurs quite simultaneously ... give rise to the characteristic S shape 
curve of innovation diffusion studied in the literature”. 401
Brenta’s persistent caution is even more evident in “hard” technology, where 
its evolution has been at best incremental. The sewing machine Blake was patented 
in the USA in the early 1960s, but its use became quite common in Brenta in the 
1930s. Heels were of wood until the mid-1950s, when production of plastic heels
400 Source: interview with Mario Crosato, computer engineer and part-time teacher at the School, 24th 
October 2004.
401 Fiorenza Belussi, Industrial Districts: networks without technologies?..., quote., p. 8-15.
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began in Brenta’s small producers of components. The main technological 
innovation introduced by Voltan in the last years of the 19th century (machine tools 
to sow soles and uppers) remained in use until the early 1950s, when it became 
possible to glue soles and uppers together. Some year later, the widespread use of 
assembly lines in Brenta reduced production times. In the mid-1960s, driving belts of 
assembly lines were replaced by air pressure devices. Special ovens were introduced 
in the late 1960s, reducing drying up of shoes from twenty-four to three hours. Some 
new machine tools also greatly enhanced working conditions and security. In the 
previous chapter I have mentioned the dangerous French machine tool “toupit”, 
which was abandoned virtually everywhere by the late 1960s. “Ribattitrice 
meccanica ad anelli”, a sort of large mechanical hammer, very noisy and producing 
continuous vibrations, was replaced by new, silent machine tools in the mid-1980s. A 
number of operations are still performed manually, sometimes simply to reduce 
costs. Laser and water-jet cutting machines for the cutting of skins and hides are for 
instance are available from the mid-Nineties, but are expensive (between 100,000 
and 200,000 Euro). In some other cases, manual operations still ensure a better 
quality (for instance polishing).402
Conclusion
The Brenta School has generated its own small “myth” as the first footwear 
vocational centre in Italy. What was really established in 1923 was rather a modest 
all-purpose Sunday school. However, it survived over the decades also in trying 
circumstances, specialised successfully in footwear-related teaching in the 1950s, 
attracted increasing attention by Brenta and Veneto collective actors from the mid-
402 Ettore Bolisani, Giorgio Gottardi and Enrico Scarso, Trasferimento di tecnologie in un settore 
maturo-Dal technology assessment alio sviluppo di tecnologie appropriate. Esperienze nelVindustria 
calzaturiera veneta, Padova 1991.; Michela Vettore, Formazione e Innovazione..., quote., p. 237-50.
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1980s, and now attracts more students from other regions of Italy than from Brenta 
itself.
The Training Centre has become the most successful provider of common 
services of the Brenta industrial district, the one which is closest to the idealised 
Italianate model. Commitment over the year to footwear training has been coupled 
with enough flexibility in the duration of courses, syllabi, teaching techniques; in the 
management of the School (which was transferred in a number of occasion from one 
to another of Brenta’s organisations); in the role it played as an object of negotiations 
in the complex interaction between entrepreneurs, local governments and trade 
unions.
In recent years, the growing number of students form other Italian regions 
(some even from abroad) and the management by the new Footwear Polytechnic 
(some stakeholders of which are not located in Brenta) indicate that the School can 
now reach out of its purely local dimension.However, in a highly integrated 
industrial district such as Brenta, skills remain multi-faceted, often tacit, 
idiosyncratic and affect the whole spectrum of social and economic life. Thus, the 
transmission of formalised teaching provided by a specific vocational centre can only 
play a supporting role, but can in no manner replace traditional channels such as the 
leaming-by-doing process either in the family or in the factory. A training centre 
however can be effective if the resources available are clearly and specifically 
targeted at reasonable, attainable goals such as the transmission and enhancement of 
specific formal skills which give an added value to local production. In this 
perspective, the School has been particularly successfully in further specialising (at 
the expense of all other footwear-related teaching) in shoe design, which has been for 
a number of years both essential to the Riviera production and scarcely transmissible 
through the factory routine.
260
This evolution occurred more as the consequence of exogenous elements, 
than as the result of rational planning. It was forced by the repositioning in the 
middle-to-high quality market segment of the early 1970s in response to increased 
competition from emerging countries and by the consequent search for new 
competitive advantages in better product quality. Nevertheless, results were 
significant. The School played a useful role in fostering the district’s design 
capabilities and contributed to the increase in the number of Brenta design 
enterprises. This in turn has enhanced the advantages associated with co-location and 
reduced transaction costs also in this specific field.403 Even import of design enhance 
transaction costs (although less than the import of goods which have to be physically 
transported), to the extent that many networks of small and medium-sized enterprises 
simply do not even consider taking up the costs even when their type of production is 
potentially suited to higher design contents. In these particular cases, the possible 
competitive advantage turns into bottlenecks to further development.404 This trap was 
avoided in the Brenta: the School’s specialisation in design, as well as the subsequent 
broadening of design-related courses, is an example of a challenge arising from 
evolutions in the footwear sector which have been resolved successfully.
The Training Centre has also played a role in enhancing the reputation of the 
footwear district as a whole and therefore of the footwear-related professions, not 
least through its “myth” as one of the first European footwear educational 
institutions. In doing so, it has offered some response to Kristensen’s paradox that in 
the long run successful initiatives in the field of training and education can be 
counterproductive, since their success can lead to an increased tendency for young
403 Other Italian districts rely on outside design supply. This is the case in particular of Sassuolo 
ceramic tiles, even if the importance of their design content is second only to their physical qualities.
404 In the furniture area of Livenza (north-east of Venice), production is based on imitation. The 
ensuing limited attention to design in the local professional education is in turn an obstacle to the 
development of higher design contents for the local furniture production.
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people to abandon the sector, if only they can find alternative, non-manual jobs. 
The response provided by the School is the search for a constant upgrading of 
footwear-related professions (many of which are now non-manual), in the context 
also of the intellectual appeal (and to some extent also mediatic impact) of the 
industrial district concept, of which Brenta takes pride in being a “perfect” 
embodiment.
Some writers now observe that the sustainability of the School’s 
specialisation in design is threatened by the possible Brenta production downgrading 
in the global value chain, with its firms increasingly receiving specific and detailed 
orders by large buyers (Italian and international) and therefore progressively loosing 
their independence in the creation and choice of design. Again, the School’s response 
is provided by the increased number of students coming from outside the district, 
while the total number of enrolments remain approximately constant. This 
development indicates that the future of the School is not mechanically 
predetermined by the destiny of the Brenta district as such. At the same time, the 
synergies of the School with the activities carried out by the technological sections of 
the Footwear Polytechnic have opened up new opportunities for collective action in 
the field of technology diffusion, in particular soft technologies (computer-assisted 
production and communications), in which Brenta still has ample space for 
improvement.
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TABLE XXXV 
THE BRENTA TRAINING CENTRE 
ENROLMENTS IN INTERWAR YEARS
YEARS ENROLMENTS
1923/24 32
1924/25 40
1925/26 56
1926/27 60
1927/28 65
1928/29 76
1929/30 77
1930/31 79
1931/32 66
1932/33 81
1933/34 67
1934/35 91
1935/36 94
1936/37 90
1937/38 122
1938/39 140
1939/40 135
1940/41 128
1941/42 150
1942/43 140
Source: Michela Vettore, Formazione e Innovazione nel Distretto Calzaturiero 
del Brenta (1923-1997), graduation thesis, Venice University, 1997
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TABLE XXXVI 
THE BRENTA TRAINING CENTRE 
ENROLMENTS FROM 1946 
TO THE CRISIS IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES
YEARS ENROLMENTS
1946/47 110
1947/48 154
1948/49 156
1949/50 165
1950/51 172
1951/52 190
1952753 243
1953/54 252
1954/55 260
1955/56 264
1956/57 270
1957/58 292
1958/59 312
1959/60 283
1960/61 226
1961/62 234
1962/63 197
1963/64 154
1964/65 112
1965/66 79
1966/67 83
1967/68 87
1968/69 107
1969/70 97
1970/71 44
1971/72 30
1972/73 29
Source: Michela Vettore, Formazione e Innovazione nel Distretto Calzaturiero 
del Brenta (1923-1997), graduation thesis, Venice University, 1997
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TABLE XXXVII 
THE BRENTA TRAINING CENTRE 
ENROLMENTS FROM THE EARLY 1970s 
TO THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE MID-1990S
YEARS ENROLMENTS
1973/74 34
1974/75 48
1975/76 79
1976/77 114
1977/78 142
1978/79 135
1979/80 140
1980/81 147
1981/82 146
1982/83 144
1983/84 146
1984/85 118
1985/86 151
1986/87 149
1987/88 148
1988/89 150
1989/90 162
1990/91 184
1991/92 176
1992/93 162
1993/94 110
1994/95 136
1995/96 155
1996/97 183
Source: Michela Vettore, Formazione e Innovazione nel Distretto Calzaturiero del 
Brenta (1923-1997), graduation thesis, Venice University, 1997
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TABLE XXX V m  
THE BRENTA TRAINING CENTRE 
GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN OF STUDENTS
Year district students District/total 
students %
1982/83 119 78.3
1983/84 116 79.4
1984/85 73 61.9
1985/86 104 68.9
1986/87 94 63.1
1987/88 92 62.2
1988/89 91 60.2
1989/90 92 56.8
1990/91 110 59.8
1991/92 102 54.8
1992/93 71 43.8
1993/94 45 40.9
1994/95 60 44.1
1995/96 59 38.1
1996/97 76 41.6
District students : number of enrolled students coming from the Provinces of Padua 
and Venice
% district students: percentage of district students on total enrolled students
Source: personal elaboration on data provided by Michela Vettore, Formazione e 
Innovazione nel Distretto Calzaturiero del Brenta (1923-1997), graduation thesis, 
Venice University, 1997
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CONCLUSION
Possibly the best description for the nascent Brenta industrial district has been 
provided not by economists or historians, but by Aldous Huxley in his short tale The 
Little Mexican.*05 It is the story of an art merchant who tries to sell a precious 
painting at Dolo in the early 1920s — a time of growing political violence prompted 
by the traumatic legacy of the First World War and by the emerging Fascism, against 
the background of growing social unrest in the few small factories in the villages 
scattered along the banks of the river. The story conveys a vivid picture of a number 
of aspects analysed in this thesis: the specific semi-urban, semi-rural environment in 
Brenta; the presence of a pool of skilled workers and of able entrepreneurs; cut-throat 
competition among local social actors; the uneasy yet continuous interaction between 
the political power and entrepreneurs; local traditions, deeply rooted in social 
attitudes, which have been instrumental in shaping the development paths of the area; 
the strong ideological competition within Brenta itself, which did not prevent its 
economic take-off but which predetermined its forms, for instance in excluding the 
local Catholic Church from footwear-related initiatives in education and training and, 
more generally, in shaping the specific blend of conservatism and flexibility in the 
area. In short, Huxley’s story about Brenta points to a number of elements which are 
crucial to the ongoing reassessment of the industrial district model and the shift from 
its strong version (the “automatic induction” into a cohesive district-wide social 
economy) to a weaker assumption (self-interested reciprocity as the only necessary 
product of spatial proximity).
405 Aldous Huxley, The Little Mexican and other stories, London 1924.
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The amount of the literature on industrial districts is impressive. However, 
Brenta demonstrates that there is still scope for additional research on case studies. 
Research is needed especially on those “non-canonical” Italian industrial districts 
recalled by Paniccia, which are very significant even in the “Third Italy” but have 
been comparatively neglected by the literature, which instead has concentrated on 
those that best fit the stylised model.
Additional research is also needed in “mature” sectors. It is precisely the 
footwear industry that demonstrates that even these sectors can be quite sophisticated 
in such aspects as brand, marketing, co-ordination of outsourcing, and participating 
in a value chain which is increasingly global and in which the strength of competitors 
also depends on their capability to place themselves in the most profitable segments. 
The footwear industry demonstrates that even “mature” sectors can benefit 
significantly from economies of scale and that therefore footwear enterprises are not 
intrinsically doomed to be small- or medium-sized firms. There are no impermeable 
borders between large- and small-scale production, as Camevali has demonstrated 
for Birmingham or, inversely, as Porter and Ranieri recall for the steel industry. In its 
early stages, Brenta was able to succeed not because it was continuing a time- 
honoured handicraft tradition a la Sabel and Piore, but because it introduced some 
elements of Fordism (including mechanisation) into a rural, comparatively backward 
environment. My research into Voltan’s archives conveys the picture of an enterprise 
which, in the unfavourable local, national and international environment of the 
1930s, enjoyed a comparatively high degree of organisational complexity, a 
significant number of workers and a place in a growing network of suppliers and 
customers.
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Over the last few years, Brenta has attracted some interest on the part of 
writers. And yet, “objective” research is still made difficult by some persistent local 
myths such as the US experience of Giovanni Luigi Voltan and Brenta’s direct links 
with the handicraft tradition of Venice. Assessments still vary widely on crucial 
issues such as the birth and take-off of the district in the 1950s and the growing 
outsourcing of the 1970s. Such areas as unionisation, undeclared work, the social 
costs of the local industrialisation, relations with the neighbouring heavily industrial 
area of Marghera and the lack of a unified political culture have not yet been 
properly addressed. I have considered these aspects from the perspective of the 
double triangle with the interaction among the most significant Brenta actors 
(entrepreneurs, workers and political authorities) on the one side, and with their 
respective formal organisations (entrepreneurial associations, trade unions and 
political parties) on the other. The picture which emerges from my research is that of 
a conservative yet resilient cluster of firms, led by a comparatively small group of 
capable entrepreneurs who take pride in what they can do best (“pure” production) 
and who are less interested in other footwear-related areas. These local entrepreneurs 
have been able to seize the few locally available competitive advantages (including 
skilled workers and a local culture which fostered mutual trust) and, over time, also 
developed significant co-operation skills along some of the lines described in the 
idealised Italianate industrial district model. Local co-operation was driven not by 
any common commitment to any collective mission or by a sense of belonging to a 
common culture, but by a handful of persons (not all of them entrepreneurs) who 
pursued their own objectives and, in so doing, experienced periods of conflict as well 
as of sectoral coalitions of interest. The general trends in the Italian economy have 
always played a crucial role and must be carefully considered in order to assess 
properly what were truly local responses and what were rather local forms or
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variations of national and international developments. This is particularly the case for 
the early steps of the local industry at the beginning of the 20th century, which was 
not endogenous but took place in the favourable environment of the early Italian 
industrial take-off. Likewise the cases for the export-driven take-off of the Brenta 
industrial district in the 1950s, which was favoured by the progressive dismantling of 
trade barriers within Europe, and for the economic recovery of the 1990s, again 
prompted by the devaluation of the Italian national currency.
In light of the above, Brenta confirms “the power of the past” recalled by 
Dritsas and Gourvish, embodied in a sort of path-dependent development covering 
not only economic but also political and social arrangements which modify in turn 
not only its organisational and technological level but also the mentality and the 
institutions of its entrepreneurs. At the same time, Brenta confirms the extent to 
which the recent shift in the literature was needed -- from the Italianate “social 
embeddedness perspective” a la Piore, Sabel and Best to the more specifically 
economic aspects of local systems emphasised by Popp, Camevali, Wilson, Raines 
and Melling. In the economic context, entrepreneurs are the key actors, and ultimate 
responsibility for success or failure depends on them. The social and cultural context 
and other actors, both individual and collective, play a useful supporting role, which 
is usually proportional to what Putnam terms “the local civic capital” and which is 
strongest in the core area of the Third Italy, Emilia-Romagna (but not so strong in 
Veneto, including Brenta). The growing need for a reassessment of the Italianate 
version of the industrial district is also widespread among Italian writers. Colli for 
instance has introduced the notion of “black box” to define the relationships between 
the economic actors in the districts, explained vaguely in terms of “cultural 
homogeneity”, local values, local ideologies, political beliefs, and so on.
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In turn, putting into perspective the Italianate model as a sort of noble 
embodiment of the industrial district concept also encourages a reconsideration of 
past experiences in other countries where industrial districts have indeed played a 
significant role in economic development, including those with a long history of 
large-scale industrialisation. Quite paradoxically, the concept of the industrial district 
was elaborated in Britain on the basis of long empirical research into local economic 
realities, but it has long been overshadowed by a Chandlerian perspective of growth 
dependent solely on the fortunes of large integrated firms.
Brenta’s case also confirms, however, that the industrial district model 
remains a powerful analytical tool. The crucial role played by the Italian industrial 
districts in reviving and updating Marshall’s industrial district model is also 
unquestionable, despite the growing awareness of the rather obvious fact that 
industrial districts unfortunately are not necessarily all successful, innovative and 
flexible. The industrial district model, as all models, implies some degree of 
simplification and a focus on certain elements at the expense of others in order to 
allow for a comprehension of the general functioning of the observed reality and to 
formulate predictions about future trends. A “perfect” industrial district, fully 
corresponding to the ideal model, does not exist. All comparisons between a given 
district and a given model, quite predictably, have resulted in a list of aspects in 
which reality falls short of ideal. In the case of the Third Italy, however, after more 
than three decades of contributions, debates and discussions, industrial districts have 
also become more than a mere model.
First, they have become a modality of self-perception by local clusters of 
small- and medium-sized enterprises. Observation is rarely neutral and tends to 
modify the realities observed: this is true for the natural as well as human sciences.
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Persistent attention to the added value of inter-firm co-operation, self-help 
organisations, local cultures and traditions, collective local identities, synergies 
within a given area, and even direct political and financial incentives have led the 
actors operating within a district to act along the lines of the industrial district model 
in many respects. This happened in Brenta, although the term “industrial district” 
was never used by local economic actors until the early 1990s and Brenta itself was 
seldom listed among Italian districts.
Second, industrial districts have also become a legal concept in Italy. 
Incentives have been foreseen for individual districts, the borders of which are 
defined on the basis of some (vague and flexible) criteria established by the law. 
Incentives are granted to both individual enterprises and collective local 
organisations. In practice, the Italian legislation encourages local clusters to present 
themselves as industrial districts and, in some cases, to act accordingly. The Veneto 
region, and Brenta within it, is particularly active in this regard.
Finally, industrial districts have also become a tool of Italian foreign policy. 
In particular in this respect, the Italian government has launched several initiatives to 
assist the establishment of industrial districts in countries such as Croatia, Tunisia 
and Romania and has strengthened the dialogue with district organisations in this 
regard, including with organisations in Brenta.
The ongoing debate on the virtues and vices of the industrial district model 
(made stronger by the declining performances of “real” industrial districts in Italy as 
well as in a number of other countries including Germany) has determined a shift in 
attention from their positive to their less positive aspects. This is clearly mirrored 
even in the specialised literature available on the Riviera. The overly optimistic 
image common in the 1970s and 1980s has been increasingly replaced by predictions
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of a slow, dignified, glorious but almost inevitable decline (unless a thorough 
restructuring of the whole system is undertaken, which is quite unlikely to happen). 
Two parallel and related risks must therefore be avoided. The first is a consequence 
of the “optimistic” vision so common in the 1980s: the temptation to look for some 
intrinsic rationality in Brenta* s history, some sort of objective-oriented evolution 
towards a more or less accomplished “ideal district”. Far from being a sort of 
conscious progression towards a well-defined objective, the history of Brenta (and of 
other districts) has been a continuous trial-and-error process. A number of possible 
options were explored and then adopted or, when necessary, abandoned (as was the 
case with some attempts to increase firm size in the 1970s, the launch of a collective 
brand in the 1980s and outsourcing in the 1990s). The second related risk is a 
consequence of the new, “pessimistic” vision: Brenta’s economic history as a mere 
sequence of uncoordinated, individual reactions by single firms to external events, 
with little attention paid to the added value derived from inter-firm and social co­
operation and to the unquestionably path-dependent development. I rather suggest 
that we consider Brenta’s history in the light of what I define“innovative 
conservatism”, where developments have been incremental rather than “quantum 
leaps”. Brenta’s strategy over half a century was of a mixture of resistance to change 
and deep commitment to the existing structures on the one hand, careful exploitation 
of all possible flexibility intrinsic to its products on the other. Brenta’s entrepreneurs 
were narrowly focussed on “pure” production, albeit they were well aware of the 
flexibility intrinsic to the existing firms sizes, employment and district governance. 
Brenta’s attitude therefore was not simple inertia or blind refusal to consider 
novelties, but rather a specific balance between opposite forces. This loyalty to 
“innovative conservatism” has been successful and has proved that viable districts 
are not necessarily always highly flexible. Brenta also proves that conservatism does
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not necessarily hinder the development of a number of key features of the ideal- 
typical industrial district, in particular the embodiment of districts’ collective identity 
in self-help institutions, increasingly efficient interaction with political and 
administrative national and local authorities, co-operation with trade unions well 
beyond the traditional area of working contracts.
A narrow focus on some core functions has also reaped specific benefits in terms of 
increased specialisation of local workers. In turn, this hyper-specialisation has further 
refined the smooth functioning of local networks and local formal institutions, which 
have been able to build upon previous experiences undisturbed by the strain of 
adjustment to innovation. Brenta*s hyper-specialisation has strengthened its 
competitive advantage in a small niche of the global value chain and ensured its 
survival (so far) in the current new context in which high-level functions are 
increasingly detached from “pure” manufacturing.
My sectoral analyses of the four key areas of formal self-help organisations, 
unionisation, the role of politics and training confirm the main concepts highlighted 
above.
The local entrepreneurial umbrella organisation ACRIB and its daughter 
organisations are often considered quite effective. However, this was the result of a 
slow, gradual development. Despite concrete results obtained in specific areas (the 
Stra’ Trade Fair in the 1950s, collective bargaining with trade unions in the 1960s), 
local entrepreneurs considered collective services as comparatively secondary in 
importance, with the possible exception of joint participation in trade fairs by 
“difficult” countries. Despite their increasing membership, local entrepreneurs* 
associations were considered a “club” for the largest enterprises until the mid-1980s, 
providing little or no incentives for the small firms to participate and fully “play the 
game” of horizontal co-operation also through the associations themselves. Many
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enterprises reluctantly considered participation as a sort of necessary evil to avoid the 
ultimate punishment in an industrial district: isolation. Again the comparative 
success for Brenta’s formal institutions was also due to the personal commitment of a 
handful of leading personalities.
Consequently, Brenta confirms the results of some other case studies: 
efficient formal horizontal inter-firm co-operation through self-help organisations, 
supported by public authorities and enjoying the confidence of entrepreneurs who 
actively contribute to its functioning. This is often an idealised model rather than an 
accurate description of reality, even in the “Third Italy”. The slow, progressive and at 
times idiosyncratic development of Brenta’s formal institutions since 1923 confirms 
that industrial districts can indeed take off and develop independent of efficient, even 
invasive formal organisations. Such organisations tend to appear in the later stages of 
the industrial districts’ development.
Brenta also indicates on the one hand that a large part of the inter-firm co­
operation (in itself one of the key features of industrial districts) can take place 
independent of the formal organisations, and on the other hand that the maximum 
collective efficiency of the formal institutions is reached in the pursuit of well- 
defined, specific and limited objectives. In turn, however, successful formal 
institutions with limited objectives can easily take on additional tasks and even, to 
some extent, influence entrepreneurs’ attitudes and ease their resistance to further 
integration.
My research into the ISTAT archives demonstrates that Brenta was 
permanently split between two almost equally powerful political cultures: Christian- 
Democratic and Socialist-Communist. Research also indicates that local authorities 
and political patronage played a comparatively limited role in Brenta, which was
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overshadowed for several decades by the huge political interest in the heavy, mostly 
publicly-owned industry of nearby Marghera. This runs contrary to some central 
aspects of the established Italianate model of the industrial district, in which one 
should find a predominance of a particular political tradition, established since the 
late 19th century. In the established model, this predominance translates into a 
number of specific local institutions through which politics performs a central 
mediation role and therefore ensures the social stability necessary for “harmonious” 
economic development.
The classical distinction between the interventionism of the Communist 
communes and the laissez-faire policy of the Christian Democrats communes tended 
to blur in Brenta and did not affect to any particular extent the location or 
performance of firms in a Christian-Democratic versus a Communist commune.
The weakness of local authorities in itself is not necessarily mirrored in a 
corresponding weakness of local political cultures. On the contrary, the latter can 
play a significant role informally, outside the official decision-taking process, 
ensuring an effective mediation of interests. However, three specific factors 
weakened significantly the linkage between Brenta’s local firm system and a specific 
local political subculture: 1) the exogenous influence of the large, integrated firms of 
Marghera, especially on unionism in Brenta; 2) the significant number of commuters 
from the Riviera to Marghera and at the same time to the Riviera from backwards 
areas in the southern parts of the provinces of Padua and Venice, who participated in 
the economic development but not to the same extent in the social and political life 
of the district;; 3) a significant number of domestic workers who again did play a 
relevant part in the production process but were not integrated into the local social 
and political environment. Far from being a geographically circumscribed area fixed 
by nature and historical heritage, a la Becattini, Brenta appears to be an open system,
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permeable to outside influences. The decline of the mass-based political parties 
coincided chronologically with Brenta’s growing self-awareness as an industrial 
district and with an increased capability for entering into a collective dialogue with 
local (and subsequently even national) authorities, who in turn have abandoned their 
traditional “benign neglect”. The new national and regional laws on industrial 
districts on the one hand, and the agreements signed with the entrepreneurs* 
association on the other hand, currently cover all the main areas in which policy can 
realistically expect to influence the clusters’ development.
My research also underlines that Brenta has a long, vibrant history of 
unionism and of entrepreneurs-workers relations, although mainly limited to the 
largest enterprises. This runs contrary to the traditional image of areas of small firms, 
which are characterised by weak trade unions and poorly institutionalised industrial 
relations. Brenta helps put into perspective the traditional image of harmonious 
relations between workers and entrepreneurs. Local labour conflicts were indeed part 
of the landscape, with Marghera playing a role as a sort of incubator for labour 
discontent. At the same time, Brenta’s case also puts into perspective the opposite 
image, of the birth of a cluster of industries based on the remorseless exploitation of 
a docile and abundant workforce with ample recourse to informal work, an image so 
dear to some post-Fordists who see in industrial districts and flexible specialisation 
simply a slightly different way of continuing the exploitation of the weakest 
categories of workers. The overall picture is more complex and includes in particular 
the fracture between small firms and artisan workshops, in which exploitation and 
self-exploitation were put into check not by unions as such but mainly by family 
links and informal social rules, and “large” factories where unionisation already took 
off in the early 1950s. Brenta’s workers were always comparatively educated and
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skilled: in the inter-war period, the training for an apprentice lasted three years. 
Trade unions therefore found a favourable social environment and could tap into a 
developed association network, which could partially offset both the dispersion of 
workers over a comparatively large territory and the small size of most of the 
factories.
This, together with the reluctance of the Catholic Church to become directly 
or indirectly involved in the Brenta industrial district, explains why local trade union 
campaigns resemble those most frequently found in the “red areas” of the Third Italy, 
in particular with a comparatively frequent recourse to strike rather than search for a 
compromise or seek mediation, and repeated attempts to enlarge the scope of 
negotiations to areas such as firm organisation, training and employment.
Rising unionism in Brenta was the catalyst for a phase of intense inter- 
institutional competition. This was prompted by the almost simultaneous 
establishment of the first local footwear workers trade union in 1958 and the 
entrepreneurs’ association in 1961. In the subsequent years, the growth of both 
organisations depended on their perceived effectiveness, which in turn depended on 
the resilience demonstrated during negotiations. In this respect, the development of 
institutions representing employers and employees in Brenta was originally based on 
tough competition, rather than on the co-operation so pivotal in the stylised model. 
Co-operation ensued only at a later stage, when the perceived respective interests 
converged to a significant extent. Even this new phase therefore was ushered in by 
contingent developments and was not directly determined by the common 
participation of entrepreneurs and workers in a community of individuals and a 
population of individual enterprises a la Becattini. In this respect, Brenta is far 
removed from the classical picture conveyed by Trigilia and others of a mediator role 
effectively being played by the mass-based political parties, and this in turn leading
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to a reduction in labour conflicts. A key determinant of this evolution was rather the 
shift towards higher market segments, which reduced the relevance of wages in total 
production costs. With the ensuing fewer incentives to use undeclared work, the fight 
against irregular employment ceased to be one of the key issues negotiated by 
entrepreneurs and trade unions. Attention progressively shifted towards other issues, 
in particular the defence of existing employment levels together with broader 
industrial policies, including training and environment. At first glance, this transition 
from a competitive to a co-operative model for industrial relations seems to have 
brought Brenta more in line with the Italianate model for the industrial district. 
Nevertheless, a number of unresolved issues remain. Domestic workers in particular 
are still often at a disadvantage even if their numbers decrease and their replacement 
is made increasingly difficult. It also remains to be seen whether the current balance 
would enable Brenta to escape instability in the case of major external challenges, as 
has been the case in the past.
Some useful insight into Brenta’s history finally can be obtained through an 
analysis of its footwear school. The school has generated its own small “myth” as the 
first footwear vocational centre in Italy. What was really established in 1923 instead 
was a modest all-purpose Sunday school. The school has survived through the 
decades also under trying circumstances, specialised successfully in footwear-related 
teaching in the 1950s, attracted increasing attention on the part of collective actors 
from Brenta and Veneto from the mid-1980s, and now attracts more students from 
other regions of Italy than from Brenta itself.
The training centre has become the most successful provider of common 
services to the Brenta industrial district and the closest to the idealised Italianate 
model. A commitment over the years to one type of training has been coupled with
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enough flexibility in the duration of the courses, syllabi and teaching techniques; in 
the management of the school (which was transferred on a number of occasions from 
one Brenta organisation to another); and in the role it played as the object of 
negotiations in the complex interaction between entrepreneurs, local governments 
and trade unions.
In recent years, the growing number of students from other Italian regions 
(some even from abroad) and its management by the new Footwear Polytechnic (a 
number of stakeholders of which are not based in Brenta) indicate that the school has 
now achieved a significant capability for stretching beyond its purely local 
dimension. The training centre has also played a role in enhancing the reputation of 
the footwear district as a whole and therefore of footwear-related professions, not 
least thanks to its “myth” as one of the first European educational institutions for the 
footwear branch. In so doing, it has offered a response to Kristensen’s paradox that 
in the long run successful initiatives in the field of training and education can be 
counterproductive, since their success can lead to an increased tendency for young 
people to abandon the sector when they find alternative, non-manual jobs. The 
response provided by the school is to search for a constant upgrading for footwear- 
related professions (many of which are now non-manual), also within the context of 
an intellectual appeal (and to some extent also a mediatic impact) for the industrial 
district concept, for which Brenta takes pride in being a virtually “perfect” 
embodiment.
Once more, this underlines the evolution of the industrial district concept (be 
it “Italianate” or “neo-Marshallian”) as it has been experienced in Brenta: from a 
purely theoretical analytical tool to a concrete organisational model, which is worth 
considering in view of the very real benefits it can provide.
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